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ABSTRACT	
	
This	dissertation	maps	the	role	of	testimonial	injustice	in	education	and	the	role	of	
pedagogy	in	addressing	knowledge	injustices.	Drawing	from	the	disciplinary	positions	of	
philosophy	of	education	and	social	justice	education,	this	dissertation	provides	an	analysis	
of	student	academic	work	to	explore	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy.	Specifically,	this	
dissertation	investigates	if	and	how	the	educational	practice	of	intergroup	dialogue	
pedagogy	can	facilitate	epistemic	justice.	This	analysis	combines	philosophical	inquiry	and	
document	analysis	to	describe	the	ways	in	which	practices	of	learning	are	related	to	social	
identifications.	Finally,	this	dissertation	offers	applications	of	this	theoretical	analysis	of	
epistemic	justice	for	education	practice	and	research.		
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Chapter	1	
Introduction	
	
I	lack	imagination	you	say	
	
No.	I	lack	language.	
The	language	to	clarify	
My	resistance	to	the	literate.	
Words	are	a	war	to	me.	
They	threaten	my	family.	
	
To	gain	the	word	
To	describe	the	loss	
I	risk	losing	everything.	
I	may	create	a	monster	
The	word’s	length	and	body	
Swelling	up	colorful	and	thrilling	
Looming	over	my	mother,	characterized.	
Her	voice	in	the	distance	
Unintelligible	illiterate.	
These	are	the	monster’s	words.	
-Cherrie	Moraga		
	
Anzaldúa	(1981)	quotes	Moraga’s	unpublished	poem	while	writing	about	her	own	
experience	in	educational	settings	as	a	woman	of	color,	particularly	as	it	relates	to	writing	
and	the	act	of	putting	language	to	experience.	In	her	poem,	Moraga	writes	of	the	pain	of	
language	exclusion	in	schools,	forced	to	write	in	English	and	to	give	up	her	native	tongue	in	
order	to	be	considered	literate	and	able	to	communicate.	Writing	in	English	is	a	betrayal	of	
both	her	mother	tongue	and	of	her	mother,	both	of	which	are	literate—have	meaning	and	
intrinsic	value—but	not	considered	so	by	the	dominant	knowledge	and	educational	
framework.	Gaining	English	means	gaining	the	ability	to	be	perceived	as	intelligible	while	
possibly	giving	up	connection	to	her	identity	and	culture.	Language,	or	rather	intelligibility,	
is	both	an	internal	war	and	an	act	of	war;	it	can	be	used	as	a	weapon	of	forced	domination	
or,	inversely,	as	a	tool	of	resistance	to	a	monstrous	knowledge	system	that	refuses	to	be	
	 	
	 	
2 
inclusive.	Anzaldúa	extends	from	the	poem	to	reflecting	on	her	own	experiences	writing,	
“white	eyes	do	not	want	to	know	us…The	schools	we	attended	or	didn’t	attend	did	not	give	
us	the	skills	for	writing	nor	the	confidence	that	we	were	correct	in	using	our	class	and	
ethnic	languages”	(1981,	p.	165).	Anzaldúa	describes	that	public	schooling	in	the	United	
States	context	was	made	for	and	by	“white	eyes”	that	neither	built	on	or	from	the	
knowledges	of	students	of	color	nor	did	it	permit	these	knowledges	in	the	classroom.	
White1	eyes	exclude	not	only	language,	but	(and	partly	by	extension)	also	the	cultures,	
identities	and	experiences	of	students	of	color.	
More	than	thirty	years	later,	Sonia	Nieto	also	discussed	the	power	of	language	
identity	and	inclusion	in	education.	Delivering	a	commissioned	essay	at	the	American	
Educational	Research	Association’s	annual	meeting,	Nieto	(2012)	observed:	
		 In	spite	of	widespread	rejection	of	bilingualism	and	bilingual	education,	research	
	 over	the	past	several	decades	could	not	be	clearer:	bilingualism	benefits	not	only	
	 individuals	but	also	the	nation.	Likewise,	bilingual	education,	when	done	well,	has	
	 proven	to	be	the	most	effective	way	to	educate	students	for	whom	English	is	an	
	 additional	language”	(para.	3).	
Nieto	echoes	Moraga	and	Anzaldúa’s	concern	and	criticism	of	mainstream	educational	
practices	that	exclude	and	demean	native	language	practices.	Additionally,	Nieto	(2012)	
cites	numerous	empirical	studies	in	education	that	support	bilingual	education	(Adesope	et	
al.,	2010;	Kovacs	&	Mehler,	2009;	Portes	&	Rumbaut,	2006).	Nieto	shares	studies	that	found	
students	from	across	immigrant	backgrounds	with	limited	bilingualism	were	much	more	
likely	to	leave	school	than	those	who	were	fluent	in	English	and	their	primary	language(s).	
Nieto	cites	studies	additionally	showing	that	youth	who	maintain	their	ethnic	ties	instead	
	 	
	 	
3 
of	being	forced	into	assimilation	experience	fewer	problems	adjusting	(including	fewer	
mental	health	problems).	In	her	essay,	Nieto	not	only	concludes	that	bilingualism	and	
biculturalism	promote	learning	instead	of	impeding	academic	achievement,	but,	
additionally,	for	educators,	these	research	findings	come	with	a	responsibility.	Nieto	
(2012)	asserted:	
	 For	educational	researchers,	it	[these	findings]	suggests	that	those	who	possess,	
	 create,	and	disseminate	knowledge	must	challenge	mainstream	knowledge	and	
	 conventional	wisdom	that	jeopardizes	those	students	least	well	served	by	our	
	 educational	system”	(para.	8).		
In	other	words,	Nieto	(2012)	points	out	that	is	not	simply	enough	for	educators	to	know	
that	(1)	Eliminating	native	language	learning	and	cultural	practices,	although	the	norm,	is	
harmful	and	that	(2)	Incorporating	and	building	from	linguistic	and	cultural	knowledges	
has	positive	educational	and	larger	life	outcomes.	Rather,	because	educational	researchers	
know	these	two	things,	they	“must”	use	this	knowledge	to	challenge	mainstream	practices	
and	policies	that	harm	marginalized	students.	Her	concluding	remark	in	this	invited	essay	
is:	“it	is	the	responsibility	of	researchers	to	hold	up	what	we	know	to	be	true”	(Nieto,	2012,	
para.	8).	
Objectives	of	this	Dissertation	
This	dissertation	walks	in	the	spirit	of	Nieto’s	call	to	educational	researchers.	
Specifically,	this	dissertation	argues	that	educational	institutions	and	systems	maintain	and	
reproduce	knowledge	injustices	experienced	by	students	with	marginalized	social	
identities.	Because	educational	institutions	maintain	and	reproduce	inequalities	in	
knowledge	practices,	they	have	an	ethical	responsibility	to	address	knowledge	injustices	
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rooted	in	social	identity(ies),	or	epistemic	injustice.	Addressing	epistemic	injustice	should	
be	a	goal	in	and	of	itself,	not	a	secondary	objective	or	byproduct	of	educational	research,	
policy	and	practice.	By	epistemic	injustice,	I	refer	broadly	to	the	knowledge	harms	done	to	
students	with	non-dominant	social	identities	based	on	or	because	of	these	identities	within	
the	scope	of	dominant	knowledge	practices	and	frameworks	(Fricker,	2007;	Dotson,	2012;	
Pohlhaus,	2012;	Medina,	2013).	Chapter	two	of	this	dissertation	describes	epistemic	
injustice	and	justice	in	detail.	Summarily,	epistemic	injustice	is	the	harm	done	to	
individuals	or	groups	with	non-dominant	social	identity(ies)	in	their	capacity	as	knowers.	
Examples	of	epistemic	justice	include:	dominant	knowers	correcting	for	flaws	in	their	
credibility	judgments	through	critical	reflection	(Fricker,	2007);	dominant	knowers	
accepting	that	marginalized	knowers	develop	epistemic	resources	from	their	
situations/standpoints	and	dominant	knowers	actively	learning	how	to	utilize	structurally	
marginalized	knowledges	(Pohlhaus,	2012);	dominant	knowers	engaging	their	
responsibility	to	seek	out	marginally	situated	hermeneutically	resources	(Dotson,	2012);	
and	dominantly	(and	subordinately)	situated	knowers	restructuring	their	habits	and	
affective	structures	to	enable	them	to	simultaneously	engage	different	perspectives	and	
viewpoints	without	polarizing	them,	and	engage	in	collective	agency	and	action	taking	
toward	political	and	cultural	transformation	(Medina,	2013).	
Specifically,	this	dissertation	considers	the	following	questions:	
• In	what	ways	do	students	with	marginalized	racial	social	identities	experience	
epistemic	injustice	in	educational	settings?	
• Can	social	justice	pedagogies	interrupt	the	production	of	knowledge	inequalities	in	
the	educational	setting?	
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• How	might	intergroup	dialogue,	as	a	particular	type	of	social	justice	pedagogy,	
facilitate	epistemic	justice	in	educational	settings?	
• What	kinds	of	applications	can	a	theoretical	analysis	of	epistemic	(in)justice	have	on	
educational	systems	and	structures?	
As	a	philosopher	of	education	writing	a	dissertation	that	applies	theorizing	about	
epistemic	injustice	to	education	theory	and	practice,	Miranda	Fricker’s	(2007)	seminal	
account	of	epistemic	injustice	has	been	significant	to	me	since	I	was	introduced	to	it	as	a	
student.	Fricker	(2007)	described	the	harm	done	to	individuals	and	groups	of	people	in	
their	capacity	as	knowers	within	the	dominant	social	framework	due	to	the	“operation	of	
social	power	in	epistemic	interactions…a	politics	of	epistemic	practice”	(p.	2).	Upon	reading	
Fricker’s	(2007)	account,	I	(1)	concluded	educational	practitioners	must	address	
educational	injustice	as	part	of	our	very	roles	and	everyday	practices	and	(2)	recognized	an	
immediate	connection	between	Fricker’s	account	of	epistemic	justice	and	my	work	as	an	
intergroup	dialogue2	researcher	and	practitioner.	It	is	not	common	for	philosophical	
theorizing	to	be	so	immediately	and	urgently	applicable	to	everyday	practice;	however,	one	
of	the	reasons	I	so	easily	connected	Fricker’s	(2007)	theorizing	and	intergroup	dialogue	is	
both	share	a	common	empirical	bedrock:	social	psychology.		
Throughout	Fricker’s	account	(described	and	explicated	in	great	detail	in	chapter	two),	
she	uses	studies	in	social	psychology	as	evidence	for	her	claims.	For	example,	Fricker	
draws	on	Claude	Steele’s	work	on	stereotype	threat	(see	chapter	two	for	detailed	
explanation)	as	a	way	of	showing	the	harm	of	one’s	losing	knowledge	due	to	epistemic	
injustice.	Intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	is	rooted	in	the	field	of	social	psychology	as	well.	
Evolving	from	the	study	of	intergroup	relations	and	contact,	intergroup	dialogue	is	part	of	
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social	science’s	efforts	to	apply	research	based	knowledge	to	real	world	intergroup	
interactions	and	situations	including	education	in	schools	and	colleges	(Gurin	et	al.,	2013).		
From	my	standpoint	as	a	philosopher	of	education,	an	intergroup	dialogue	practitioner,	
and	a	former	public	school	teacher,	philosophers	of	epistemology	exploring	epistemic	
injustice	and	social	scientists	practicing	and	researching	intergroup	dialogue	are	traversing	
shared	territory:	addressing	how	knowledge	practices	harm	marginalized	individuals	and	
groups	owing	to	social	structures	and	inequalities	toward	the	common	goal	of	describing	
and	creating	a	more	just	society.	Like	these	theories	and	researched	practices,	this	
dissertation	takes	a	multidisciplinary	and	multimethod	approach	towards	understanding	
how	education	institutions	and	practices	create	knowers	and	lesser	knowers	and	how	they	
may	instead	create	greater	knowledge	justice.		
Studying	both	theories	of	epistemic	justice	and	intergroup	dialogue	quite	literally	
brings	together	theories	and	practices.	Therefore,	in	addition	to	introducing	the	questions	
this	dissertation	engages,	this	chapter	introduces	an	overview	on	intergroup	dialogue	
pedagogy	and	on	research	about	intergroup	dialogue.	Chapters	two	through	four	of	this	
dissertation	(as	described	below)	either	engage	the	features	philosophers	describe	as	
necessary	for	knowledge	justice	or	give	an	account	of	how	intergroup	dialogue	responds	to	
philosophers’	theorizing	about	epistemic	justice;	therefore,	the	following	overview	of	
intergroup	dialogue	and	the	features	summarized	act	as	a	foundation	for	the	following	
chapters.		
Intergroup	Dialogue	
There	are	various	forms	of	“dialogue”	models	and	pedagogies.	Intergroup	dialogue	
as	named	and	described	in	this	dissertation	specifically	refers	to	the	praxis	developed	in	
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the	1980s	by	the	Program	on	Intergroup	Relations	at	the	University	of	Michigan	(Ford,	
2017;	Gurin,	Nagda,	&	Zúñiga,	2013;	Zúñiga,	Nagda,	Chesler,	&	Cytron-Walker,	2007).	At	its	
broadest,	intergroup	dialogue	is	defined	as:	
A	face-to-face,	interactive,	and	facilitated	learning	experience	that	brings	together	
	 twelve	to	eighteen	students	from	two	or	more	social	identity	groups	over	a	
	 sustained	period	to	explore	commonalities	and	differences,	examine	the	nature	and	
	 consequences	of	systems	of	power	and	privilege,	and	find	ways	to	work	together	to	
	 promote	social	justice	(Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007,	p.	vii).		
Intergroup	dialogue	courses	are	guided	by	trained	facilitators	using	an	educational	
curriculum;	they	are	offered	mostly	on	college	campuses	but	are	increasingly	being	applied	
and	adopted	in	high	school	settings	and	as	co-curricular	programs	at	universities	(Zúñiga,	
Lopez,	&	Ford,	2012).	Intergroup	dialogue	shares	the	goals	of	other	diversity	efforts	in	
education,	and	it	takes	a	distinct	and	well-researched	critical	dialogic	approach	to	
simultaneously	addressing	social	identities	and	locations	in	relation	to	systems	of	power	
and	privilege.		
	 Across	institutions	and	settings,	intergroup	dialogue	courses	and	initiatives	share	a	
significant	set	of	features	(Gurin	et	al.,	2013;	Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007).	Firstly,	intergroup	
dialogue	courses	are	facilitated,	face-to-face,	exchanges	grounded	in	interdisciplinary	
scholarly	content	and	driven	by	the	active	co-inquiry	and	shared	knowledge	making	of	
participants	across	social	identities.	Facilitation	means	active	and	responsive	guidance;	
facilitators	support	and	challenge	participants	through	rigorous	content,	deep	reflection,	
group	sharing	and	dialogues	about	perspectives	and	experiences	and	through	the	process	
of	developing	empathy	and	perspective	taking	(Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007).	Facilitators	are	active	
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co-participants	in	the	dialogic	process;	they	also	benefit	from	on-going	training	and	
coaching	(Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007).	As	Freire	(2009)	describes:	
Through	dialogue,	the	teacher-of-the-student	and	the	students-of-the-teacher	cease	
	 to	exist	and	a	new	term	emerges:	teacher-student	with	student-teachers…They	
	 become	jointly	responsible	for	the	process	in	which	all	grow	(p.	80).	
	Intergroup	dialogues	usually	take	particular	social	identities	as	a	focus,	for	example,	
intergroup	dialogues	on	race,	on	sexuality	and	gender	or	on	socio-economic	class.	
Facilitators	of	these	dialogues	are	not	only	trained	and	experienced	social	justice	
educators,	but	they	also	represent	the	dominant	and	subordinate	identities	represented	in	
the	dialogue.	Additionally,	students	apply	to	participate	in	intergroup	dialogue	and	the	
placement	process	strives	to	ensure	an	inclusive	dialogue	in	which	no	identity	group	makes	
up	a	majority	of	participants.		
	 The	educational	design	of	intergroup	dialogue	courses	addresses	hidden	and	
explicit	issues	of	power	and	privilege	through	both	content	(what	participants	read	and	
discuss)	and	process	(how	participants	engage	with	each	other	and	with	the	information	
they	are	learning)	(Gurin	et	al.,	2013;	Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007).	Intergroup	dialogue	brings	
together	structured	activities	and	dialogic	communication	to	encourage	student	learning	
and	critical	reflections	across	differences	and	through	contested	beliefs	and	assumptions.	
Intergroup	dialogue	practitioners	utilize	a	four-phase	design	(see	Table	1	below	for	
overview	of	IGD’s	four	phase	design	adapted	from	Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007,	pp.	27-28)	to	
facilitate	student	learning	by	starting	with	group	dynamics	and	discovering	commonalities	
and	differences	based	on	social	identity	to	directly	taking	up	controversial	issues	(e.g.	can	
reverse	racism	exist?)	to	taking	action	for	social	change	(both	individual	and	collective).	
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	Across	institutions	and	programs,	intergroup	dialogue’s	four	phase	design	includes	
specific	content	and	process	objectives	as	well	as	some	hallmark	structured	interactions	
(these	are	explored	in	greater	detail	in	chapter	four).	Phase	one	focuses	on	group	
beginnings	and	the	forming	of	relationships.	During	this	phase,	students	learn	how	to	
participate	in	dialogue	and	share	in	activities	to	build	relationships	across	difference.	Phase	
two	focuses	on	students	exploring	differences	and	commonalities	of	experiences.	
Consciousness	raising	is	a	major	focus;	students	learn	about	social	identities	and	how	these	
identities	reflect	systems	of	social	power,	resources	allocation,	and	conflicting	relationships	
among	groups	(Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007;	Zúñiga,	Nagda,	&	Sevig,	2002).	Readings	and	reflective	
writing	are	used	to	help	students	understand	issues	of	dominance	and	subordination	and	
their	roles	in	maintaining	systems	of	oppression	and	privilege.	Phase	three	focuses	on	
dialoguing	and	exploring	controversial	and	conflict	laden	issues.	Students	are	encouraged	
to	share	their	perspectives	and	experiences	with	controversial	issues	through	dialogue	and	
not	debate	(i.e.	not	focusing	on	“rightness”	or	“wrongness”	of	their	position).	Phase	four	
focuses	on	encouraging	students	to	think	about,	plan,	and	take	individual	and	collective	
action	towards	social	change.		
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Phase Objectives 
Content                           Process 
Examples of  
Learning Activities 
Phase 1 
(2-3 sessions) 
 
Beginnings: 
Forming and 
Building 
Relationships 
• Build knowledge for 
dialogue 
• Clarify meaning of 
“dialogue” and other 
forms of communication 
• Build values and 
skills for dialogue 
• Establish foundations 
for honest and 
meaningful dialogue 
 
• Exploring goals and 
expectations 
• Distinguishing 
dialogue from debate 
• Practicing interactive 
communication: 
speaking, listening, 
paraphrasing, giving 
and receiving feedback  
• Exploring personal and 
social identities 
• Exploring 
multiple/intersectional  
social identities 
• Discuss socialization 
• Web of oppression and 
privilege, caucus 
groups, and fishbowl 
activities to encourage 
introspection and 
deeper dialogue 
Phase 2 
(3-4 sessions) 
 
Exploring 
Differences and 
Commonalities of 
Experiences 
• Increase awareness of 
multiple social groups, 
intersectional nature of 
identities, and dynamics 
of inequality 
• Promote understanding 
of the systemic basis of 
group differences and 
conflicts in perceptions 
and experiences  
 
 
• Encourage listening 
and perspective 
taking of experiences 
and perceptions 
different from one’s 
own 
• Explore meaning of 
key terms such as  
prejudice, 
discrimination, and 
oppression and their 
impact on students’ 
lived experiences 
 
Phase 3 
(3-5 sessions) 
 
Exploring and 
Discussing Hot 
Topics 
• Encourage analysis of 
systems of privilege, 
power, and oppression 
• Interdisciplinary 
exploration of some of 
the roots of conflicting 
perceptions and 
experiences (historical, 
cultural, institutional, 
interpersonal) 
• Explore differences 
and similarities in  
perceptions and 
experiences of 
controversial topics 
across social groups 
• Encourage informed 
and meaningful 
dialogue and inquiry 
• Probe for deeper 
levels of thinking, 
feeling, and 
responding 
 
• Dialogue on and de-
briefing about student-
identified “hot topics” 
(such as gender and 
media, safety on 
campus; separation 
and self-segregation on 
campus; immigration, 
affirmative action, 
etc.) 
 
Phase 4 
(2-3 sessions) 
 
Action Planning and 
Alliance Building 
• Explore ways of moving 
from dialogue to action 
• Explore range of 
continuing learning 
opportunities and 
actions to promote 
diversity and social 
justice 
• Bring closure to 
dialogue experience 
 
• Discuss liberation  
• Develop action plans 
to illustrate various 
ways of taking action 
for inclusion and 
social justice 
 
Table	1.	Overview	of	the	Intergroup	Dialogue	(IGD)	Curriculum:	Adapted	from	Zúñiga,	Nagda,	Chesler,	&	
Cytron-Walker	(2007),	Intergroup	dialogue	in	higher	education:	Meaningful	learning	about	social	justice	
(Exhibit	1,	pp.	27-28),	ASHE	Higher	Education	Report,	32(4).	
 
These	phases	are	sometimes	referred	to	as	stages.	Whether	referred	to	as	a	phase	or	a	
stage,	it	is	important	to	note	that	facilitators	match	the	educational	design	to	the	flow	of	
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their	participants’	learning	and	processes	(Gurin	et	al.,	2013;	Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007).	As	
necessary,	groups	may	move	back	and	forth	through	the	processes.	Of	central	importance,	
intergroup	dialogue:		
	 is	not	a	de-contextualized	practice	(Burbules,	2000),	participants	are	encouraged	
	 to	take	a	critical	perspective	when	examining	how	relationships	among	groups	are	
	 shaped	and	affected	by	the	dynamics	of	interpersonal,	institutional,	and	societal	
	 power,	privilege,	and	exclusion.	Dialogue	participants	are	also	challenged	to	make	
	 meaning	of	the	various	forms	of	information	introduced	in	the	dialogue	through	
	 sustained	engagement	that	embraces	thoughts	and	feelings,	self-reflection,	
	 perspective	taking,	and	critical	reflection	(Zúñiga	et	al.,	2012,	p.	3).	
The	dialogue	process	is	dynamic;	it	is	both	structured	and	responsive	(Schoem	&	Hurtado,	
2001).	
In	summary,	the	key	structure	and	process	features	of	intergroup	dialogue	include:		
• explicit	focus	on	systems	power	and	privilege	and	how	these	systems	shape	
experiences	of	social	identities	and	social	group	membership;	
• processes	that	emphasize	communication	across	differences,	especially	amongst	
groups	with	histories	of	conflict	or	potential	conflict,	through	shared	knowledge	
making;	
• processes	that	emphasize	critical	individual	and	group	reflection	and	collective	
knowledge	making;	
• processes	that	take	up	conflict	to	develop	empathy	and	understanding;	
• structure	that	“strengthens	individual	and	collective	capacities	for	social	action	by	
fostering	connections	and	alliances….and	build	the	confidence,	commitments,	and	
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skills	needed	to	support	coalitional	action	for	social	justice”	(Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007,	p.	
viii).	These	skills	and	practices	for	social	action	extend	inside	and	outside	the	
classroom	(Gurin	et	al.,	2013;	Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007).	
These	features	will	be	taken	up	again	in	chapters	three	and	four	which	directly	describe	
intergroup	dialogue	based	programs	and	courses	and	their	relationship	to	epistemic	
justice.		
Research	on	intergroup	dialogue	has	identified	some	well	documented	outcomes.	Using	
data	from	a	national	longitudinal	survey	of	incoming	first	year	students	(follow	up	surveys	
were	administered	at	the	end	of	the	students’	second	year)	Hurtado	(2005)	found	white	
students	who	participated	in	intergroup	dialogue	increased	their	ability	to	take	the	
perspectives	of	others,	adopt	a	pluralistic	world	view	and	attribute	greater	complexity	in	
their	development	of	analytical	problem-solving	skills.	Zúñiga	et	al.	(2007)	report	on	a	
controlled	study	comparing	students	enrolled	in	a	course	focused	on	cultural	diversity	and	
social	justice	with	students	who	participated	in	an	intergroup	dialogue	course.		
Researchers	found	that	intergroup	dialogue	students	showed	increases	in	consciousness	
raising,	ability	to	bridge	difference,	and	greater	capacity	to	work	for	social	change.	These	
findings	held	for	students	of	color	and	white	students;	additionally,	students	of	color	
showed	a	significant	increase	in	perspective	taking	as	a	result	of	taking	the	intergroup	
dialogue	course	(Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007).		Lopez,	Gurin,	and	Nagda	(1998)	utilized	a	similar	
design	comparing	first	year	students	who	participated	in	an	intergroup	dialogue	course	
with	first	year	students	who	did	not	participate	in	an	intergroup	dialogue	course.	They	
found	that	students	who	participated	in	intergroup	dialogue	attributed	a	more	structural	
causal	analysis	to	race	and	ethnic	inequality;	they	exhibited	more	structural	and	less	
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individualistic	thinking	than	students	in	the	control	group;	they	also	applied	a	more	
structural	causal	analysis	to	intergroup	conflict.	There	was	little	evidence	for	selection	bias	
between	the	two	groups,	students	who	enrolled	in	intergroup	dialogue	and	those	who	did	
not,	as	student	responses	to	pre-test	questionnaires	showed	no	difference	between	the	
control	and	participant	samples	in	response	to	questions	on	racial	and	ethnic	inequality.	
There	was	also	no	significant	difference	in	political	ideology	between	the	two	groups	at	the	
start	of	the	course.			
A	follow-up	study	of	Lopez	et	al.	(1998)	intergroup	dialogue	and	control	group	students	
just	before	graduation	found	that	the	students	who	participated	in	the	intergroup	dialogue	
course	had	more	positive	intergroup	perceptions	and	attitudes	than	students	from	the	
control	group	(Gurin,	Peng,	Lopez,	&	Nagda,	1999).	They	found	that	white	and	male	
intergroup	dialogue	participants	did	not	subscribe	as	strongly	to	dominant	perspectives	on	
intergroup	conflict	and	educational	inequality	as	their	control	group	counterparts,	and	
students	of	color	and	women	participants	reported	more	positive	views	of	conflict	and	of	
educational	equity	policies	than	their	control	group	counterparts	(Gurin	et	al.,	1999).	
Students	of	color	who	participated	in	the	intergroup	dialogue	course	also	reported	
perceiving	more	positive	interactions	with	white	students	and	less	campus	divisiveness	
than	their	control	group	counterparts	(Gurin	et	al.,	1999).	The	intergroup	dialogue	course	
participants	were	shown	to	have	greater	interest	in	politics	and	to	participate	more	in	
campus	politics	(Gurin,	Nagda,	&	Lopez,	2004).	Also,	when	compared	with	their	matched	
control	group,	the	students	who	participated	in	intergroup	dialogue	showed	greater	
perspective	taking,	greater	understanding	of	difference	as	not	being	divisive,	a	greater	
sense	of	commonality	with	other	racial	and	ethnic	group	and	greater	learning	about	their	
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own	and	other	ethnic	groups	(Gurin	et	al.,	2004).	Gurin	et	al.	(2004)	posited	that	
participation	in	intergroup	dialogue	during	their	first	year	of	college	likely	influenced	their	
curricular	and	co-curricular	choices	while	on	campus.	Students	from	both	privileged	and	
disadvantaged	social	groups	who	participated	in	an	intergroup	dialogue	course	showed	
more	positive	attitudes	towards	intergroup	life,	made	stronger	ties	with	students	who	
were	both	similar	and	different	from	them	and	valued	ethnic	and	racial	difference	more	
than	students	from	the	control	group.	The	course,	then,	may	offer	an	important	
counterpoint	to	campus	life	and	life	within	the	larger	social	context	of	ever	increasing	
segregation	by	both	race	and	class	in	public	elementary	and	secondary	education	(Orfield,	
Jongyeon,	Frankenberg,	&	Siegel-Hawley,	2016).	
Additionally,	multiple	studies	have	demonstrated	that	intergroup	dialogue	students	
show	an	increased	willingness	towards	action	for	social	justice	(Dessel	&	Rogge,	2008;	
Zúñiga,	2004;	Nagda,	Kim	&	Truelove,	2004).	Multiple	studies	have	also	demonstrated	
increased	perspective	taking	across	social	groups	and	understanding	of	identity	and	the	
impact	of	social	group	membership	on	social	inequalities	(Nagda,	Spearmon,	Holley,	
Harding,	Balasson,	Moise-Swanson	&	de	Mello,	1999;	Nagda	&	Zúñiga,	2003;	Dessel	&	
Rogge,	2008).	
Gurin	et	al.	(2013)	report	findings	from	a	longitudinal	field	experiment	on	intergroup	
dialogue	across	nine	colleges	and	universities	in	the	United	States.	Across	the	nine	
institutions,	students	who	applied	for	either	a	race-ethnicity	or	a	gender	intergroup	
dialogue	course	were	randomly	assigned	to	either	an	experimental	(race/ethnicity	or	
gender	intergroup	dialogue	course)	or	a	control	group	(students	placed	on	an	intergroup	
dialogue	wait-list	after	applying).	This	design	allowed	researchers	to	address	questions	
	 	
	 	
15 
such	as:	were	previously	documented	findings	attributable	to	interest	in	intergroup	
dialogue	(as	students	in	both	groups	chose	to	apply	to	participate	in	an	intergroup	dialogue	
course).	Changes	measured	in	students	could	be	attributed	to	participation	in	the	course	as	
students	in	the	experimental	and	control	group	took	pre-	and	post-tests	at	the	start	and	
end	of	the	course	and	the	following	year.	The	post-test	administered	one	year	after	
students	participated	in	the	course	made	it	possible	to	test	long	term	impacts	of	intergroup	
dialogue	courses,	namely	if	outcomes	persisted	beyond	the	term	in	which	students	
participated	in	intergroup	dialogue.		
In	total,	there	were	720	students	who	participated	in	the	dialogues	and	712	students	in	
the	control	group.	Additionally,	Gurin	et	al.	(2013)	also	included	nonrandomized	
comparison	groups	from	students	enrolled	in	traditional	university	social	science	courses	
on	race	and	gender.	The	social	science	comparison	courses	were	run	during	the	same	term	
as	the	dialogue	courses,	and	438	students	participated	in	them.	These	data	included	
fourteen	courses	on	race	and	thirteen	on	gender,	and	they	were	also	run	across	the	nine	
participating	colleges	and	universities.	Again,	this	design	feature	allowed	researchers	to	
discern	if	previous	documented	outcomes	could	be	the	result	of	a	selection	bias	(or	a	result	
of	student	interest	in	enrolling	in	dialogue)	because	the	students	enrolling	in	the	social	
science	courses	also	chose	to	participate	in	a	course	focused	on	race-ethnicity	or	gender,	
Gurin	et	al.	(2013)	report	findings	on	cognitive	involvement,	which	measured	“complex	
thinking,	analytical	thinking	about	society,	consideration	of	multiple	perspectives,”	and	
thinking	and	learning	about	one’s	identity	(p.	152).	They	found	that	there	was	no	difference	
in	these	measures	between	the	dialogue	and	control	group	in	the	pre-test;	however,	the	
difference	between	the	two	groups	in	the	post-test	was	significant.	This	means	students	
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who	participated	in	intergroup	dialogue	across	the	nine	institutions	showed	an	increase	in	
complex	thinking	about	society,	perspective	taking,	and	identity	awareness	after	taking	a	
dialogue	course.	The	same	findings	were	present	for	affective	positivity	(measures	of	
positive	emotions	and	interactions	with	others),	structural	understanding	of	inequity,	
intergroup	empathy,	and	intergroup	collaboration	and	action	taking	(Gurin	et	al.,	2013).		
Like	earlier	studies	cited	above,	Gurin	et	al.	(2013)	found	that	participation	in	
intergroup	dialogue	resulted	in	important	cognitive,	affective,	and	behavior	outcomes.	
Importantly,	this	impressive	study	was	able	to	measure	these	impacts	across	nine	
institutions	across	the	United	States	(varying	in	size	and	geographic	location)	and	showed	
that	outcomes	are	not	the	result	of	self-selection	or	student	interest;	they	are	the	result	of	
students	participating	in	intergroup	dialogue	courses.	The	particular	content	and	process	
of	intergroup	dialogue	courses	increase	students’	ability	to	think	critically,	engage	in	
critical	perspective	taking,	address	issues	of	identity	and	societal	inequality,	develop	
empathy	across	difference	and	to	take	action	for	social	change	across	identity	lines.	These	
increases	were	not	only	found	in	intergroup	dialogue	students	over	wait	list	students	
(experimental	and	control	groups)	but	these	increases	were	also	greater	in	intergroup	
dialogue	students	compared	to	those	students	who	chose	to	enroll	in	social	science	courses	
focused	on	race	and	ethnicity	(Gurin	et	al.,	2013).	These	findings	were	not	the	result	of	
students	exhibiting	demand	characteristics,	or	“reporting	what	facilitators	would	want	
them	to	say”	as	the	effects	of	IGD	relative	to	the	control	group	and	the	social	science	group	
were	still	evident	across	indicators	a	year	later	as	found	during	the	longitudinal	follow-up	
(Gurin	et	al.,	2013,	p.	166).	
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		 Thus	far,	this	chapter	has	linked	the	shared	relevance	of	the	rich	field	of	social	
psychology	on	theorizing	about	epistemic	injustice	and	the	development	of	intergroup	
dialogue	pedagogy;	it	then	provided	an	overall	framework	for	understanding	what	
intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	is	and	what	it	does.	It	also	pointed	out	one	of	intergroup	
dialogue	pedagogy’s	and	social	epistemology’s	shared	objectives,	particularly	the	
theorizing	of	philosophers	focused	on	epistemic	injustice:	calling	upon	knowledge	making	
practices	to	address	inequality	and	work	towards	justice.		
	 Because	learning	about	epistemic	injustice	immediately	connected	to	my	work	and	
learnings	as	an	intergroup	dialogue	researcher	and	practitioner	and	because	both	fields	
pursue	knowledge	justice	as	social	justice,	it	is	important	for	me	to	bring	both	disciplines	
and	bodies	of	research	together	in	this	dissertation.	Epistemologists	describe	the	changes	
in	individuals	and	structures	necessary	to	create	the	conditions	for	epistemic	justice;	
intergroup	dialogue	researchers	and	facilitators	develop	and	enact	the	very	types	of	
knowledge	practices	that	epistemologists	argue	for	in	order	to	create	epistemic	justice.		To	
argue	for	and	describe	epistemically	just	practices	without	at	the	same	time	working	to	
create	these	practices	seems	to	betray	the	call	to	disrupt	and	resist	knowledge	hegemony.	
By	bringing	theorizing	and	practice	in	both	epistemic	injustice	and	intergroup	dialogue	
together	in	this	inquiry,	this	dissertation	hopes	to	not	only	bridge	theory	and	practice	
across	disciplines	but	also	to	argue	that	educational	institutions	and	stake	holders	must	
address	epistemic	injustice.	
Organization	of	this	Dissertation	
	
Figure	1.	below	presents	a	visual	overview	of	this	dissertation	and	its	chapters.		
Chapter	two	of	this	dissertation	provides	a	theoretical	framework.	Chapter	two	introduces	
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and	explicates	the	concepts	of	epistemic	injustice	and	epistemic	justice.	It	begins	with	
Fricker’s	(2007)	seminal	account	of	epistemic	injustice	and	its	two	types:	testimonial	and	
hermeneutic	injustice.	Since	Fricker’s	initial	theorizing,	philosophers	of	epistemology	and	
of	race	have	both	critiqued	and	richly	broadened	her	account	making	it	stronger	with	the	
inclusion	of	more	non-dominant	perspectives	and	knowledges.	Chapter	two	provides	an	
accounting	of	the	theorizing	of	these	philosophers	with	special	attention	to	Pohlhaus	
(2012),	Dotson	(2012)	and	Medina	(2013).	The	goal	of	this	review	is	to	provide	a	robust	
accounting	of	epistemic	justice	and	injustice;	the	features	of	these	accounts	will	be	applied	
to	research	in	education	in	chapters	three	and	four	of	this	dissertation.	Chapter	two	then	
addresses	the	assertion	that	education	institutions	and	stakeholders	have	a	responsibility	
to	address	epistemic	injustice	by	reviewing	and	linking	Young’s	(2010)	social	responsibility	
model	and	Dewey’s	(1954)	and	Outlaw’s	(2007)	descriptions	of	the	purpose	of	education	
within	the	context	of	the	United	States’	democracy.	These	reviews	of	the	theorizing	of	
philosophers	of	epistemology,	race	and	education	provide	the	theoretical	framework	of	this	
dissertation.		
Chapter	three	moves	to	applying	theories	of	epistemic	ignorance	and	the	practices	of	
critical	pedagogy,	especially	intergroup	dialogue,	to	education.	Chapter	three	addresses	the	
first	two	questions	listed	above:	In	what	ways	do	students	with	marginalized	racial	social	
identities	experience	epistemic	injustice	in	educational	settings?	Can	social	justice	pedagogies	
interrupt	the	production	of	knowledge	inequalities	in	the	educational	setting?	In	applying	
theories	of	epistemic	ignorance,	the	chapter	begins	with	an	account	of	how	social	identity	
impacts	students’	experiences	in	education	settings	from	pre-school	through	college	
graduation.	Students	experience	epistemic	injustice	in	education	in	a	few	ways.	Firstly,	
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students	with	marginalized	social	identities	are	often	not	present.	For	example,	students	of	
color	and	low-income	students	often	do	not	have	access	to	pre-school,	rendering	them	less	
prepared	for	kindergarten	than	their	counterparts	with	dominant	social	identities.	
Students	who	are	not	present	in	education	settings	cannot	contribute	to	knowledge	making	
and	they	also	lose	out	on	the	opportunity	to	make	meaning	from	their	lived	experiences	
within	the	dominant	knowledge	making	framework.	Additionally,	students	with	
marginalized	social	identities	are	not	able	to	benefit	from	public	education	in	the	ways	that	
their	peers	with	dominant	identities	do.	This	persistent	“gap”	in	student	performance	
reifies	negative	stereotypes	about	students	of	color	and	low-income	students	while	
providing	false	support	for	the	persistent	dominance/privilege	of	white	and	high-income	
students.	The	“gap”	in	student	outcomes	between	dominant	and	non-dominant	students	
also	is	characterized	as	an	“achievement	gap”	that	puts	the	onus	and	failing	of	student	
performance	on	students,	their	families,	and	their	cultures.		
However,	when	described	by	marginalized	students,	the	achievement	gap	is	indeed	
an	“opportunity	gap”	in	which	non-dominant	students	are	structurally	excluded	from	the	
most	beneficial	and	productive	aspects	of	public	education.	Dominant	analysis	of	student	
performance	excludes	the	insights,	experiences,	perspectives	and	interpretations	of	
marginalized	students,	while,	at	the	same	time,	hiding	or	making	less	intelligible	their	
accounts	of	school	experiences--this	is	a	form	of	epistemic	injustice.	So	long	as	education	
settings,	from	kindergarten	through	college,	limit	the	ability	of	non-dominant	students	to	
contribute	and	share	in	public	knowledge	making,	limit	the	ability	of	non-dominant	
students	to	make	intelligible	to	themselves	and	to	others	their	educational	experiences,	and	
reinforces	the	unearned	epistemic	dominance	of	those	with	privileged	social	identities,	
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education	systems	and	settings	contribute	to	and	reproduce	epistemic	injustice.	This	
chapter	describes	how	educational	systems	are	not	only	examples	of	structural	inequality;	
they	actively	create	and	foster	epistemic	harm	to	students	of	color	and	low-income	
students	by	preventing	their	full	participation	in	shared	knowledge	making	and	by	making	
their	experiences	un/less	intelligible.		
Chapter	four	extends	from	chapter	two’s	macro	exploration	of	epistemic	injustice	in	
education	settings	to	a	micro	focus	on	two	sections	of	intergroup	dialogue	on	race	and	
ethnicity	at	a	private	research	institution	in	the	northeast.	Chapter	four	responds	to	
questions	two	and	three	listed	above:	Can	social	justice	pedagogies	interrupt	the	production	
of	knowledge	inequalities	in	the	educational	setting?	How	might	intergroup	dialogue,	as	a	
particular	type	of	social	justice	pedagogy,	facilitate	epistemic	justice	in	educational	settings?	
This	chapter	offers	a	description	of	how	a	praxis—content,	process,	and	context—can	help	
students	(1)	recognize	lacunas	in	the	dominant	hermeneutic	frame,	(2)	acknowledge	their	
role	in	either	maintaining	lacunas	or	seeking	out	alternative/additional	perspectives	and	
hermeneutical	resources,	and	(3)	expand	their	understandings	and	interpretations	beyond	
the	dominant	hermeneutic	resources	to	understand,	analyze,	and	contribute	to	alternative	
and	multiple	shared	interpretive	resources.	This	chapter	explicitly	explores	how	
intergroup	dialogue	can	be	a	tool	for	epistemic	justice	by	exploring	students’	experiences	of	
an	intergroup	dialogue	course	in	terms	of	their	self-described	knowledge	shifts	by	
providing	findings	from	a	qualitative	document	analysis	of	students’	reflection	papers	and	
final	papers	from	two	sections	of	intergroup	dialogue	on	race	and	ethnicity.		
Chapter	five	offers	a	review	of	conclusions	and	contributions	of	the	preceding	chapters	
and	offers	suggestions	for	applications.	It	responds	to	the	final	question	listed	above:	What	
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kinds	of	applications	can	a	theoretical	analysis	of	epistemic	(in)justice	have	on	educational	
systems	and	structure?	Chapter	five	specifically	looks	at	philosophers’	recent	applications	of	
theorizing	about	epistemic	injustice	to	education	(Frank,	2013;	Kotzee,	2013;	Kotzee,	
2017),	and	it	presents	the	case	that	philosophers—to	date—have	not	sufficiently	
considered	what	philosophers	and	educational	researchers	and	practitioners	must	do	
given	our	understanding	of	educational	institutions	systems	and	institutions	role	in	
perpetuating	epistemic	injustice.	While	this	dissertation	explores	intergroup	dialogue	as	a	
type	of	social	justice	pedagogy	that	can	be	applied	in	educational	settings	to	disrupt	the	
reproduction	of	epistemic	injustice,	pedagogy	is	not	enough.	Educational	researchers,	
institutions,	and	stakeholders	must	perceive	that	knowing	is	not	enough	(Nieto,	2012)	and	
take	up	research	and	policies	that	will	intentionally	address	epistemic	injustice	and	work	to	
create	the	conditions	for	greater	epistemic	justice.		
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Figure	1.	An	overview	of	the	dissertation	project	and	chapter	organization:		
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Chapter	2	
Theoretical	Framework:	Epistemic	Injustice	
	
“Education	for	critical	consciousness…requires	a	reformulation	of	the	knowledge-as-
accumulated	capital	model	of	education	and	focuses	instead	on	the	link	between	the	
historical	configuration	of	social	forms	and	the	way	they	work	subjectively.	This	issue	of	
subjectivity	represents	a	realization	of	the	fact	that	who	we	are,	how	we	act,	what	we	think,	
and	what	stories	we	tell	become	more	intelligible	within	an	epistemological	framework	
that	begins	by	recognizing	existing	hegemonic	histories”		
–Chandra	Mohanty	(2006,	p.	195).	
	
Testimonial	exchanges	happen	throughout	our	daily	lives.	When	people	interact,	
they	are	constantly	sharing	and	assessing	information.	When	it	comes	to	schooling,	people	
generally	believe	these	exchanges	center	around	content.	Students	and	teachers,	though,	
embody	social	identities	that	are	present	in	testimonial	exchanges.		In	the	vignette	below,	I	
paraphrase	an	experience	shared	often	by	college	students	in	a	course	I	teach	that	is	
focused	on	race	and	ethnicity.	Students	cite	this	experience	as	an	example	of	their	identities	
becoming	salient	in	a	popular	journalism	course.	I	start	the	lesson	by	defining	racial	
microagressions	as,	“subtle	insults	(verbal,	nonverbal,	and/or	visual)	directed	toward	
people	of	color,	often	automatically	or	unconsciously”	(Solorzano,	Ceja,	&	Yosso,	2000,	p.	
60).		I	then	ask	students	if	they	can	describe	a	racial	microagression	they	have	perpetrated	
or	experienced	on	campus.	3		Hands	are	raised	and	I	hear:	
Student:	In	Introduction	to	Print	Journalism4	there	is	this	assignment	where	we	have	
to	write	up	an	incident,	this	scenario,	as	if	it	just	happened	and	we	are	reporters	on	a	
deadline.	
	
Facilitator:	Can	you	describe	the	scenario?	
	
Student:	Well,	the	sheet	says	that	a	Latino	man	robs	a	store.	
	
Facilitator:	How	does	that	make	you	feel?	
	
Student:	I	feel	like	it’s	racist	because	that’s	all	we	ever	see	about	Latino	people	in	the	
	 news	and	in	the	media	and	we	are	not	all	just	thieves.	There’s	more	to	us	than	that,	but	
	 you	never	see	that	in	the	media.	
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Facilitator:	Have	you	given	this	feedback	to	the	professor?	
	
Students:	The	professor	calls	it	a	fictional	but	standard	case	that	provides	enough	
	 information	for	us	to	use	to	write	a	journalistic	article	using	the	skills	learned	over	
	 the	course	of	the	semester.		
	
Facilitator:	What	does	it	mean	for	your	professor	not	to	consider	your	feedback?	
	
Students:	It’s	frustrating	because	there	are	like	maybe	one,	maybe	two	students	of	
	 color	in	each	journalism	class.	The	rest	are	all	white.	That’s	ok,	but	like	when	there	
	 are	only	one	or	two	of	you	who	understand	what	it	feels	like	to	be	singled	out,	and	then	
	 the	example	only	applies	to	one	of	you	in	particular,	you	feel	like	you	don’t	even	matter	
	 in	the	course.	It	makes	me	angry	and	it	makes	me	feel	like	who	cares	what	I	have	to	say	
	 anyway.	
	
These	students6	explicitly	share	with	their	journalism	professor	that	this	scenario	
marginalizes	them	within	the	course	because	it	is	one	of	the	few	representations	of	Latinos	
in	the	media	and	it	is	laden	with	negative	stereotypes.	The	professor	responds	that	the	
scenario	is	“realistic”	and,	therefore,	the	students’	concerns	are	unfounded.		
	 In	this	example,	the	professor	is	providing	content	and	positioning	the	content	as	
neutral	as	it	connects	to	a	scenario	assumed	to	be	prevalent	and	commonplace.	Students	
whose	racial	social	identities	are	made	salient	by	the	scenario	are	asserting	that	the	
content	is	prejudicial	(if	not	explicitly	racist).	What	makes	the	scenario	racist?	Describing	
the	thief	as	a	Latino	both	draws	from	and	reinforces	pernicious	stereotypes	prevalent	in	
North	American	society.	In	the	United	States	today	Latinos	are	often	associated	with	
criminal	behavior	such	as	“illegal	immigration”	(which	should	be	but	is	rarely	called	
“undocumented	immigration”	in	the	media;	this	labeling	itself	criminalizes	Latino	
populations),	gangs,	and	drug	cartels	(e.g.	Tukachinsky,	Mastro,	&	Yachi,	2015;	Schmader,	
Block,	&	Lickel,	2015).	These	stereotypes	are	exaggerated	caricatures	and	problematic	
(Schmader	et	al.,	2015).	Instead	of	challenging	these	omnipresent	images	in	the	dominant	
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collective	imagery,	the	professor’s	narrative	mobilizes	them	as	given	and	unconscious	
scripts	to	be	used	in	the	assignment.	Drawing	from	racialized	tropes	in	this	manner	
empowers	them;	drawing	upon	racist	tropes	in	a	way	that	normalizes	them	is	in	and	of	
itself	an	act	of	racism.	Rather	than	listening	to	and	taking	up	the	students’	perspectives,	the	
professor	dismisses	the	students’	claims	refuting	the	assertion	that	their	or	the	fictitious	
robber’s	identity	matters.	The	students	provide	testimony	and	the	professor	judges	it	to	be	
irrelevant	or	perhaps	even	false.	I	consider	this	to	be	an	example	of	epistemic	injustice	in	
an	education	setting.		
This	chapter	addresses	question	one	outlined	in	the	introduction:	In	what	ways	do	
students	with	marginalized	racial	and	ethnic	social	identities	experience	epistemic	injustice	in	
educational	settings?	by	providing	an	account	of	the	ways	in	which	philosophers	
characterize	and	describe	epistemic	injustice	and	justice.	This	chapter	provides	a	short	
overview	of	the	social	pathways	to	knowledge;	it	then	sets	out	to	provide	a	broad	account	
of	epistemic	injustice	that	will	provide	the	theoretical	buttressing	for	this	dissertation.	This	
section	will	begin	with	a	review	of	Fricker’s	(2007)	seminal	account	of	epistemic	injustice,	
which	is	followed	by	a	broad	analysis	of	the	critiques	and	extensions	of	Fricker’s	account	by	
many	of	the	philosophers	concerned	about	epistemic	injustice.	This	review	of	theories	
concludes	with	a	summary	of	the	characteristics	of	epistemic	injustice	and	justice	based	on	
the	theorizing	of	contemporary	philosophers;	this	broad	account	is	the	foundation	for	the	
theoretical	analysis	in	this	dissertation.	The	next	section	of	this	chapter	provides	an	
account	of	why	epistemic	injustice	matters	in	education.	Fricker	(2007)	argued	that	“the	
ethical	is	political”	(p.	8);	this	section	argues	that	the	educational	is	ethical.		
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Theoretical	Framework	
	
Knowledge	as	Social	
	
	The	study	of	epistemic	injustice	builds	from	theorizing	in	social	epistemology	
(Goldman,	1999)	which,	broadly	defined,	is	the	“conceptual	and	normative	study	of	the	
relevance	of	social	relations,	roles,	interests,	and	institutions	to	knowledge”	(Schmitt,	1994,	
p.	1).	Put	another	way,	social	epistemology	refers	to	the	“social	pathways	to	knowledge”	
that	include	institutions	and	disciplinary	communities	(e.g.	scientists,	media	organizations,	
governmental	agencies)	(Goldman,	2002).	From	this	we	understand	that	practices	of	
epistemic	evaluation	are	social;	we	learn	from	others	(terms,	concepts,	conditions),	we	
make	evaluations	of	the	concepts	and	assertions	of	others,	and	we	are	able	to	carry	out	
these	evaluations	because	of	social	systems	that	reinforce,	structure	and	facilitate	our	
judgment	making.	Working	from	a	social	epistemology	frame,	we	understand	that	a	
person’s	knowing	is	not	individualistic;	instead,	it	is	a	result	of	participation	in	social	
exchanges.	In	working	to	understand	the	dynamics	of	these	testimonial	exchanges,	we	must	
talk	about	identity,	specifically,	identity	power	(Fricker,	2007).		
Identity	&	Power	
	
Feminist	standpoint	theorists	contribute	to	social	epistemology	by	explicitly	linking	
social	location	and	the	politics	of	knowing	(Wylie,	2011;	Hill-Collins,	2010).	Standpoint	
theorists	argue	that	implicit	practices	of	power	appear	to	be	value-neutral	in	dominant	
conceptual	frameworks	because	they	are	normalized	by	social	institutions	(Hartsock,	1983;	
Harding,	1992).	Standpoint	is	achieved	through	the	struggles	of	oppressed	groups	(e.g.	
women,	people	of	color,	LGBT	community)	against	dominant	social	groups	and	the	political	
infrastructure	that	buttresses	their	dominance.	Social	situatedness,	for	standpoint	
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theorists,	is	not	sufficient;	they	go	on	to	argue	that	one’s	position	as	subordinated	provides	
an	epistemic	privilege	(Harding,	2006;	Hill-Collins,	2000).	For	example,	women	understand	
not	only	what	it	is	to	be	a	woman	in	the	workplace,	still	receiving	unequal	pay	for	equal	
work	in	2014	(Lips,	2013),	but	they	also	understand	how	men	perceive	women	in	the	
workplace	and	how	to	navigate	a	workplace	which	does	not	fully	acknowledge	the	value	of	
women’s	labor.	Women	know	simultaneously	their	professional	skills	and	that	they	must	
over-perform	relative	to	their	male	counterparts	in	order	to	be	recognized.		
The	double	bind	experienced	by	women	is	compounded	by	intersecting	social	
identities,	particularly	race	and	class,	which	offer	additional	layers	of	epistemic	insight	
(Gutiérrez	y	Muhs,	Niemann,	González,	&	Harris,	2012).	Illustratively,	Kupenda	(2012)	
recalls	an	exchange	with	a	white	dean	her	first	year	as	an	assistant	professor.	As	a	junior	
faculty	member,	Kupenda	requested	not	to	teach	either	in	the	summer	of	her	first	year	or	
the	fall	term	of	her	second	year,	so	she	could	have	time	to	research	and	publish	as	part	of	
the	institution’s	requirements	for	tenure	and	promotion.	The	dean	rejected	her	request,	
requiring	she	teach	during	both	semesters	even	though	tenured	faculty	were	available.		
When	Kupenda	met	with	the	dean	to	discuss	her	concerns,	the	dean	told	her:	“‘We	need	you	
to	teach	in	the	summer	program	because	you	are	black,	you	are	a	woman,	you	are	a	great	
teacher,	and	you	nurture,	mother,	feed	and	nurse	all	the	students’”	(Kupenda,	2012,	p.	23).	
Kupenda’s	reply	to	the	dean	was	incisive:	“‘You	just	described	a	mammy….I	guess	I	will	
have	to	be	a	mammy	for	you	nine	months	a	year,	but	I	will	not	be	a	mammy	twelve	months	
a	year.	Three	months	a	year	I	must	try	to	be	a	scholar’”	(Kupenda,	2012,	p.	23).		
As	a	woman,	and	particularly	as	a	Black	woman,	Kupenda	was	able	to	identify	and	
name	the	pernicious	controlling	image	(Hill-Collins,	2000),	specifically	the	mammy,	the	
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dean	was	operating	from	and	utilizing	to	marginalize	Kupena’s	identity	as	scholar.	
Characterizing	a	woman	with	the	gendered	stereotype	of	“nurturing	mother”	often	times	
serves	to	discount	her	emotional	labor.	Labeling	a	Black	woman	as	nurturing	and	
mothering	serves	the	same	function	but	is	additionally	racialized	through	association	with	
the	mammy	trope	(see	for	example,	Bradley,	2005;	Howard-Baptiste,	2014).	Kupenda’s	
experiences	as	a	Black	women	provide	her	with	the	insight,	what	Hill-Collins	(2009)	calls	
subjugated	knowledge,	to	identify	this	act	of	marginalization.		
Corollary	to	the	power	to	know—or	to	benefit	from	the	epistemic	resources	
associated	with	one’s	social	identities—is	the	power	to	be	ignorant.	In	the	example	above,	
Kupena	is	able	to	identify	that	the	dean	is	looking	for	her	to	mother	students	(sexist)	and	to	
be	a	Black	woman	who	nurtures	and	mothers	the	students	(racist).	What	she	identifies	
immediately,	the	dean	does	not	have	to	acknowledge	at	all.	The	dean’s	identity	power	
allows	him	to	be	ignorant	of	the	sexist	and	racist	content	of	his	seeming	compliment	(i.e.	
the	students	need	you	because	you	are	all	these	wonderful	things:	mother,	nurturer,	etc.).	
Epistemic	ignorance	is	an	important	tool	used	by	those	with	identity	power	to	undermine	
the	intellectual	contributions	of	individual	knowers	and	members	of	subordinate	identity	
groups	in	ways	that	do	harm.	As	described	in	greater	detail	below,	when	a	person	or	social	
group	routinely	experiences	the	discrediting	of	their	knowledge	contributions	because	of	
social	identities,	that	person	or	group	is	harmed	in	their	capacity	as	givers	of	knowledge	
(Fricker,	2007).		Because	knowledge	practices	advantage	some	while	disadvantaging	
others,	knowledge	and	power	are	linked;	therefore,	there	is	an	ethical	component	to	
knowledge	practice;	this	ethical	component	is	explored	in	theories	of	epistemic	injustice	
(described	in	detail	below).		
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Review	of	Theories	
Given	social	epistemology	is	a	theoretical	framework	from	which	to	consider	the	
relationship	between	institutions	and	social	identities	as	a	way	of	making,	sharing	and	
validating	knowledge,	this	chapter	turns	now	to	recent	theoretical	accounts	that	explore	
specifically	the	role	of	race	and	knowledge/ignorance	production	with	the	goal	of	
understanding	the	ethical	implications	of	racialized	knowledge	practices.		
Epistemic	Ignorance	
Charles	Mills	(1997)	described	a	racial	contract	that	“[prescribes]	norms	for	
cognition	to	which	its	signatories	must	adhere”	(p.	11).	The	norms	are	maintained	and	
enforced	by	the	racial	contract	that	privileges	white	people	over	people	of	color	physically	
(in	relation	to	resources,	and	in	relation	to	economic	opportunities)	and	epistemically.	
According	to	Mills,	what	counts	as	knowledge	of	reality	might	diverge	from	empirical	fact	
when	misinterpreting	the	world	is	necessary	to	maintain	the	racial	hierarchy.	Because	of	
the	racial	contract,	one	may	learn	to	see	the	world	wrongly	with	the	assurance	that	the	
misperception	will	be	affirmed	by	white	epistemic	authority.	This	disconnect	between	
what	Mills	refers	to	as	reality	and	normalized	perception	owing	to	white	privilege	gives	
rise	to	an	epistemology	of	ignorance.	Epistemic	ignorance	is	a	“cognitive	model	that	
precludes	self-transparency	and	genuine	understanding	of	social	realities”	(Mills,	1997,	p.	
18).	In	order	to	maintain	white	privilege,	a	structured	opacity	in	relation	to	race	is	
required.	White	misunderstandings	and	misrepresentations	related	to	race	are	structures	
of	society	that	maintain	systems	of	oppression.		
	 In	Mills’	(2007)	update	to	the	Racial	Contract,	he	further	develops	his	theory	of	
epistemic	ignorance	as	it	relates	to	race	focusing	on	white	ignorance	as	a	historical	and	
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social	practice	that	encourages	misinformation	and	the	spread	of	error.	Even	when	the	
cognizer	is	unaware	(e.g.	not	intentionally	being	racist),	the	socio-structural	nature	of	
white	ignorance	is	operatively	giving	rise	to	mistaken	beliefs.	Mills	grants	that	(1)	not	all	
white	people	are	equally	complicit	or	participatory	in	white	ignorance	because	other	social	
identities	lead	to	varied	experiences	and	socializations;	and	that	(2)	people	of	color	can	
manifest	white	ignorance	too,	owing	to	socialization	and	normative	practices.		Thus,	Mills	
(2007)	argues	that	“white	ignorance	is	best	thought	of	as	a	cognitive	tendency—an	
inclination,	a	doxastic	disposition—which	is	not	insuperable”	(p.	23).		It	is	normative	and	
cognitive	and,	therefore,	social	structures	maintain,	reproduce,	and	promote	the	flawed	
reasoning	of	the	racial	contract.		
White	ignorance,	then,	is	embedded	in	the	conceptual	frame	from	which	cognizers	
view	the	world;	it	is	already	present	in	the	concepts	that	drive	perception.	This	is	an	
incredibly	important	connection	between	systemic	ignorance	and	conceptual	frames.	Mills	
is	describing	an	existing	error	in	the	collective	interpretive	framework—epistemic	
ignorance	is	not	just	missing	information,	but	built-in	bad	information	that	drives	our	
normative	concepts.		It	is	because	of	the	normative	nature	of	white	ignorance	that	lacunas	
can	come	to	exist.	To	maintain	itself,	white	ignorance	seeks	to	control	narratives,	not	
correct	for	them,	so	that	the	“mystification	of	the	past	underwrites	a	mystification	of	the	
present”	(Mills,	2007,	p.	31).	For	example,	white	ignorance	permits	contemporary	society	
to	talk	about	slavery	as	a	thing	of	the	past	while	erasing	the	historical	legacy	of	
entitlements	for	white	people	such	as	white	veteran’s	relative	easy	access	to	the	GI	Bill’s	
mortgage	and	higher	education	benefits	that	provided	access	to	middle-class	status	while	
Black	veterans	faced	institutional	discrimination	at	the	state	level	limiting	their	access	to	
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equally	earned	Federal	benefits	(Katznelson,	2006).	Thus,	people	can	argue	for	a	
colorblindness	that	positions	everyone	as	equal	without	having	to	worry	about	the	
structural	extent	of	the	subordination	of	people	of	color	(Bonilla-Silva,	2009).	Ignoring	the	
history	of	what	Katznelson	calls	“when	Affirmative	Action	was	white,”	is	not	just	a	lacuna,	it	
is	not	just	a	lack	of	understanding	or	knowing;	it	is	a	crafting	of	collective	memory	(and	
silencing	of	counter	memory)	for	the	benefit	of	white	dominance.		
Alcoff	(2007)	extends	Mills’	account	of	epistemic	ignorance	concluding	that	
epistemic	ignorance	must	be	understood	as	a	“substantive	epistemic	practice”	(p.	56)	in	
and	of	itself	(not	just	an	absence)	and,	therefore,	“the	problem	is	in	the	cognitive	norm,	not	
in	the	identity…so	we	need	to	focus	on	isolating	and	identifying	these	dysfunctional	norms	
and	understand	how	they	operate”	(p.	50).	For	Alcoff,	this	understanding	can	be	made	
possible	through	an	epistemic	reflexivity	that	is	critically	aware	of	its	relationship	to	the	
systems	in	which	it	is	produced.		
Epistemic	Injustice:	Fricker’s	Account	
	 Over	the	past	decade,	many	philosophers	have	taken	up	and	critically	engaged	
theorizing	about	epistemic	injustice.	Most,	if	not	all,	work	from,	critique	or	make	reference	
to	Fricker’s	(2007)	account.	Therefore,	this	section	starts	with	Fricker’s	(2007)	initial	
theorizing	and	then	explores	theorizing	by	additional	philosophers.	In	Epistemic	Injustice:	
Power	and	ethics	of	knowing,	Fricker	(2007)	tries	to	sketch	out	a	description	of	both	the	
distinctive	type	of	harm	done	to	individuals	as	knowers	when	their	individual	and	social	
group	knowledge	is	discounted	owing	to	identity	prejudice,5while	also	developing	an	
account	of	how	individuals	can	correct	for	these	discriminatory	practices.	Linking	social	
epistemology	and	feminist	standpoint	theory,	Fricker	explores	the	spaces	where	epistemic	
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interactions	become,	or—perhaps	more	importantly—reveal,	a	politics	of	epistemic	
practice.	Fricker	is	intentionally	drafting	a	socially	situated	account	of	epistemic	practice	
that	understands	participants	to	be	“operating	as	social	types	who	stand	in	relations	of	
power	to	one	another”	(2007,	p.	3).	Fricker	puts	forth	what	she	calls	two	forms	of	epistemic	
injustice:	testimonial	and	hermeneutical	injustice.	Summarizing	the	difference	between	
testimonial	and	hermeneutical	injustice,	Fricker	(2007)	argues:	
Testimonial	injustice	occurs	when	prejudice	causes	a	hearer	to	give	a	deflated	level	
of	credibility	to	a	speaker’s	word;	hermeneutical	injustice	occurs	at	a	prior	stage,	
when	a	gap	in	collective	interpretive	resources	puts	someone	at	an	unfair	
disadvantage	when	it	comes	to	making	sense	of	their	social	experiences…We	might	
say	that	testimonial	injustice	is	caused	by	prejudice	in	the	economy	of	credibility;	
and	that	hermeneutical	injustice	is	caused	by	structural	prejudice	in	the	economy	of	
collective	hermeneutical	resources	(emphasis	added,	p.1).		
We	see	clearly	that	Fricker	acknowledges	the	two	forms	of	knowledge	injustice	are	linked;	
hermeneutical	injustice	occurs	at	a	prior	stage;	therefore,	we	can	infer	that	it	is	present	in	
the	collective	knowledge	resource	from	which	individuals	(including	perpetrators	of	
testimonial	injustice)	draw.	However,	Fricker	does	not	define	the	two	forms	in	relation	to	a	
system	or	one	another.	Rather,	she	takes	care	to	define	each	separately;	this	structure	is	
mirrored	below	during	the	review	of	her	account.		
Testimonial	injustice	occurs	when	identity	prejudice,	or	prejudice	based	on	
stereotypes	associated	with	one	of	the	speaker’s	social	identities,	causes	a	knower’s	
credibility	to	be	devalued.		When	identity	prejudice	causes	a	listener	to	devalue	the	
speaker’s	credibility,	a	“credibility	deficit”	is	inflicted	upon	the	speaker	(Fricker,	2007,	p.	
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27).		Since	social	constructs	(e.g.	gender,	race,	etc.)	implicate	patterns	of	systemic	social	
injustice	in	the	epistemic	exchange,	Fricker	concludes	that	a	speaker	is	the	victim	of	
testimonial	injustice	only	if	the	hearer	believes	the	speaker’s	credibility	to	be	deficient	
because	of	the	hearer’s	internalized	identity	prejudice.		
Fricker	offers	the	treatment	of	Tom	Robinson	in	Harper	Lee’s	To	Kill	A	Mockingbird	
as	an	example	of	testimonial	injustice.		In	the	novel	set	in	1935	Alabama,	Tom	Robinson,	a	
Black	man,	is	accused	of	raping	a	white	woman	even	though	he	repeatedly	proclaims	his	
innocence.		As	the	trial	progresses,	evidence	supplied	by	attorney	Atticus	Finch	makes	clear	
to	the	reader	that	Robinson,	who	was	injured	by	a	machine	years	earlier	at	work,	physically	
could	not	have	assaulted	the	woman.		However,	members	of	the	all	white	jury	believe	
prevailing	prejudicial	racial	stereotypes.		Finch	is	aware	of	this,	and	in	his	closing	argument	
compels	the	jury	to	“do	their	duty”	to	dispense	with	the	assumptions	that	“all	Negroes	lie,	
that	all	Negros	are	basically	immoral	beings,	that	all	Negro	men	are	not	to	be	trusted	
around	our	women”	(Lee,	1960,	p.	202,	emphasis	in	original).		
Succumbing	to	the	automatic	and	deeply	rooted	identity	prejudice	that	forms	the	
architecture	of	the	jurors’	perception	of	Robinson,	the	jury	finds	him	guilty.		The	jurors	fail	
in	their	duty	to	use	the	evidence	to	make	an	appropriate	testimonial	judgment.		This	failed	
epistemic	duty	wronged	Robinson	as	it	wrongs	all	victims	of	testimonial	injustice,	in	their	
capacity	as	givers	of	knowledge	because	they	are	“degraded	qua	knower,	and	they	are	
symbolically	degraded	qua	human”	(Fricker,	2007,	p.	44).		
Hermeneutical	injustice	occurs	when	“some	significant	area	of	one’s	social	
experience	[is]	obscured	from	collective	understanding	owing	to	a	structural	identity	
prejudice	in	the	collective	hermeneutic	resource”	(Fricker,	2007,	p.	155).		Hence,	the	
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hermeneutical	type	of	epistemic	injustice	occurs	in	the	realm	of	socially	accepted	
knowledge	(p.	155).		As	in	the	case	of	testimonial	injustice,	hermeneutical	injustice	is	
systematic	because	the	marginalization	that	causes	it	is	part	of	a	broad	pattern	that	impacts	
a	social	group	(e.g.	women	of	color).		Thus,	while	testimonial	injustice	(the	degrading	of	a	
speaker’s	testimony	owing	to	credibility	prejudice	on	the	part	of	the	hearer)	is	the	primary	
case	of	epistemic	injustice,	hermeneutic	injustice	marginalizes	members	of	subordinated	
groups	by	barring	them	from	equal	hermeneutical	participation	and,	hence,	their	
experiences	are	not	represented	in	the	collective	conceptual	framework.	Therefore,	when	
members	of	marginalized	groups	try	to	draw	on	their	experiences	they	are	not	understood	
by	hearers	outside	of	their	social	identity	group;	their	knowledge,	which	cannot	be	
understood,	is	what	Hill-Collins	(2010)	describes	as	“subjugated	knowledge.”	
Again,	Fricker	(2007)	offers	an	illustrative	example.	In	the	case	of	hermeneutical	
injustice,	she	describes	the	experiences	of	Carmita	Woods.		Woods	requested	a	department	
transfer	after	being	repeatedly	groped	by	a	male	colleague	at	Cornell	University.		When	the	
transfer	request	was	denied,	she	resigned	and	subsequently	applied	for	unemployment	
insurance.		The	claims	forms	did	not	include	a	specific	term	for	her	experience,	so	Woods	
listed	“personal”	as	a	reason	for	leaving	her	job,	and	she	was	therefore	denied	benefits.		
When	Woods	shared	her	story	in	a	class,	the	other	women	could	identify	with	her	
experience;	they	contacted	a	lawyer	and	decided	to	speak	out	against	the	condition	they	
named	“sexual	harassment.”	
Woods	and	the	women	in	her	coalition	identified	a	gap	where	the	name	of	the	distinct	
social	phenomena	they	were	experiencing	should	be	in	the	collective	hermeneutical	
resource.		Certainly	Woods	herself	suffered	a	wrong,	but	systemic	social	conditions	
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occasioned	the	gap	in	the	collective	interpretive	resource	that	caused	her	and	other	women	
in	similar	conditions	to	be	unintelligible.		Because	women	lack(ed)	social	power,	they	had	
unequal	access	to	hermeneutic	participation	and	so	a	significant	aspect	of	her	social	
experience	was	marginalized	and	obscured	from	collective	understanding.			
Each	type	of	epistemic	injustice	results	in	a	particular	type	of	corresponding	harm	
to	the	speaker.		In	the	case	of	testimonial	injustice,	repeated	wrongful	denial	of	epistemic	
credibility	leads	to	a	loss	of	knowledge	for	speakers	because	“not	only	is	he	repeatedly	
subject	to	the	intrinsic	epistemic	insult	that	is	the	primary	injustice,	but	where	this	
persistent	intellectual	undermining	causes	him	to	lose	confidence	in	his	beliefs	and/or	his	
justification	for	them,	he	literally	loses	knowledge”	(Fricker,	2007,	p.	49).	Astutely,	Fricker	
offers	social	psychologist	Claude	Steele’s	research	about	stereotype	threat	as	evidence	of	
this	phenomenon.		
For	over	two	decades,	Steele	has	demonstrated	that	students	sharing	a	social	
identity	for	which	there	is	a	pervasive	negative	stereotype	(e.g.	women	perform	poorly	on	
math	exams;	Black	students	perform	less	successfully	than	their	white	peers	on	exams)	
often	have	a	tendency	to	perform	to	these	stereotypes	when	the	students	have	an	
awareness	that	these	negative	stereotypes	may	be	pertinent	in	a	given	situation	(Spencer,	
Logel,	&	Davies,	2016).	In	relation	to	racial	stereotype	threat,	for	example,	Steele	(2010)	
found	that	Black	students	will	perform	less	well	than	white	students	on	the	verbal	portion	
of	the	GRE	when	the	test	is	described	as	a	measure	of	intellectual	ability	as	the	students	are	
aware	of	related	stereotypes	that	suggest	their	group	has	decreased	intellectual	ability	
(Steele,	2010).	However,	when	the	same	test	is	given	to	similar	groupings	of	Black/white	
students	and	the	questions	are	instead	described	as	“tasks,”	(a	non-evaluative	operation)	
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students	with	marginalized	racial	identities	perform	at	the	same	or	higher	levels	than	their	
dominant-identified	counterparts	as	the	identity	related	negative	stereotype	is	no	longer	
relevant	to	the	situation	(Steele,	2010).	Because	of	stereotype	threat,	students	implicated	in	
socially	constructed,	identity-based	credibility	deficits	functionally	lose	knowledge	as	the	
fear	of	confirming	a	“broadly	held	negative	stereotype”	(Steele,	2010)	about	their	social	
group	can	occasion	their	academic	underperformance	(see	for	example	Steele,	1997;	
Spencer,	Steele,	&	Quinn,	1999;	Steele,	Spencer,	&	Aronson,	2002).		
Importantly,	when	one	is	wronged	in	her	capacity	to	give	knowledge,	as	Fricker	and	
Steele	demonstrate,	one’s	ability	to	give	reason	is	also	harmed;	this	is	a	dehumanizing	act.	
As	Fricker	compellingly	argues:	
The	epistemic	wrong	bears	a	social	meaning	to	the	effect	that	the	subject	is	less	than	
fully	human.	When	someone	suffers	a	testimonial	injustice,	they	are	degraded	qua	
knower,	and	they	are	symbolically	degraded	qua	human…what	the	person	suffers	
from	is	not	simply	the	epistemic	wrong	in	itself,	but	also	the	meaning	of	being	
treated	like	that…a	dehumanizing	meaning	(Fricker,	2007,	p.	44).		
Given	testimonial	exchanges	are	the	“primary	form	of	knowledge	in	everyday	life,”	
excluding	a	subject	from	participating	in	credible	exchanges	marginalizes	the	knower	in	
her	capacity	as	knower	and	as	a	social	being	(Alcoff	&	Martin,	2001,	p.	236).	Fricker	(2007)	
concludes	that	testimonial	injustice	is	a	form	of	oppression	that	can	be	“explicitly	
repressive	(as	it	was	for	Tom	Robinson)	or	it	can	be	a	silent	by-product	of	residual	
prejudice	in	a	liberal	society”	(p.	58).		
Extending	this	argument,	Fricker	(2007)	claims	entire	social	groups	can	be	harmed	
in	their	capacity	to	understand	their	own	social	experiences	because	of	hermeneutical	
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injustice.	In	instances	of	hermeneutic	injustice	a	group	is	excluded	from	participating	in	
both	the	pool	and	spread	of	knowledge	because	of	identity	prejudice	in	the	collective	
hermeneutical	resource;	the	consequences	of	this	are	two-fold.		In	the	case	of	Carmita	
Woods,	Woods	as	an	individual	was	harmed	because	she	was	not	able	to	make	herself	
understood	to	the	people	at	the	unemployment	office	because	she	lacked	terms	they	would	
understand.		But	the	first	harm	occurred	because	of	a	prior	harm:	women	as	a	social	group	
were	not	(are	not)	permitted	equal	participation	in	the	shared	hermeneutical	resource	so	
their	collective	experiences	were	left	out	of	the	social	interpretive	framework.	The	latter	
wrong	is	structural	and	discriminatory;	it	excludes	groups	from	contributing	to	and	from	
spreading	knowledge,	while	it	also	leads	to	a	loss	of	epistemic	confidence	among	
disadvantaged	groups.	
Fricker	holds	that	testimonial	and	hermeneutical	injustice	are	related	forms	of	
injustice.		Fricker	understands	that	hermeneutical	marginalization	impacts	individuals	
throughout	their	social/societal	interactions	(i.e.	with	their	employers,	in	interactions	with	
state	agents);	this	makes	the	injustice	systemic,	which	renders	victims	susceptible	to	many	
types	of	injustice	just	as	testimonial	injustice	does.		What	is	more,	since	hermeneutical	
injustice	is	often	situated	in	exchanges	where	the	speaker	cannot	be	heard	as	intelligible	in	
a	testimonial	exchange,	it	is	often	exacerbated	by	testimonial	injustice.	Fricker	(2007)	
concludes	that	both	types	of	injustice	then	“bear	the	aspect	of	oppression”	because	“both	
kinds	of	systemic	epistemic	injustice	stem	from	structural	inequalities	of	power”	(p.	156).		
Both	forms	of	injustice	lead	to	a	decrease	in	epistemic	confidence,	which	can,	in	turn,	
perniciously	impact	the	construction	of	one’s	conception	of	self-hood.	Fricker	(2007)	
asserts,	“hermeneutical	injustice	can	mean	that	someone	is	socially	constituted	as,	and	
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perhaps	even	caused	to	be,	something	they	are	not,	and	which	it	is	against	their	interests	to	
be	seen	to	be”	so,	as	was	the	case	with	testimonial	injustice,	one’s	very	self-hood	is	
undermined	(p.	168).			
While	making	it	clear	that	her	goal	is	to	develop	a	theory	of	epistemic	injustice,	
Fricker	(2007)	does	begin	to	sketch	a	theoretical	framework	of	epistemic	justice.		The	
epistemically	just	listener	is	sensitive	to	context,	to	the	speaker’s	sincerity,	and	open	to	
trusting	the	interlocutor.		Asserting	that	prejudice	will	always	exist	but	will	change	with	
history,	Fricker	insists	that	the	listener	has	an	ethical	responsibility	to	develop	a	critical	
link	between	how	she	was	ethically	socialized	and	her	life	experiences	so	that	the	listener	
uses	participation,	practice	and	observation	of	testimonial	exchanges	to	inform	her	latent	
background	theory.		
Adjusting	her	judgments	as	she	reflects	and	discerns	that	they	are	based	on	
stereotypes,	the	virtuous	listener	may	undergo	a	change	in	how	she	generates	credibility	
judgments	about	members	of	certain	socially	constructed	groups.	The	virtuous	listener	
reflects	and	then	adjusts	unfounded	or	erroneous	judgments.	Fricker	posits	that	both	
hearers	and	speakers	have	race	and	gender;	neither	party	can	be	neutral.		Again,	we	see	
socially	constructed	identities	are	unavoidable	factors	in	epistemic	exchanges;	however,	
the	hearer	must	develop	a	“corrective	anti-prejudicial	virtue	that	is	distinctively	reflexive	in	
structure”	(Fricker,	2007,	p.	156,	emphasis	original).		A	virtuous	hearer	must	not	
universalize	race	or	gender;	she	must	“neutralize	the	impact	of	prejudice	in	her	credibility	
judgments”	through	reflexive	critical	social	awareness	which,	with	practice,	will	occasion	a	
gestalt	shift	(Fricker,	2007,	p.	192).		I	read	“neutralize”	to	mean	“to	suspend”	or	“to	adjust”	
for	what	the	listener	knows	to	be	internalized	identity	prejudice	(Fricker,	2007,	p.	7).			
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Developing	this	criticality	requires	a	reflexivity	that	is	practiced	and	on-going	in	
order	to	compensate	for	the	negative	impact	of	identity	prejudices	to	increase	the	degree	of	
credibility	one	affords	her	interlocutor	so	her	credibility	is	no	longer	downgraded	by	
prejudice.	Fricker	(2007)	writes	that	epistemic	justice	is	corrective;	this	means	that	
epistemic	justice	does	not	remove	or	deny	the	existence	of	societal	prejudice.	Rather,	it	
calls	upon	the	hearer	to	be	aware	of	and	on	the	lookout	for	prejudices	in	her	credibility	
judgment	and	to	make	attempts	to	adapt	her	credibility	assessment	in	order	to	minimize	
habitually	the	impacts	of	these	prejudices	as	to	develop	a	pattern	of	“suitably	
reconditioned”	corrected	credibility	judgments	(Fricker,	2007,	p.	97).	While	Fricker’s	
(2007)	goal	is	for	each	listener	to	develop	the	virtue	of	testimonial	justice,	she	does	provide	
an	awareness	that	in	our	social	world	such	a	virtue	will	likely	never	be	fully	developed	
because	the	nature	of	prejudices	is	that	they	are	“ever	changing	and	self-renewing”	(p.	97).	
Hermeneutical	justice	shares	with	testimonial	justice	the	demand	for	reflexivity	to	
guard	against	and	to	correct	for	identity	prejudice.			However,	in	the	hermeneutic	context,	
the	listener	must	acknowledge	that	there	can	sometimes	be	more	than	one	interpretation	
of	the	truth,	and	so	she	should	be	listening	to	hear	if	her	interlocutor	is	offering	an	
alternative	interpretation.		Listeners	must	correct	for	the	credibility	deficit	resulting	from	
the	speaker’s	marginalization,	and,	as	in	the	case	of	testimonial	injustice,	neutralize	the	
impact	of	identity	prejudice	which	is,	in	this	case,	systemic	to	the	shared	hermeneutic	
resource.		Fricker	(2007)	argues	that	the	virtue	of	hermeneutic	justice	is	to	“neutralize	the	
impact	of	structural	identity	prejudice	on	one’s	credibility	judgment”	(p.	173).	The	
hermeneutically	virtuous	listener,	then,	is	one	who	uses	“reflexive	critical	sensitivity”	to	
recognize	what	might	be	a	lack	of	intelligibility	suffered	by	the	speaker	due	to	a	lack	in	the	
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collective	hermeneutical	resource,	and	she	“adjusts	or	suspends”	her	“credibility	judgment	
accordingly”	(Fricker,	2007,	p.	7).		
Epistemic	Injustice:	Broadening	the	Account			
	 While	Fricker’s	(2007)	account	of	epistemic	injustice	is	seminal	and	a	baseline	
theory	from	which	the	concept	of	epistemic	injustice	used	in	this	paper	has	developed,	it	
has	also	been	critiqued	and	expanded	in	recent	years.	Hookway	(2010)	argues	that	there	
are	types	of	epistemic	injustice	that	do	not	involve	credibility	(testimonial	injustice)	or	
conceptual	resources	(hermeneutical	injustice).	Specifically,	Hookway	(2010)	claims	that	
epistemic	injustice	can	occur	prior	to	the	testimonial	exchange	taking	place;	namely,	in	the	
silencing	(or	perhaps	dismissing)	of	the	possibility	of	an	agent	contributing	testimony	due	
to	assumptions	about	one	or	more	of	the	individual’s	social	identities.	According	to	
Hookway	(2010)	this	is	a	genuinely	epistemic	injustice,	but	it	is	manifested	outside	of	the	
direct	testimonial	exchange	in	“practices	that	are	constitutive	of	activities	that	are	
distinctively	epistemic”	(p.	155).		
	 Hookway	offers	a	helpful	school	based	example.	Imagine	a	teacher	who	readily	
answers	a	student’s	question	when	the	student	raises	her	hand.		If	the	student	asserts	that	
she	is	confused	or	needs	help,	the	teacher	readily	accepts	her	assertion	and	provides	the	
necessary	information.	However,	when	the	same	student	raises	her	hand	to	contribute	an	
assertion—whether	in	question	or	statement	form—the	teacher	dismisses	the	student	out	
of	hand	assuming	that	the	student,	because	of	her	identity,	cannot	make	a	relevant	
contribution.	Hookway	concludes	that	there	are	cases,	such	as	these,	where	an	individual	is	
assumed	to	not	be	able	to	contribute	or	to	participate.	The	result,	she	argues,	is	that	the	
student	no	longer	believes	herself	to	be	a	possible	participant	in	the	inquiry	or	discussion;	
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she	loses	epistemic	confidence	and	is,	in	effect,	epistemically	silenced.	Hookway	(2010)	
calls	this	the	“participant	perspective”	of	epistemic	injustice	(p.	155).	Hookway	(2010)	
asserts	that	we	must	be	critically	aware	of	the	way	stereotypes	and	prejudices	influence	
our	judgments	about	the	relevance	of	an	agent’s	potential	contributions.	Epistemic	injustice	
can	include	a	“refusal	to	take	seriously	the	ability	of	an	agent	to	provide	information	that	is	
relevant	in	the	current	context”	(Hookway,	2010,	p.	158).		
	 Furthermore,	Alcoff	(2010)	and	Mason	(2011)	develop	nuanced	critiques	of	
Fricker’s	articulation	of	epistemic	injustice.	Alcoff	reads	Fricker’s	description	of	testimonial	
injustice	as	the	listener	wrongly	responding	to	speech,	while	hermeneutic	injustice	
preempts	speaking.	Thus,	Alcofff	reads	Fricker	as	arguing	that	testimonial	and	
hermeneutical	injustice	are	distinct	but	mutually	supportive.	These	observations	lead	
Alcoff	(2010)	to	raise	two	most	interesting	challenges	for	Fricker:	“Can	volitional	epistemic	
practice	correct	for	non-volitional	prejudices?”	and	“How	can	we	address	the	structural	
causes	of	credibility-deflation?”	(p.	128).			
	 For	Fricker	(2007),	correction	for	identity	prejudice	in	testimonial	exchanges	
requires	that	the	listener	either	(1)	bump	up	the	speaker’s	credibility	to	correct	for	a	
deficit,	(2)	work	to	be	neutral	instead	of	skeptical	or	automatically	misbelieving,	(3)	be	
aware	of	the	challenges	some	speakers	face	in	making	certain	claims	because	of	the	
speakers’	social	identity(ies).		Alcoff	(2010)	finds	these	intentional	and	volitional	acts	to	be	
worrisome	because	“prejudice	can	operate	quite	effectively	even	when	it	runs	counter	to	a	
person’s	own	consciously	held	values	and	commitments”	(p.	132).	Alcoff	does	not	reject	
Fricker’s	account	of	epistemic	justice;	rather,	she	finds	the	volitional	virtue	of	testimonial	
justice	to	be	insufficient.	She	observes	that	more	must	be	done,	particularly	in	educational	
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settings,	to	“correct	the	identity	prejudices	built	up	out	of	our	faulty	narratives	of	history”	
(Alcoff,	2010,	p.	132).		
	 While	it	is	important	that	Alcoff	(2010)	questions	Fricker’s	(2007)	reliance	on	the	
listener’s	awareness	and	habitual	corrective	reflexivity,	it	is	also	relevant	to	consider	
recent	research	in	social	psychology	that	finds	both	a	person’s	awareness	and	habits	can	
assist	in	decreasing	implicit	prejudices	and	stereotypes	(Rudman,	Ashmore,	&	Gary,	2001;	
Devine,	Forscher,	Austin,	&	Cox,	2012).	Rudman	et	al.	(2001)	studied	a	course	focused	on	
prejudice	and	conflict.	They	found	that	students	experienced	a	reduction	of	explicit	and	
implicit	prejudice	through	a	combination	of	students’	motivation	to	be	non-prejudiced,	
students’	learning	about	their	own	biases,	and	students’	positive	interactions	with	out-
group	student	peers	in	the	course.6	Building	from	research	on	awareness	of	bias	and	the	
reduction	of	prejudice,	Devine	et	al.	(2012)	developed	what	they	describe	as	a	“prejudice	
habit-breaking	intervention”	(p.	1267).		These	researchers	found	that	if	a	person	is	aware	
of	their	biases	and	is	concerned	about	the	consequences	of	those	biases,	that	person	can	be	
motivated	to	eliminate	bias	using	five	specific	strategies.	These	strategies	include:	
stereotype	replacement,	counter-stereotypic	imaging,	individuation,	perspective	taking,	
and	increased	opportunities	for	contact	(Devine	et	al.,	2012).		
	 There	are	some	significant	links	between	Devine	et	al.’s	model	and	Fricker’s	(2007)	
account	of	testimonial	virtue.		Firstly,	stereotype	replacement	helps	a	participant	to	
recognize	her	responses	are	based	on	stereotypes,	identify	them	as	stereotypical	and	then	
reflect	on	why	they	occurred.	This	is	followed	by	a	consideration	of	“how	the	biased	
response	could	be	avoided	in	the	future	and	replaces	it	with	an	unbiased	response”	(Devine	
et	al.,	2012,	p.	1267).	Counter-stereotypic	imaging	requires	the	participant	to	correct	for	
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stereotypes	by	making	positive	counter-stereotypes	accessible	(e.g.	the	image	of	a	smart	
Black	man	in	contrast	to	the	common	stereotype	that	associates	Black	man/people	with	a	
lack	of	formal	education)	so	one	can	challenge	the	validity	of	negative	stereotypes.	
Individuation	calls	upon	the	participant	to	learn	more	about	stereotyped	groups	and	their	
members.	These	three	strategies—stereotype	replacement,	counter-stereotypic	imaging,	
and	individuation—are	key	practices	of	the	virtuous	listener	(as	described	above).	
	 Even	though	recent	empirical	research	supports	Fricker’s	(2007)	assertion	that	
listeners	can/should	correct	for	identity	prejudice,	her	account	is	not	without	relevant	
critique.	Alcoff	(2010),	along	with	Mason	(2011),	further	notes	that	Fricker’s	account	of	
identity,	particularly	in	the	case	of	hermeneutical	injustice,	fails	to	acknowledge	that	social	
identity	can	be	the	source	of	epistemic	resources.	Alcoff	(2010)	and	Mason	(2011)	both	
observe	that,	while	social	identity	can	be	the	source	of	unearned	merit	or	marginalization,	
it	can	also	be	a	resource	when	“one	is	structurally	positioned	in	society	to	tend	to	see	what	I	
cannot”	(emphasis	original,	Alcoff,	2010,	p.	134).		As	Mason	(2011)	argues,	social	groups	
with	target	identities	often	have	“non-dominant	interpretive	resources	from	which	they	can	
draw	to	understand	and	describe	their	experiences	despite	absences	or	distortions	that	
exist	in	so-called	collective	hermeneutical	resources”	(emphasis	added,	p.	295).	Fricker	
asserts	that	epistemic	injustice	leads	to	a	loss	of	knowledge	because	people	cannot	name	or	
make	intelligible	their	experiences.	Mason	re-interprets	the	Carmita	Woods	case,	agreeing	
it	is	an	example	of	hermeneutic	injustice,	but	Mason	also	thinks	that	the	Woods	case	is	an	
example	of	epistemic	agency.	Woods	sought	out	a	feminist	advocate	and	a	women’s	group;	
Woods	helped	to	organize	and	speak	out	against	her	rejected	insurance	claim	with	the	
women	in	her	group.		 	
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	 As	Mason	(2011)	describes:	
These	were	not	the	actions	of	a	woman	mystified	by	her	experiences	of	a	yet-to-be-
named	phenomenon;	rather,	the	silencing	to	which	she	had	previously	been	subject	
was	exploded	by	the	coalition	she	formed	with	other	women	who	both	corroborated	
and	supplemented	her	experiences	with	their	own	(p.	297).		
Mason	raises	two	important	critiques:	(1)	it	is	the	case	that	marginalized	groups	can	name	
and	describe	some	shared	phenomenon	even	if	there	is	a	lacuna	in	the	collective	
knowledge	resources,	and	(2)	coalition	with	others	who	share	in	a	marginalized	experience	
can	be	an	epistemic	resource,	one	that	can	not	only	affirm	an	experience,	but	also	help	one	
describe	it	and	take	action	to	resist	and	change	it.		Mason	asserts	that	Fricker	makes	this	
error	because	collective	hermeneutical	resource	in	Fricker’s	account	is	the	dominant	
account.	Mason	wants	to	assert	that	there	are	multiple	collective	hermeneutical	accounts,	
including	the	ones	shared	by	marginalized	populations.	Mason	(2011)	infers	that	this	
implicit	assumption	about	“collective”	hermeneutical	resources	is	problematic	because	it	
does	not	explicitly	hold	members	of	dominant	groups	accountable	for	maintaining	
distorted	understandings	of	marginalized	experiences/groups	even	though	contrary,	“and	
arguably	better,	interpretations	that	fail	(through	systemic	hermeneutic	marginalization)	
to	gain	voice	in	dominant	discourse”	are	available	in	the	non-dominant	hermeneutic	
resource	(p.	300).	This	critique	brings	us	back	to	Alcoff’s	(2010)	concern	that	epistemic	
justice	cannot	rest	on	volitional	acts.	If	alternative	interpretations	already	exist	and	are	
available,	there	is	more	to	hermeneutic	justice	than	a	listener	simply	needing	to	neutralize	
systemic	misinformation.		
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Advancing	Mason’s	argument	that	subordinate	groups	have	a	shared	understanding	
or	knowledge	resource,	some	philosophers	describe	marginalized	groups’	epistemologies	
of	resistance	(Medina,	2013;	Dotson,	2011;	Gilson,	2011;	Bailey,	2007).7	Bailey	(2007)	
argues	that	the	oppressed	are	simultaneously	resisting	subjects	who	learn	to	use	the	
“dominator’s	tools”	without	replicating	that	dominance	(p.	87).	She	extends	this	assertion	
(which	should	be	seen	as	an	extension	of	DuBois’	[1994]	double	consciousness	and	Collin’s	
[2000]	outsider-within)	to	develop	a	notion	of	strategic	ignorance.	Strategic	ignorance	
takes	the	misconceptions	of	the	dominant	group	and	actively	uses	them	to	resist.	So,	for	
example,	the	domestic	worker	who	acts	childlike	and	simple	is	knowingly	performing	to	
the	employer’s	prejudices.	As	Bailey	(2007)	admits,	strategic	ignorance	is	not	an	answer	for	
white	epistemic	ignorance;	it	needs	to	be	part	of	a	“broad	coalition	of	resistance”	that	
includes	engagement	between	white	people	and	people	of	color	(p.	90).	I	believe	this	to	be	
an	important	extension	of	Fricker’s	work	because	Bailey	connects	the	clear	need	for	white	
people	(people	with	dominant	identities)	to	do	the	work	of	critically	reflecting	on	their	
knowledge	assumptions	and	practices	but	while	doing	so	in	coalition	with	people	of	color	
(people	with	non-dominant	identities),	so	as	to	broaden	their	epistemic	resources	and	
interpretive	frames.	
Bailey	(2007)	begins	to	articulate	what	I	call	a	knowing	in	coalition	with—an	
important	epistemic	practice	that	can	work	against	what	Dotson	(2011)	characterizes	as	
epistemic	violence,	or	the	intentional	silencing	of	marginalized	groups.	Black	feminist	
theorists	(e.g.	Patricia	Hill	Collins)	have	long	argued	that	they	are	discounted	as	possible	
knowers	because	there	is	widespread	belief	in	the	social	narrative	(social	imaginary,	as	
Fricker	calls	it)	that	they	are,	for	example,	mammies	or	matriarchs.	These	controlling	
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images	prevent	Black	women	from	being	perceived	as	knowers	able	to	offer	testimony.	
Because	white	people	are	not	aware	of	the	narratives	that	permeate	their	immediate	
responses	to	marginalized	givers	of	testimony,	they	lack	a	contextual	understanding	of	the	
epistemic	exchange.		As	Gilson	(2011)	powerfully	argues,	“A	refusal	to	recognize	historical	
context	constitutes	ignorance	about	race	and	facilitates	an	ignorant	preservation	of	white	
privilege,	which	is	simultaneously	a	way	of	remaining	ignorant	about	oneself	and	one’s	
share	in	that	history”	(p.	120).	Gilson	offers	an	important	extension	to	Dotson’s	critique:	an	
unwillingness	of	white	people	to	be	epistemically	vulnerable,	or	open	to	an	understanding	
of	themselves	in	relation	to	those	with	marginalized	social	identities,	constitutes	an	
epistemic	ignorance.	Epistemic	vulnerability	is	what	makes	learning	and,	thereby,	reducing	
ignorance	epistemically	possible	because	it	repositions	the	listener	not	just	as	a	knower	
and	a	judger	of	epistemic	credibility,	but	also	as	an	interlocutor	who	understands	that	she	
can	learn	from	the	experiences	of	others.	This	practice	of	epistemic	openness	is	a	“resource	
for	ethical	response	and	political	resistance	to	oppression”	(Gilson,	2011,	p.	324).	
However,	epistemic	vulnerability	should	not	only	be	practiced	by	those	with	
dominant	social	identities.	Gilson	(2011)	foregrounds	an	intersectional	understanding	of	
identities	arguing	that	that	those	who	experience	both	privilege	and	oppression	must	
practice	epistemic	vulnerability	because	all	interlocutors	have	lapses	and	gaps	“in	our	
experience	and	attunement	that	demand	alterations	in	our	knowing”	(p.	325).	Gilson	
(2011)	understands	that	Fricker’s	lacunas	in	the	shared	interpretive	resource	do	not	only	
impact	the	oppressed	as	those	who	cannot	be	made	intelligible	and	the	privileged	as	those	
who	cannot	understand	the	oppressed,	but,	rather,	that	the	lacunas	impact	all	knowers	
differentially	relative	to	their	social	locations.	In	other	words,	everyone	stands	to	learn	
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from	others	to	alter	beliefs,	ideas	and	a	sense	of	self;	Gilson	(2011)	does	not	leave	people	
who	experience	oppression	out	of	the	process	of	creating	hermeneutic	justice.	This	is	not	to	
suggest	that	everyone	stands	to	learn	equally	or	that	we	can	discount	power.	Rather,	it	
serves	to	include	the	active	work	of	marginalized	groups	in	creating	epistemic	justice.		
There	are	many	examples	of	marginalized	groups	raising	awareness	and	taking	
action	towards	epistemic	justice,	including	the	vignette	described	at	the	start	of	this	
chapter.	Reflecting	on	my	own	journey	as	a	white	woman	in	education,	I	realize	that	when	I	
began	teaching	as	a	twenty-one-year-old	in	an	alternative	certification	program,	I	very	
likely	would	have	read	a	writing	prompt	like	the	journalism	assignments	as	“man	robs	
store”	with	no	awareness	of	its	problematic	assumptions	and	harmful	implications.	It	is	
through	content	learning	about	identities	and	inequalities,	contact	with	my	students	of	
color	and	through	the	habitual	practice	of	perspective	taking	as	a	critical	educator	that	I	am	
now	able	to	identify	both	the	problematic	nature	of	the	assigned	scenario	and	the	
testimonial	injustice	experienced	by	the	students	in	the	course.	Still,	it	was	only	after	
multiple	semesters	of	hearing	this	scenario,	in	this	particular	journalism	course,	raised	by	
Latina/o	students	that	I	am	able	to	perceive	the	pervasive,	harmful	impact	of	these	
exchanges	on	students.	When	the	professor	ignores	students’	feedback	semester	after	
semester,	students	feel	offended	and	de-valued	as	learners	in	the	course.	Students’	agency	
as	learners	and	as	journalistic	writers	is	undermined	by	their	professor’s	denial	of	their	
insight	and	dignity	as	racialized	knowers	in	the	course.		
	 If	hermeneutic	justice	is	something	to	strive	for,	it	will	need	interpretations	of	
marginalized	groups	to	join	with	the	developing	critical	awareness	of	dominant	groups.	
Meaningful	interactions	(e.g.	course	based	dialogue)	with	marginalized	groups	is	what	
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informs	the	critical	self-reflection	of	dominant	identified	individuals	(this	too	is	shown	by	
the	social	psychology	Fricker	is	so	keen	to	draw	from,	for	example,	Gaertner	&	Dovidio,	
1986).	Acknowledging	the	influence	of	marginalized	collective	resources	can	also	help	to	
account	for	the	understanding	individuals	can	develop	owing	to	their	multiple	social	
identities.	For	example,	white	women	experience	marginalization	as	a	result	of	being	
women,	but	also	dominance	owing	to	their	whiteness.	This	allows	for	access	to	both	
dominant	and	non-dominant	collective	hermeneutical	resources.	This	combination	can	be	
powerful	and	epistemically	invaluable;	although,	too	often,	white	women	rely	on	the	safety	
of	their	whiteness	and	fail	to	act	on	their	access	to	the	marginalized	experience	of	women	
across	race	and	ethnicity.	A	productive	account	of	hermeneutical	justice	needs	to	consider	
the	ways	that	those	with	dominant	identities	come	to	understand	their	privilege.	This	
includes	listening	to	the	voices	and	experiences	of	those	with	marginalized	identities	
because	we	know	these	experiences	provide	knowledge	that	is	otherwise	inaccessible	in	
the	dominant	framework	(Alcoff,	2010:	Hill-Collins,	2000).			
	 The	practice	of	centering	the	experiences	and	voices	of	marginalized	groups	is	easily	
captured	when	we	consider	the	“achievement	gap”	in	urban	education.	When	popular	
media	imagines	the	“under	achievement”	of	students	of	color	in	school,	films	like	
Dangerous	Minds	and	Freedom	Writers	rely	on	the	archetypes	of	the	white	savior	and	poor,	
criminalized	bodies	of	color	to	depict	white	teachers	as	heroes	and	young	Black,	Latino	and	
Asian	students	as	pathological	problems	(Yosso	&	García,	2010;	Giroux,	1997).	Even	federal	
policy,	like	Race	to	the	Top,	relies	upon	and	rewards	“damage	centered”	(Tuck,	2009)	
research	and	initiatives	that	concern	themselves	with	“at	risk”	low-income	youth	of	color	
who	need	to	be	“saved”	or	“fixed”	(Baldridge,	2014).		
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However,	when	urban	students	of	color	provide	the	analysis,	the	“achievement	gap”	
is	reframed	as	an	opportunity	gap	caused	by	inadequate	educational	resources	and	the	low	
expectations	of	teachers	and	administrators	(Fine	et	al.,	2005).	When	the	students	
themselves	tell	the	story	of	urban	education,	we	learn	that	students	care	about	learning,	
school,	and	their	communities,	which	is	a	stark	contrast	to	the	angry,	disengaged	youth	
prevalent	in	the	media,	public	policy,	and	the	dominant	social	imaginary.	Another	layer	of	
analysis,	still,	can	be	engaged	via	attention	to	scholars	of	color	researching	education	
inequalities.	For	example,	challenging	the	“achievement	gap”	framing	of	education	
inequalities,	Ladson-Billings	(2006)	posits	an	“education	debt”	accumulated	over	time	on	
the	part	of	public	education	systems	and	owed	to	students	with	marginalized	racial	
identities.		Powerfully,	Ladson-Billings	(2006)	identifies	that	this	educational	debt	has	
historical,	economic,	socio-political	and	moral	dimensions,	positioning	racialized	
disparities	not	as	a	pathological	deficit,	but	a	systemic	and	intentional	reproduction	of	
power	and	inequality.	The	reframing	of	the	“achievement	gap”	as	an	opportunity	gap	by	
students	of	color	and	as	an	education	debt	by	Ladson-Billings	(2006)	illustrates	why	
marginalized	knowledges	play	a	key	role	in	creating	hermeneutic	justice.	
	 Moreover,	taking	race	as	an	example	of	identity	prejudice,	George	Yancy	(2012)	
offers	a	powerful	argument	for	why	unconcealing	whiteness	is	necessary	for	addressing	the	
power	latent	in	hermeneutic	injustice.	Yancy	(2012)	describes	the	need	to	intentionally	
name	and	identify	whiteness;	he	asserts:		
After	all,	without	this	pre-conditional	critical	work	of	naming	whiteness,	of	critically	
engaging	whiteness,	“diversity”	might	simply	function	to	serve	the	hidden	values	of	
whites	as	a	group;	diversity	might	function	as	a	way	of	feeding	white	moral	
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narcissism;	and,	diversity	might	function	as	a	way	of	making	whites	comfortable,	
giving	them	a	false	sense	of	post-racial	and	post-racist	arrival	(p.	44).		
It	is	insufficient	to	seek	diversity	or	inclusion	without	first	asking	who	is	doing	the	
including	and	into	what	are	we	asking	people	to	be	included.	People	of	color	are	not	
welcomed	into	a	“diverse”	educational	setting,	for	example,	if	they	are	asked	to	ignore	their	
cultures,	stories,	and	knowledges	to	adopt	normative	whiteness.	This	is	neither	diversity	
nor	inclusion;	it	is	protecting	whiteness	within	the	narcissistic	guise	of	including	them	in	
us;	it	recenters	whiteness	and	the	invisibility	of	power.	
	 Hermeneutic	virtue	must	include	a	critical	engagement	of	dominance	and	power,	
not	simply	alternative	collective	epistemic	resources,	if	epistemic	virtue	is	to	do	more	than	
feed	the	moral	narcissism	of	those	with	dominant	identity.	Like	diversity,	neutrality	
becomes	hijacked	when	it	does	not	hold	itself	open	for	critique.	Without	a	critical	analysis	
of	privilege,	in	this	case	white	racial	dominance,	epistemic	justice	cannot	be	achieved.	It	is	
not	enough	simply	to	become	aware,	for	example,	that	urban	students	of	color	do	care	
about	their	education.	This	may	alter	one	stereotype	or	prejudice.	However,	without	the	
further	understanding	that	urban	students	of	color	are	constructed	as	educationally	
disengaged	in	the	dominant	interpretive	framework	precisely	because	this	construction	
serves	to	marginalize	urban	youth	of	color,	all	we	are	doing	is	replacing	one	stereotype	
while	leaving	untouched	the	knowledge	practices	that	systemically	privilege	some	(e.g.	
white	people	and	white	teachers)	at	the	expense	of	others	(e.g.	people	of	color	and	students	
of	color).		In	calling	for	critical	self-reflexivity	Fricker	(2007)	is	hoping	to	encourage	those	
with	dominant	identities	to	practice	a	vigilant	awareness,	but,	by	excluding	non-dominant	
perspectives	(Hookway,	2010)	and	non-dominant	epistemic	resources	(Mason,	2011;	
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Alcoff,	2010),	one	can	see	how	Fricker	can	be	read	as	reinscribing	dominance	and	giving	it	
far	too	much	social	power.	Whether	or	not	the	experiences	of	marginalized	people	can	be	
easily	read	within	a	dominant	framework,	it	is	essential	that	non-dominant	interpretive	
schemas	be	centered	through	alliances	and	action	with	and	across	social	groups.	This	
knowledge	making	in	coalition	with	others	is	at	the	heart	of	what	I	perceive	to	be	a	socially	
just	epistemic	virtue.		
Epistemic	Justice:	Broadening	the	Account			
Since	Fricker	(2007)	published	her	theory	of	epistemic	justice,	philosophers	have	
critiqued	and	expanded	her	account	(McKinnon,	2016).	We	now	review	some	of	these	
critiques	with	the	goal	of	incorporating	both	diverse	voices	and	diverse	perspectives	to	
explore	a	more	hermeneutically	inclusive	theory	of	epistemic	justice.	As	Mason	(2011)	
argued,	acknowledging	multiple	hermeneutical	frames	is	an	important	step	for	listeners	
with	dominant	social	identities	working	towards	epistemic	justice	(Pohlhaus,	2012).	
Pohlhaus	(2012)	extends	this	idea	to	develop	a	theory	of	willful	hermeneutical	ignorance:		
	 “which	occurs	when	dominantly	situated	knowers	refuse	to	acknowledge	
	 epistemic	tools	developed	from	the	experienced	world	of	those	situated	
	 marginally.	Such	refusals	allow	dominantly	situated	knowers	to	
	 misunderstand,	misinterpret,	and/or	ignore	whole	parts	of	the	world”	(p.	715).		
In	describing	willful	hermeneutic	injustice,	Pohlhaus	(2012)	also	bridges	Fricker’s	(2007)	
responsibility	gap	between	testimonial	and	hermeneutical	injustice.	Fricker’s	(2007)	
account	states	that	individuals	are	responsible	for	testimonial	injustice,	but,	in	the	case	of	
hermeneutic	injustice,	individuals	are	merely	the	vehicle	for	injustice	since	the	cause	is	
structural.	Pohlhaus	(2012)	describes	willful	hermeneutical	ignorance	as	“simultaneously	
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an	agential	and	structural	injustice”	(p.	725).	Pohlhaus	(2012)	takes	up	Fricker’s	(2007)	
example	of	Tom	Robinson’s	trial	in	To	Kill	a	Mockingbird	to	re-theorize	hermeneutic	
injustice	in	terms	of	willful	hermeneutical	ignorance.8	Tom	Robinson	is	a	Black	man	
accused	of	raping	a	white	woman	in	To	Kill	A	Mockingbird;	his	white	attorney	presents	the	
testimony	of	Tom	Robinson	and	additional	evidence	to	prove	he	is	innocent.	However,	the	
jury	still	finds	Tom	Robinson	guilty.		
	 Pohlhaus	(2012)	argues	that	not	only	is	the	jury	unwilling	to	believe	Robinson,	but	
the	members	of	the	jury	cannot	believe	him	because	they	are	using	epistemic	resources	
that	“do	not	allow	for	the	intelligibility	of	what	Robinson	has	to	say”	(p.	725).	The	structural	
error	is	not	only	in	what	the	jurors	don’t	know	because	they	only	access	the	dominant	
racist	hermeneutic	frame;	the	jurors	are	also	unwilling	to	engage	with	Tom	Robinson,	a	
knower	“outside	dominant	social	positions”	(p.	725).	Pohlhaus	(2012)	powerfully	points	
out	that	the	unwillingness	of	jurors	to	earnestly	engage	epistemic	interdependence	with	a	
marginalized	knower	“results	in	a	current	structural	problem	with	regard	to	the	transfer	of	
knowledge”	(p.	725).	Members	of	the	jury	are	failing	to	use	the	appropriate	epistemic	
resources	and	they	are	instead	actively	using	faulty	epistemic	resources	to	systemically	
understand	a	marginalized	knower.	The	jurors’	unwillingness	to	engage	an	alternative	
situated	knowledge	is	both	an	agential	and	a	structural	wrong.	This	is	a	powerful	and	
compelling	extension	of	hermeneutic	injustice.		
	 As	a	feminist	epistemologist,	Pohlhaus	(2012)	utilizes	standpoint	and	social	
epistemology	to	explain	what	the	jurors	specifically,	and	dominant	hearers	generally,	can	
do	in	epistemic	interactions	with	marginalized	knowers.	Pohlhaus	(2012)	acknowledges	
that	epistemic	resources	are	maintained	and	developed	in	conjunction	with	others,	
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interdependently.	As	Pohlhaus	(2012)	importantly	describes,	“When	epistemic	agents	
refuse	to	allow	the	development	of	or	refuse	to	acknowledge	already	developed	epistemic	
resources	for	knowing	the	world	from	situations	other	than	their	own,	they	contribute	to	
epistemic	injustice	and	maintain	their	own	ignorance	about	whole	parts	of	the	world”	(p.	
733).	However,	if	those	with	dominant	social	positions	take	an	active	interest	in	the	world	
as	it	is	experienced	from	those	with	subordinate	social	positions	they	can	participate	in	a	
more	critical	standpoint.	Dominant	knowers	do	not	have	to	choose	to	maintain	their	
ignorance.		
	 Instead,	Pohlhaus	(2012)	argues,	“When	one	genuinely	cares	to	know	something	
about	the	world	as	experienced	from	social	positions	other	than	one’s	own,	one	must	use	
epistemic	resources	situated	to	(and	developed	from)	those	situations”	(p.	731).	How	does	
one	do	this?	Pohlhaus	(2012)	suggests:	(1)	allowing	those	resources	to	be	well	developed	
by	those	who	are	situated	in	them,	(2)	to	trust	marginalized	people	who	have	developed	
situated	knowledges,	(3)	to	take	an	active	interest	in	learning	how	to	use	epistemic	
resources	that	are	structurally	marginalized.	When	a	dominantly	situated	knower	refuses	
to	take	these	steps,	Pohlhaus	(2012)	argues	they	are	culpable	for	willful	hermeneutic	
ignorance.		
	 Dotson’s	(2012)	critique	of	Fricker’s	(2007)	account	of	epistemic	justice	takes	a	far	
more	critical	assessment	than	Pohlhaus’	(2012).	Dotson	(2012)	cautions,	
	 “One	can	advocate	for	better,	more	responsible	epistemic	conduct	capable	of	
	 reducing	epistemic	oppression,	without	also	harboring	unrealistic	expectations	for	
	 superior	epistemic	conduct	and	abilities	necessary	for	eliminating	epistemic	
	 oppression	entirely”	(emphasis	original,	p.	25).	
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In	fact,	Dotson	(2012)	claims	Fricker’s	(2007)	theory	contributes	to	epistemic	injustice	by	
only	offering	accounts	of	testimonial	and	hermeneutical	injustice,	effectively	foreclosing	
the	possibility	of	other	forms	of	epistemic	injustice.	One	such	form	is	what	Dotson	(2012)	
calls	“contributory	injustice.”		
Dotson	(2012),	like	Mason	(2011)	and	Pohlhaus	(2012),	calls	Fricker	to	task	for	
assuming	in	her	writing	that	there	is	one	hermeneutic	resource	to	which	knowledge	is	
included	in	or	structurally	excluded	from.	For	Dotson	(2012),	contributory	injustice	is,	
“caused	by	an	epistemic	agent’s	situated	ignorance,	in	the	form	of	willful	hermeneutical	
ignorance,	in	maintaining	and	utilizing	structurally	prejudiced	hermeneutical	resources	
that	result	in	epistemic	harm	to	the	epistemic	agency	of	a	knower”	(p.	31).	Because	there	
are	different	hermeneutical	resources	a	hearer	could	chose	to	utilize	instead	of	the	
structurally	prejudiced	dominant	hermeneutic	resource,	the	hearer	plays	a	role	in	
contributory	injustice	by	“willfully	refusing	to	recognize	or	acquire	requisite	alternative	
hermeneutical	resources”	(p.	32).	Importantly,	Dotson	(2012)	argues	this	unwillingness	on	
the	part	of	the	hearer	compromises	her	agency	as	a	knower.	Dotson	(2012)	importantly	
extends	Pohlhaus’s	(2012)	conception	of	willful	hermeneutic	ignorance	by	arguing	that	
contributory	injustice	includes,	
“an	epistemic	agent’s	willful	hermeneutical	ignorance	in	maintaining	and	
	 utilizing	structural	prejudiced	hermeneutical	resources	thwarts	a	knower’s	ability	
	 to	contribute	to	shared	epistemic	resources	within	a	given	epistemic	community	by	
	 compromising	her	epistemic	agency”	(p.	32).	
This	is	an	extremely	important	extension	in	theorizing	the	possibility	for	epistemic	justice.	
Fricker	(2007)	identified	the	harm	dominant	knowers	perpetuate	against	marginalized	
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knowers	based	on	structural	identity	prejudice.	She	only	highlighted	the	harm	done	to	
marginalized	knowers	(an	important	point	to	be	sure).	Mason	(2011)	and	Pohlhaus	(2012)	
showed	that	marginalized	knowers	have	not	only	agency	but	also	access	to	alternative	
hermeneutical	frames.	Dotson	(2012)	further	argued	that	dominantly	situated	knowers	
have	a	responsibility	to	seek	marginally	situated	hermeneutical	resources.		
Dotson	(2012)	is	asserting	that	dominant	knowers,	in	their	unwillingness	to	engage	
alternate	epistemic	resources,	compromise	their	own	agency	as	a	knower;	dominant	
knowers	cannot	be	contributors	to	shared	epistemic	resources	when	they	are	unwilling	to	
give	up	the	structural	prejudiced	resources	that	benefit	them.	We	see	now	that	a	concept	of	
knowledge	justice	does	not	only	have	to	include	the	agency	of	those	with	marginalized	
knowledge	while	acknowledging	the	complicity	of	dominantly	situated	knowers,	but	it	
must	also	incorporate	a	degradation	on	the	account	of	dominantly	situated	knowers	ability	
to	contribute	knowledge	owing	to	the	structural	prejudice	they	willingly	accept	when	only	
engaging	the	hegemonic	epistemic	resource.		All	knowers,	dominantly	and	marginally	
situated,	lose	epistemic	agency	when	exclusively	engaging	the	hegemonic	hermeneutic	
resource	because	the	dominant	hermeneutic	resource	is	self-preserving.		
Medina	(2013)	offers	an	exceptional	analysis	of	what	he	calls	active	ignorance	that	
can	help	us	expand	not	only	Bailey’s	(2014)	and	Dotson’s	(2012)	critiques,	but	it	will	also	
help	us	expand	our	understanding	of	hermeneutic	epistemic	harm.	Medina	(2013)	expands	
Dotson’s	(2012)	concept	of	hermeneutic	ignorance	with	his	own	similar	active	ignorance,	
which	he	describes	as	a	type	of	meta-ignorance.	Active	ignorance,	like	Fricker’s	(2007)	
hermeneutic	injustice,	has	sociopolitical	roots,	but	Medina	(2012)	further	describes	active	
ignorance	as	supported	by	psychological	structures	that	prevent	agents	from	“corrective	
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misconceptions	and	acquiring	knowledge	because	they	would	have	to	change	so	much	of	
themselves	and	their	communities	before	they	can	start	seeing	things	differently”	(p.	58).	
Individuals	and	groups	are	made	desensitized	to	phenomena	and	bodies	of	evidence	
because	active	ignorance	is	self-preserving	and	protects	itself.	Because	of	these	defense	
mechanisms	protecting	active	ignorance,	Medina	(2013)	asserts	that	active	ignorance	is	a	
form	of	meta-ignorance.	As	Applebaum	(2016)	summarizes,	“we	not	only	don’t	know,	but	
we	do	not	know	that	we	don’t	know	and	think	we	know.	Such	ignorance	becomes	a	form	of	
collective	denial	of	certain	social	facts	and	uncomfortable	truths	by	those	who	benefit	from	
such	ignorance”	(p.	449).			
Medina	(2013)	charges	that	Fricker	(2012)	excludes	the	harm	of	meta-ignorance	
from	her	account	of	hermeneutic	injustice	because	she	does	not	perceive	the	harm	of	
credibility	excess	(afforded	to	knowers	with	dominant	social	identities)	because	of	her	
focus	on	direct,	momentary	testimonial	exchanges.	However,	as	Medina	describes,	if	we	
track	the	intersecting	trajectories	of	testimonial	exchanges	and	understands	what	happens	
before	and	after	the	momentary	exchange,	we	can	appreciate	the	unfair	character	and	
harm	of	credibility	excess.	Medina	(2013)	powerfully	asserts	that	when	he	affords	others	
with	more	dominant	identities	than	his	(for	example,	white	or	heterosexual	people)	greater	
credibility	than	they	actually	deserve	it	“can	have	the	effect	of	my	voice	feeling	inhibited,	
my	becoming	vulnerable	to	gullibility,	my	self-trust	shaken	or	fading	in	comparison	to	the	
disproportionate	epistemic	trust	given	to	the	speaker,	and	so	on”	(p.	61).	
Importantly,	Medina	describes	the	problematic	nature	of	epistemic	dominance	in	
holistic	terms:	
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	 “By	assigning	a	level	of	credibility	that	is	not	proportionate	to	the	epistemic	
	 credentials	shown	by	the	speaker,	the	excessive	attribution	does	a	disservice		to	
	 everybody	involved:	to	the	speaker	by	letting	him	get	away	with	things;	and	to	
	 everybody	else	by	leaving	out	of	the	interactional	a	crucial	aspect	of	the	process	of	
	 knowledge	acquisition:	namely,	opposing	critical	resistance	and	not	giving	
	 credibility	or	epistemic	authority	that	has	not	been	earned.	Insofar	as	the	
	 transmission	of	knowledge	is	affected,	there	is	an	epistemic	harm	that	affects	all	
	 involved	in	the	testimonial	exchange—speaker,	hearer—attributor,	and	other	
	 interlocutors	included”	(emphasis	original,	p.	61).		
Medina	(2013)	argues	that	because	those	with	dominant	social	identities	receive	an	unfair	
upgrade	to	their	credibility,	those	with	non-dominant	epistemic	identities	are	indirectly	
affected	by	receiving	comparatively	less	epistemic	trust.	As	an	example,	Medina	(2013)	
points	to	social	science	research	that	shows	students	ascribe	greater	authority	to	male	
teachers	than	to	female	teachers,	and,	similarly,	to	white	teachers	over	teachers	of	color;	
thus,	even	though	all	professors	occupy	positions	of	intellectual	authority,	students,	from	
the	first	day	of	class,	ascribe	to	professors	differing	levels	of	credibility	based	on	social	
identity.	Medina	(2013)	shows	deep	appreciation	for	the	relational	and	situated	nature	of	
credibility	appraisals,	and	he	pays	attention	to	their	role	in	hermeneutic	in/justice.	
	 	Medina	(2013)	uses	Fricker’s	(2007)	example	of	Tom	Robinson’s	trial	in	To	Kill	A	
Mockingbird	to	highlight	the	relational	nature	of	credibility	judgments.	Medina	(2013)	
writes	that	jurors	are	able	to	disregard	Tom’s	testimony	(even	after	Atticus	proves	he	was	
unable	to	assault	Mayella	Ewell,	a	white	woman)	not	only	because	Tom	was	Black,	but	
because	of	a	“hierarchy	of	credibility	presumptions	at	play”	in	the	shared	dominant	
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hermeneutic	resource;	this	hierarchy	asserts	that	white	women	are	more	credible	than	
Black	men	and	that	white	men	(like	the	prosecutor)	are	more	credible	than	white	women	
(p.	66).	The	novel	illustrates	how	credibility	deficits	and	excesses	go	hand	in	hand,	in	a	
compare	and	contrast	relationship:	the	credibility	excess	of	a	white	woman	(Mayella)	and	a	
white	man	questioning	(the	prosecutor)	a	Black	man	(Tom	Robinson)	lead	to	the	near	
complete	diminishing	of	the	Black	man’s	credibility	causing	him	physical,	sociopolitical,	
and	epistemic	harm.	
	 Medina	(2013)	then	circles	back	to	meta-ignorance.	The	jurors’	resistance	to	know,	
their	unwillingness	to	genuinely	consider	alternative	evidence,	comes	from	what	Medina	
calls	the	social	imaginary	and	what	this	dissertation,	like	Fricker,	is	calling	structural	
prejudice	in	the	dominant	hermeneutic	framework.	The	dominant	hermeneutic	framework	
“produces	a	strong	form	of	epistemic	laziness	that	blocks	evidentiary	explorations.	This	
laziness	becomes	an	epistemic	obstacle	in	the	pursuit	of	knowledge	that	can	easily	lead	to	
epistemic	injustices”	(Medina,	2013,	p.	68).	Those	who	experience	the	epistemic	injustice	
may	be	disadvantaged	by	being	unable	to	recognize	or	properly	conceptualize	the	
phenomena	they	are	experiencing	(as	Fricker	argues)	or	they	may	not	only	be	able	to	
describe	the	phenomena	but	also	the	hermeneutical	gap	(as	Mason	and	Dotson	noted).	
Medina	(2013)	contends	that	the	experience	of	oppression	does	“afford	the	opportunity	to	
go	beyond	the	received	dominant	view,	to	recognize	its	limitations	and	flaws,	and	
occasionally	to	develop	an	alternative	viewpoint,	a	dual	consciousness,	or	even	a	
kaleidoscopic	consciousness	that	can	hold	and	maintain	active	multiple	perspectives	
simultaneously”	(emphasis	original,	p.	74).		
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Medina’s	(2013)	introduction	of	a	kaleidoscopic	consciousness	is	an	important	
contribution	to	the	discussion	of	hermeneutic	justice.	Bailey	(2014)	summarized	Dotson’s	
(2012)	argument	clarifying,	“The	biggest	obstacle	to	epistemic	liberation	(the	one	Fricker	
misses)	is	that	our	shared	epistemic	resources	are	themselves	inadequate	for	
understanding	their	inadequacy”	(emphasis	original,	p.	66).	As	Dotson	(2012)	and	Bailey	
(2014)	are	arguing,	the	flawed,	dominant	hermeneutic	resource	is	an	epistemic	system	that	
contains	within	it	the	structures	for	preserving	and	legitimating	insufficient	epistemic	
resources.	How	then	can	knowers,	particularly	dominantly	situated	knowers,	do	as	
Pohlhaus	(2012)	and	even	Dotson	(2012)	suggest:	become	acquainted	with	differently	
situated,	particularly	marginally	situated,	epistemic	resources?	
How	indeed?	We	know	they	can,	as	the	social	science	research	summarized	in	
chapters	one	and	four	describe	that	white	students	are	able	to	critically	engage	new	
information	about	others	and	demonstrate	a	decrease	in	prejudice	and	racist	attitudes	(see	
for	example	Gurin	et	al.,	2013).	Medina	(2013)	offers	us	philosophical	insight	with	the	goal	
of	hermeneutic	justice	in	mind.	Medina	describes	the	necessary	habits	or	behaviors	
necessary	for	addressing	and	correcting	meta-ignorance.	He	argues	justice	requires	the	
“restructuring	of	habits	and	affective	structures…it	also	involves	political	action	and	deep	
cultural	transformation”	(Medina,	2013,	p.	76).	Privilege	knowers	must	remain	open	to	
engaging	the	perspectives	of	others	(like	Fricker,	2007,	suggests)	but	they	must	
additionally	develop	the	ability	to:	
	 “move	back	and	forth	among	alternative	sensibilities,	to	look	at	the	world	from	
	 more	than	one	perspective,	to	hold	different	viewpoints	simultaneously	so	that	they	
	 can	be	compared	and	contrasted,	corrected	by	each	other,	and	combined	when	
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	 possible.	It	is	important	to	entertain	different	perspectives	without	polarizing	them,	
	 dichotomizing	them,	and	presenting	them	as	exhaustive”	(Medina,	2013,	p.	78).		
Privileged	knowers	must	demonstrate	a	critical	openness	that	is	both	cognitive	(open	to	
new	information	and	interpretations)	but	also	affective	(practicing	empathy	and	
perspective	taking).	Medina	describes	this	as	developing	a	kaleidoscopic	consciousness.	
Medina	rightly	observes	that	different	experiences	of	oppression	do	not	only	bring	rise	to	a	
double	consciousness	(the	experiences	of	the	oppressed	and	their	awareness	of	how	their	
experiences	are	interpreted	by	others)	but	a	multiplicity	of	perspectives.	Medina	also	calls	
for	white	agents	(dominant	knowers)	to	develop	a	multiplicitious	perspective.	One	way	
privileged	knowers	can	do	this,	as	Applebaum	(2016)	describes,	is	to	learn	about	the	
discursive	moves	dominant	knowers	use	to	avoid	confronting	their	implication	and	
participation	in	oppression.	Privileged	knowers	need	to	broaden	their	cognitive	and	
affective	openness	to	others,	but	they	also	must	become	continuously,	critically	aware	of	
the	habits	they	use	to	conceal	their	own	participation	in	epistemic	injustice.	
Kaleidoscopic	consciousness	involves	developing	particular	habits,	“the	continuous	
exposure	to	and	a	serious	engagement	with	multiple	and	conflicting	viewpoints”	
(Applebaum,	2016,	p.	450).	Medina	(2013)	like	many	social	scientists	described	in	earlier	
chapters,	emphasizes	the	importance	of	(1)	contact	with	others,	(2)	critical	engagement	of	
new	knowledge	(including	the	self-awareness	that	raises	consciousness	about	privileged	
knowers	moves	to	self-conceal	their	participation	in	oppression)	and	interpretations	of	
phenomena,	and	(3)	affective	engagement	with	others	(which	includes	empathy	and	
perspective	taking)	(see	for	example,	Gurin	et	al.,	2013).		
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	 However,	given	meta-ignorance	is	structural—rooted	in	flaws	within	the	dominant	
interpretive	resource—it	is	not	enough	for	the	epistemically	privileged	to	only	work	on	
their	own	knowing	and	unknowing;	structural	change	is	required	as	well.	Medina	(2013)	
explicitly	calls	for	political	action	and	deep	cultural	transformations.	Collective	agency	and	
action	taking	are	required	to	expand,	broaden	and	correct	the	social	imagination,	or	the	
shared	hermeneutic	resource.	The	dysfunction	of	epistemic	injustice	is	not	merely	
epistemic,	but	structural	and	political.	The	structural	conditions	in	which	people	live	must	
be	changed	in	addition	to	peoples’	mind	and	ethical	character	in	order	to	work	towards	
epistemic	justice.	Medina	(2013)	candidly	observes	that	such	a	transformation	would	take	
multiple	generations.	As	Medina	(2013)	summarizes,	“In	order	to	overcome	situations	of	
oppression,	we	need	to	transform	the	polis	and	its	citizens	simultaneously,	and	in	multiple	
ways;	we	need	to	change	their	ethical,	their	political,	and	their	epistemic	ways	of	relating”	
(p.	85).		
Moving	Towards	Action:	A	Social	Responsibility	Model	
	
Epistemic	injustice	occurs	when	identity	prejudice	harms	people	with	salient	non-
dominant	social	identities	in	their	capacity	as	knowers;	it	occurs	when	and	because	non-
dominant	knowers’	perspectives,	interpretations	and	experiences	are	left	out	of	the	
dominant	hermeneutic	resource	because	of	a	structural	failing/inequality	(Fricker,	2007).	
However,	there	are	multiple	hermeneutic	resources	(Alcoff	2010;	Mason,	2011),	and	
dominantly	situated	knowers	have	a	responsibility	to	willfully	engage	other	(i.e.	non-
dominant)	interpretive	resources	through	epistemic	interdependence	with	differently	
situated	others	(Pohlhaus,	2012).		When	dominantly	situated	knowers	refuse	to	access	and	
acquire	alternative	hermeneutic	resources,	they	are	contributing	to	hermeneutic	injustice;	
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Dotson	(2012)	calls	this	contributory	injustice.	Choosing	to	use	flawed	knowledge	
resources	without	attempting	to	access	other	perspective,	interpretations	or	
understandings	is	simultaneously	a	choice	to	maintain	hermeneutic	injustice	(Dotson,	
2012).	Dominantly	situated	knowers	do	not	seek	out	alternative	interpretive	frameworks	
because	they	(1)	do	not	know	(that	the	dominant	hermeneutic	frame	is	flawed	and	limited	
and	that	there	are	other	interpretive	resources	available)	(2)	don’t	know	what	they	need	to	
know	but	(3)	believe	that	they	know;	for	privileged	knowers,	active	ignorance	becomes	a	
form	of	collective	denial,	an	unwillingness	to	know,	which	Medina	(2013)	describes	as	
meta-ignorance.		
Thus,	epistemic	injustice	is	rooted	in	structural	oppression,	in	the	intentional	
exclusion	of	non-dominantly	situated	hermeneutic	resources	from	the	dominant,	shared	
hermeneutic	frame;	it	is	caused	by	socio-political	injustices,	and	also	by	the	contributory	
injustice	of	privileged	knowers	who	participate	in	the	marginalization	of	non-dominant	
knowers	and	knowledges	(Fricker,	2007;	Alcoff,	2010;	Mason	2011;	Pohlhaus	2012,	
Dotson,	2012;	Medina,	2013).	In	order	to	work	towards	epistemic	justice,	individuals	need	
to	develop	a	kaleidoscopic	consciousness	and	collectively	work	toward	socio-political	
transformation	(Medina,	2013).	Developing	a	kaleidoscopic	consciousness	allows	us	to	
hold	multiple	perspectives	simultaneously,	comparing	and	contrasting	them	while	
practicing	affective	awareness	(Medina,	2013).	These	personal	knowledge	habits	must	be	
combined	with	social-political	and	institutional	restructuring	through	shared	responsibility	
(Medina,	2013;	Fricker,	2007).	
Young	(2011)	offers	a	blueprint	for	a	social	connection	model	of	justice	that	is	
helpful	for	understanding	educational	institutions’	and	stakeholders’	responsibility	for	
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epistemic	justice.	When	thinking	about	responsibility	for	justice,	both	individual	and	
institutional,	in	relation	to	structural	injustice,	Young	(2011)	introduces	and	describes	a	
social	connection	model,	which	finds	that	“all	those	who	contribute	by	their	actions	to	
structural	processes	with	some	unjust	outcomes	share	responsibility	for	the	injustice”	(p.	
96).	In	order	to	illustrate	her	theory	of	a	social	connection	model,	Young	(2011)	offers	the	
example	of	“Sandy”	and	housing	markets	in	the	US	context.		Summarily,	Sandy	is	a	single	
mother	of	two	who	lives	in	an	apartment	in	a	building	in	a	city.	Sandy	commutes	for	three	
hours	to	work	as	a	store	clerk	in	a	suburban	mall	every	day.	A	developer	buys	Sandy’s	
apartment	building	and	decides	to	convert	it	into	condominiums;	Sandy	has	two	months	to	
find	a	new	place	to	live,	which	she	is	happy	to	do	because	the	building	was	poorly	
maintained	and	the	rent	was	too	high.	She	decides	to	look	for	an	apartment	closer	to	work	
on	the	bus	line.	She	diligently	searches	for	an	apartment	but	the	rents	are	too	high;	she	
seeks	the	help	of	a	rental	agent	who	goes	out	of	his	way	to	help	her.	Sandy	applies	for	a	
housing	subsidy	program	and	is	told	the	wait	is	about	two	years;	rental	housing	along	bus	
routes	is	expensive	and	the	bus	commute	is	very	long,	so	Sandy	decides	to	use	some	of	her	
housing	funds	for	a	car.	Sandy	gives	up	her	quest	for	a	two-bedroom	apartment	and	settles	
on	a	one-bedroom	apartment	in	a	building	with	no	amenities	that	is	a	forty-five	minute	
drive	to	her	job.	However,	with	her	eviction	deadline	looming,	Sandy	learns	that	rent	for	
three	months	is	required	as	a	deposit	for	the	apartment	and,	having	used	her	savings	on	a	
down	payment	for	her	car,	she	cannot	afford	the	apartment	deposit.		
Sandy’s	story	is	at	once	common	and	complicated.	Young	(2011)	points	out,	“The	
median	asking	rent	for	a	two-bedroom	apartment	in	2004	was	$974,	far	out	of	reach	of	the	
40	percent	of	renters	with	incomes	less	than	$20,000.	Only	one	in	eighty	subsidized	
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apartment	units	is	located	in	an	area	with	strong	job	growth,	and	one-fifth	are	located	in	
areas	whose	employment	opportunities	are	declining”	(p.	44).	Young	(2011)	asserts	that	
she	intentionally	crafted	this	story	so	that	no	one	person	is	doing	something	wrong;	for	
example,	the	rental	agent	goes	out	of	his	way	to	help	Sandy,	and	Sandy	is	a	working	adult	
pays	her	rent	and	works	hard.	Sandy’s	position—the	position	of	being	vulnerable	to	
homelessness—is	a	social-structural	position	(Young,	2011).	Young	argues	that	the	wrong	
experienced	by	Sandy	in	this	story	is	a	structural	injustice,	not	a	wrong	attributable	to	
single	person	or	policy.	
We	see	a	parallel	pattern	of	structural	injustice	in	the	educational	experiences	of	
students	of	color	and	low-income	students.	As	we	reviewed	in	chapter	two,	inequality	in	
educational	settings	accompanies	students	with	non-dominant	social	identities	from	pre-
school	through	beyond	college	graduation;	it	is	not	caused	by	students,	just	as	Sandy’s	
experiences	in	the	housing	system	are	not	caused	by	her	or	others	in	her	position.	
According	to	the	Department	of	Education’s	research,	students	living	below	the	federal	
poverty	level	showed	the	lowest	kindergarten	readiness,	and	Black	and	Hispanic	student	
populations	had	the	highest	percentages	of	students	living	in	poverty	(Kena,	Musu-Gillette,	
Robinson,	Wang,	et	al.,	2015).	Low-income	students	are	more	likely	to	be	concentrated	in	
schools	where	there	is	also	a	concentration	of	low-income	students	(Orfield	&	
Frankenberg,	2014).	Federal	education	reports	reveal	that	white	and	Asian	students	score	
higher	than	Black	and	Hispanic	students	on	national	reading	and	mathematics	exams	(Kena	
et	al.,	2015).			
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Similarly,	less	Black	and	Hispanic	high	school	students	graduate	on	time	than	their	
white	and	Asian	counterparts,	and	less	Black	and	Hispanic	students	immediately	enroll	at	
colleges	(Kena	et	al.,	2015).		College	enrollment	rates	were	higher	for	students	from	high	
income	families	than	those	for	students	from	low	income	families	(Kena	et	al.,	2015).	
Students	with	college	degrees	earn	more	than	65%	more	than	those	without	college	
degrees	(Synder,	de	Brey,	&	Dillow,	2016).	Thus,	students	from	low-income	families	and	
students	of	color	are	more	likely	to	begin	their	engagement	with	school	systems	less	
prepared	then	students	with	higher-income	and	White	students,	and	they	end	their	
educational	engagement	in	the	same	position,	locking	them—or	at	least	pushing	them—
into	a	cycle	limiting	their	abilities	to	excel	academically	and	socio-economically.	This	
mapping	in	education,	like	the	mapping	of	Sandy	and	the	housing	market,	fits	Young’s	
(2011)	conception	of	a	structural	injustice.	
Educational	Institutions’	Particular	Social	Responsibility		
	
This	chapter	argues	that	because	educational	institutions	maintain	and	reproduce	
epistemic	injustice,	they	are	responsible	for	addressing	it.	However,	one	could	rightly	raise	
the	issue	that	many	institutions	and	systems	contribute	to	epistemic	injustice,	and,	yet,	this	
dissertation	argues	that	education	institutions	in	particular	have	a	responsibility	for	
addressing	epistemic	injustice	(Robertson,	2013).	Why?	This	question,	in	many	ways,	
harkens	to	perhaps	the	most	fundamental	questions	in	educational	theorizing:	In	a	
democratic	society,	what	is	education	for,	who	is	education	for,	and	what	is	the	role	of	
education?		
While	many	philosophers	and	theorists	across	disciplines	have	attempted	to	answer	
these	questions,	it	is	John	Dewey	who	advanced	these	questions	most,	offering	invaluable	
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insights	and	a	copious	foundation	from	which	to	consider	why	education	institutions	in	
particular	should	work	to	address	epistemic	injustice.	Dewey	(1954)	characterizes	
democracy	as,	above	all,	community	life	in	which	the	citizen	is	participant	who	shares	in	
the	good	produced	by	conjoint	civic	activity.	Individual	citizens	are	not	simply	voters,	but	
they	are	manifestations	of	society	who,	taken	together,	produce	a	national	consciousness.	
For	Dewey	(1888),	democracy	is	more	than	a	political	relationship;	it	is	an	ethical	one.		
Dewey	(1888)	asserts:	
	 Democracy,	like	any	other	polity,	has	been	finely	tuned	in	the	memory	of	a	historic	
	 past,	the	consciousness	of	a	living	present,	the	ideal	of	the	coming	future.	
	 Democracy,	in	a	word,	is	a	social,	that	is	to	say,	an	ethical	conception,	and	upon	its	
	 ethical	significance	is	based	its	significance	as	governmental.	Democracy	is	a	form	of	
	 government	only	because	it	is	a	form	of	moral…association	(p.	240).	
For	Dewey,	it	is	in	acting	as	a	public,	in	which	the	action	of	the	individual	expresses	the	
consciousness	of	the	majority,	that	the	ethical	grounds	of	a	democracy	is	constituted.	When	
a	member	of	a	participatory	democracy	acts	corruptly,	this	corruption	is	“the	expression	of	
society	through	him”	(Dewey,	1969,	p.	234).	There	is	a	mutual	responsibility	inherent	in	a	
democracy	because	the	people	who	constitute	it	are	members	of	a	shared	system.	Dewey’s	
(1954;	1969)	characterizations	of	democracy	are	marked	by	some	key	features.	Firstly,	
Dewey	is	acknowledging	the	importance	of	individual	agents	and	individual	agents	in	
relations	to	others.	Dewey	names	the	importance	of	considering	the	past,	present	and	
future:	issues	and	actions	cannot	be	taken	as	snapshots	in	time	but,	rather,	in	relation	to	
the	dynamic	temporal	movement	of	the	issue/action.	While	this	is	very	different	from	
standpoint	theory,	it	is	important	that	Dewey	is	theorizing	an	understanding	of	democratic	
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relations	as	situated.	Lastly,	Dewey	expresses	a	concept	of	shared	responsibility;	each	
member	of	society	shares	responsibility	for	societal	corruptions.		
	 For	Dewey,	a	great	difficulty	in	a	democracy	is	that	of	the	public	coming	to	recognize	
itself	and	to	“define	and	express	its	interests”	(1954,	p.	146).	Dewey	perceived	
communication	and	education	as	essential	for	public	participation	and	identification.	
Dewey	(1954)	used	the	analogy	of	a	pie	to	describe	communication	as	neither	given	nor	
shared,	or	passed	from	one	person	to	the	next;	rather,	Dewey	(1944)	described	
communication	as	“participation	in	a	common	understanding”	(p.	4).	For	there	to	be	
consensus,	there	must	be	a	common	purpose;	if	there	is	to	be	a	common	purpose	shared	
among	citizens,	they	must	be	able	to	communicate	with	each	other.	When	interlocutors	
communicate,	they	share	experience	in	such	a	way	that	it	becomes	a	“common	possession”	
that	“modifies	the	disposition	of	both	the	parties	who	partake	in	it”	(Dewey,	1944,	p.	9).		In	
this	way,	participation	in	a	democracy	is	a	communicative	experience.	Therefore,	we	once	
again	see	an	ethical	connection.	A	just	society	makes	provisions	for	free	discourse	among	
all	its	members	on	equal	terms.		Each	member	must	have	both	a	personal	interest	in	and	
access	to	communication	in	order	to	engage	in	participatory	deliberation.	
Dewey	(1954)	describes	education	and	knowledge	making	as	an	essential	method	
for	the	democratic	public	to	constitute	itself.	Dewey	(1954)	envisions	knowledge	as	a	
function	of	communication	and	association	because	objects	of	our	knowledge	are	
constituted	by	“habits	reflecting	social	customs”	(p.	161).			Although	knowledge	is	a	
reflection	of	habit	and	custom,	change	can	occur	over	time	when	observations	of	
consequences	lead	to	“reflection,	discovery,	invention,	[and]	experimentation”	(p.	162).		As	
such,	changes	in	knowledge,	particularly	socio-political	knowledges,	should	be	publicly	
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accessible	so	it	can	be	both	obtained	and	tested.		Dewey	(1954)	observed,	“For	public	
opinion	is	judgment	which	is	formed	and	entertained	by	those	who	constitute	the	public	
and	is	about	public	affairs”	(p.	177).		The	public	needs	information	to	deliberate	(if	the	
consequences	are	known,	Dewey	calls	this	knowledge)	and	make	choices	(on	a	decision	
which	is	to	impact	the	future,	Dewey	calls	this	opinion)	to	form	a	national	consciousness.			
Knowledge	is	not	simply	something	in	the	mind;	it	is	an	interaction	with	the	world.	
People,	the	everyday	public,	are	possessors	of	knowledge	as	are	the	experts.		In	fact,	Dewey	
(1902)	called	for	a	“socialism	of	the	intelligence”	during	his	speech	entitled	School	as	Social	
Center	delivered	before	members	of	the	National	Education	Association.		Dewey	argued	
that	community	requires	sharing	of	the	full	range	of	intellectual	resources.	Knowledge	is	
not	something	for	one	to	possess	or	own,	it	is	social	in	both	its	creation	and	in	its	use.			
	 If	knowledge	is	a	public	transaction,	we	can	infer	communication	is	essential	for	its	
dissemination.		A	public	requires,	“full	publicity	in	respect	to	all	consequences	which	
concern	it…Without	freedom	of	expression,	not	even	methods	of	social	inquiry	can	be	
developed”	(Dewey,	1954,	p.	167).	The	function	of	knowledge	is	to	provide	information	for	
action	(Dewey,	1944).	For	the	public	to	use	knowledge,	it	must	be	communicated.	However,	
communication	is	not	sufficient.	False	information	can	be	disseminated.	Deception	is	an	
inherent	risk	where	there	is	free	exchange	of	information.			
In	our	society,	the	public	is	too	large,	too	multiple	and	too	ill-defined	for	each	
participant	to	investigate	all	knowledge	claims;	what	is	more,	knowledge	is	too	specialized	
for	the	public	to	investigate	on	its	own	(Dewey,	1954).	Dewey	describes	experts	as	
reciprocal	informants	of	the	public.		The	masses	must	be	able	to	inform	the	experts	of	their	
needs;	the	experts	must	be	assured	their	testimony	will	be	used	for	public	deliberation.	In	a	
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society	as	technical	as	ours,	where	each	citizen	has	affinities	with	multiple	social	groups,	it	
cannot	be	the	case	that	each	member	of	the	public	can	“have	the	knowledge	and	skill	to	
carry	on	the	needed	investigation;”	however,	it	must	be	the	case	that	each	member	of	a	
participatory	democracy	has	the	ability	to	“judge…the	bearing	of	the	knowledge	supplied	
by	others	upon	common	concern”	(p.	209)			
Therefore,	Dewey	describes	communication,	open	discourse,	and	education,	socially	
generated	knowledge	making,	as	essential	for	democratic	participation	and	deliberation.	
However,	given	the	theoretical	and	empirical	claims	presented	in	this	dissertation	thus	far,	
we	must	ask	if	this	is	possible.	Is	open	discourse	and	public	knowledge	making	possible	in	a	
society	with	structural	inequality	built	into	its	epistemic	infrastructure?	Dewey	argued	it	is	
not.	Dewey	acknowledged	inequality	and	participatory	disenfranchisement	based	on	social	
identity.	He	called	for	the	“breaking	down	of	those	barriers	of	class,	race,	and	national	
territory”	precisely	because	they	prevent	citizens	from	being	perceived	as	knowers,	as	
communicators	of	experience	and	perspectives	(Dewey,	1944,	p.	87).	When	a	group	is	
denied	their	opportunity	to	contribute	to	public	knowledge	making	and	social	discourse,	
their	ideas	are	prevented	from	becoming	the	“possession	of	the	multitude,”	and	democracy	
cannot	be	brought	about	(1954,	p.	208).	In	1927	(the	original	printing	of	The	Public	and	Its	
Problems)	Dewey	offers	a	precursor	to	epistemic	injustice	(Fricker,	2007);	he	wrote	that	
denying	a	group	the	ability	to	produce	and	share	knowledge	in	the	dominant	social	
discourse	forestalls	the	development	of	knowledge	for	the	“multitude”	and	prevents	
democratic	participation;	he	outlined	some	hallmark	features	of	hermeneutic	injustice.		
What	is	more,	Dewey	(1944)	forwarded	schools	as	a	site	for	addressing	this	
inequality.	He	wrote,	“The	intermingling	in	the	school	of	youth	of	different	races,	differing	
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religions,	and	unlike	customs	creates	for	all	a	new	and	broader	environment”	(1944,	p.	21).	
Crucially,	Dewey	argued	that	there	is	a	direct	connection	between	education	and	the	ability	
for	individuals	across	social	groups	to	participate	in	and	benefit	from	social	life.	
Presciently,	Dewey	(1944)	wrote:	
Since	education	is	a	social	process…a	criterion	for	educational	criticism	and	
	 constriction	implies	a	particular	social	ideal	(emphasis	original).	The	two	points	
	 selected	by	which	to	measure	the	worth	of	a	form	of	social	life	are	the	extent	in	
	 which	the	interests	of	a	group	are	shared	by	all	its	members,	and	the	fullness	and	
	 freedom	with	which	it	interacts	with	other	groups.	An	undesirable	society,	in	other	
	 words,	is	one	which	internally	and	externally	sets	up	barriers	to	free	intercourse	
	 and	communication	of	experience.	A	society	which	makes	provision	for	
	 participation	in	its	good	of	all	its	members	on	equal	terms	and	which	secures	
	 flexible	readjustment	of	its	institutions	through	interaction	of	the	different	forms	of	
	 associated	life	is	in	so	far	democratic.	Such	a	society	must	have	a	type	of	
	 education	which	gives	individuals	a	personal	interest	in	social	relationships	and	
	 control,	and	the	habits	of	mind	which	secure	social	changes	(emphasis		 added)…”	(p.	
	 99).	
Dewey	(1944)	writes	that	education	is	the	social	process	for	bringing	about	shared	
participation	in	knowledge	making;	it	is	supposed	to	bring	about	open	communication	of	
experience.	The	social	function	of	education	is	to	make	sure	students	across	identities	can	
participate	in	the	social	good,	in	institutions,	in	democratic	life.	Democratic	society	requires	
education	systems	and	institutions	which	ensure	individuals	can	participate	in	social	
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relationships	and	create	social	change.	The	epistemic	habits	and	equity	that	education	
systems	are	responsible	for	are	essential	for	democratic	participation.	
	 Dewey	(1944)	originally	wrote	Democracy	and	Education	in	1916.	Since	1916,	some	
have	critiqued	Dewey	(a	founding	member	of	the	National	Association	for	the	
Advancement	of	Colored	People)	for	not	making	public	statements	about	race	and	
imperialism	(Margonis,	2007).	Specifically,	Dewey	has	been	criticized	for	not	calling	
attention	to	lynching,	violence	against	African	Americans,	and	U.S.	colonialism	abroad;	even	
though,	he	did	take	strong	and	public	stands	against	“racial	reasoning	and	racial	policies”	
(Margonis,	2007,	p.	175).	While	this	is	not	the	place	for	an	exploration	of	Dewey’s	cannon	
or	his	scholar	activism,	it	is	very	important,	particularly	within	the	scope	of	this	
dissertation,	to	acknowledge	Dewey’s	white	ignorance	and,	even	if	unwitting,	participation	
in	white	epistemologies	of	ignorance.	Not	even	Dewey,	a	white	man	writing	about	the	
unethical	role	of	racial	inequality	in	education	and	democratic	life	at	the	turn	of	the	19th	
century,	was	able	to	stand	completely	outside	of	white	hegemonic	norms.	
	 Thus	far,	this	chapter	has	presented	Dewey’s	arguments	for	the	essential	role	of	
education	in	knowledge	formation	and	communication	in	a	democracy.	Now,	it	is	important	
to	explore	the	role	of	education	institutions	in	ensuring	“children—black,	brown,	yellow,	
red,	mixed—would	be	miseducated	to	be	racially	inferior	adults	subordinate	to	white	
adults	and	children”	(Outlaw,	2007).	Outlaw	(2007)	describes	the	systemic	production	and	
distribution	of	ignorance	across	generations	to	order	life	as:	
	 This	miseducation	would	involve	the	deliberate,	ethnically	sanctioned		production	of	
	 ignorance	in	folks	of	all	races,	too	often	with	concomitant	dehumanizing	notions:	of	
	 themselves	as	superior	white	persons	and	race,	others	as	inferior	races	of	nonwhite	
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	 nonpersons—and	these	doings	and	consequences	were	both	legal	and	ethical	(p.	
	 197).		
Dewey	(1944)	acknowledged	that	education	for	democratic	participation	was	not	possible	
due	to	structural	inequality.	What	Outlaw	argues	is	far	more	pernicious—education	was	
and	is	used	as	a	tool	for	systemically	producing	structural	inequality	to	maintain	a	
racialized	hierarchy.		
	 Outlaw	(2007)	specifically	argues	that	teachers,	administers,	schools,	institutions	of	
higher	learning	and	even	philosophers	and	scientists	contribute	to:	
	 epistemologies	by	which	to	produce	and	legitimate	ignorance	(emphasis	original).	
	 That	is,	lack	of	knowledge…would	be	a	consequence	of	the	certainties	produced	by	
	 the	sanctioned	and	legitimate	knowledge	that	would	render	it	unnecessary	to	
	 engage	with	fully	and	humanely,	with	empathy	and	openness	
	 to	people	of	color	(p.	198).		
To	put	it	in	terms	relevant	to	central	argument	of	this	dissertation,	it	is	not	only	the	case	
that	educational	institutions	maintain	and	reproduce	epistemic	injustice	because	epistemic	
injustice	is	structural.	Rather,	the	role	of	educational	institutions	has	been	to	create,	
develop,	and	legitimate	epistemic	ignorance.	Put	more	bluntly,	the	social	role	of	
educational	institutions	has	been	to	produce	epistemic	injustice.	Educational	institutions	
are	not	simply	“one	of	the	pathways”	to	injustice;	they	are	the	primary	state	actors	in	the	
structural	production	of	epistemic	injustice.		
	 Outlaw	(2007)	argues	that	schools	were	and	continue	to	be	the	principal	means	of	
the	social	ordering	that	privileges	white	students	at	the	expense	of	students	of	color.	
Outlaw	(2007)	traces	this	ordering	historically,	from	schools	for	“Indian”	children	which	
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were	devoted	to	assimilating	Native	American	children	to	“Euro-American	white	people”	
by	relocating	these	children	from	their	communities	to	isolated	boarding	schools	where	
indigenous	languages	and	knowledges	were	erased.	Similarly,	racial	apartheid	existed	in	
public	schools	in	the	United	States	until	the	Brown	verdict	in	1954,	and,	as	chapter	two	of	
this	dissertation	showed,	this	racialized	segregation	still	exists	today.	
	 Schools	are	and	have	always	been	racialized	in	structure	and	content.	Powerfully,	
Outlaw	(2007)	writes:	
	 Knowledge	productions	and	knowledge	mediation,	including	ethical	knowledges	
	 practiced	within	school,	and	institutions	of	higher	learning,	were	thoroughly	
	 conditioned	by	the…imprimatur	of	whiteness	(emphasis		original)	…In	knowledge	
	 production,	too,	the	norms	structuring	hierarchic	reality	were	at	play.	
	 Epistemological	matters	of	truth	and	falsity	and	validity		and	fallacy	were	ordered	in	
	 keeping	with	the	racial	hierarchy	of	White	Supremacy”	(p.	202).		
Outlaw	argues	that	every	aspect	of	formal	knowledge	making	in	the	United	States	has	
served	the	production	of	white	racial	hierarchy.		While	the	Supreme	Court’s	decision	in	
Brown	v.	Board	of	Education	of	Topeka,	Kansas	named	that	separate	schools	are	inherently	
unequal	and	unjust	and	brought	to	light	the	unethical	nature	of	academic	apartheid,	Outlaw	
(2007)	argues	much	more	must	be	done	to	reeducate	and	redirect	the	work	of	“knowledge	
workers”	to	correct	for	the	“miseducation”	that	is	still	present	in	educational	institutions	
across	academic	levels.	Thus,	we	see,	that	educational	institutions	and	stakeholders	bare	a	
particular	responsibility	for	epistemic	justice	because	they	participate	in	systems	that	have	
and	continue	to	be	producers	of	epistemic	injustice.		
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Educational	Institution’s	Social	Responsibility	
	
Using	the	analysis	of	philosophers	like	Dotson	(2012)	and	Medina	(2013)	we	can	
understand	educational	structural	inequality—described	above—as	a	particular	type	of	
harm,	as	hermeneutic	injustice.	Structures	within	education	systems	create,	maintain	and	
reproduce	the	marginalization	of	non-dominant	knowers	and	their	knowledges.	Education	
institutions	and	those	involved	(administrators,	educators,	policy	makers,	etc.)	with	them	
participate	in	the	exclusion	of	non-dominant	knowers	and	their	perspectives,	
interpretations,	and	experiences	from	the	dominant	interpretive	framework;	they	also	
prevent	those	with	dominant	epistemic	identities	from	learning	about	multiple	
hermeneutic	frameworks	with	epistemic	agents	who	are	different	from	them.	Medina	
(2013)	and	Dotson	(2011)	argued	that	participating	in	hermeneutic	injustice	is	indeed	
simultaneously	contributing	to	hermeneutic	injustice.	Individuals,	with	and	in	their	
relationship	to	institutions	and	social	structure,	are	responsible	for	the	flaws	in	the	
dominant,	shared	knowledge	framework.	This	contribution	to	structural	injustice	is	
distinctly	epistemic	in	nature	because	it	maintains,	reproduces	and	extends	(generational)	
hermeneutic	injustice.		
Again,	structural	injustice	in	education	contributes	to	hermeneutic	injustice;	it	
produces	an	epistemic	harm.	As	participators	in	systems	of	education,	dominantly	situated	
knowers	share	responsibility	for	this	wrong.	To	be	clear,	this	does	not	mean	that	
professors,	teachers,	principals,	provosts	or	parents	choosing	homes	based	on	school	
districts	are	aiming	to	marginalize	our	society’s	epistemically	vulnerable	knowers	and	their	
knowledges—just	as	Young	(2011)	does	not	charge	a	particular	landlord	or	rental	agent	for	
the	harm	Sandy	experiences	in	the	housing	example	above.	In	fact,	Young	(2011)	argued	
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most	of	the	actors	in	that	scenario	were	doing	their	best	within	structures	and	policies	that	
produced	injustice.	Agents	relative	to	educational	structural	injustice,	just	like	agents	
relative	to	housing	structural	injustice,	share	responsibility	as	participators	in	a	collective	
that	participates	in	the	production	of	injustice.	Young	(2011)	clarifies:	
“The	ground	of	my	responsibility	lies	in	the	fact	that	I	participate	in	the	structural	
process	that	have	unjust	outcomes.	These	processes	are	ongoing	and	ought	to	be	
transformed	so	that	they	are	less	unjust.	Thus	I	share	with	others	the	responsibility	
to	transform	these	processes	to	reduce	and	eliminate	the	injustices	they	cause.	My	
responsibility	is	essentially	shared	with	others	because	the	harms	are	produced	by	
many	of	us	acting	together	within	accepted	institutions	and	practices…”(p.	110).		
Clearly,	dominantly	situated	knowers	who	participate	in	educational	structural	
injustice,	which	produces	hermeneutic	injustice,	share	the	responsibility	to	transform	the	
process,	policies,	practices,	and	false	ideologies	that	produce	these	injustices.	They	must	do	
this,	as	Young	(2011),	argues	in	collective	action	with	others	independent	of	and	in	
conjunction	with	state	policies	and	programs.	As	this	educational	structural	injustice	is	
epistemic	in	nature—producing	and	maintaining	hermeneutic	injustice	(and	therefore	
testimonial	injustice	which	is	rooted	in	testimonial	injustice)—collective	action	must	be	in	
conjunction	with	non-dominantly	situated	knowers.		
Dominantly	situated	knowers	cannot	access	multiple	hermeneutic	resources	unless	
they	act	and	learn	in	conjunction	with	differently	situated	others.	Righting	educational	
structural	injustice	requires	dominant	knowers	to	actively	face	their	contributions	to	
hermeneutic	injustice.	Therefore,	taking	responsibility	for	educational	structural	injustice	
requires	epistemically	privileged	agents	to	address	hermeneutic	injustice	in	the	ways	that	
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Medina	(2013)	outlined:	in	collaborative	contact	with	others	through	the	critical	
engagement	of	new	knowledge	and	affective	engagement	with	the	perspectives	of	others.	
Further,	educational	institutions	share	in	both	accountability	and	responsibility.	
Anderson	(2012)	argues	that	structural	injustice	in	education	is	distinctively	epistemic	in	
nature.	Anderson	(2012)	points	out	that	when	disadvantaged	social	groups	are	
systematically	deprived	access	to	education	those	groups	will	tend	to	be	excluded	from	
participation	in	inquiry.	Because	of	this	exclusion:	
An	original	structural	injustice—denial	of	fair	opportunities	for	education—
	 generates	additional	structural	inequalities	in	opportunities	of	exercising	full	
	 epistemic	agency,	which	is	an	injustice	to	the	speakers	(Anderson,	2012,	p.	169).	
Further,	Anderson	(2012)	argues	that	because	epistemic	injustice	is	structural,	it	requires	
structural	remedies.	Anderson	(2012)	asserts	that	epistemic	justice	for	institutions	is	
required	for	the	“universal	participation	on	terms	of	equality	for	all	inquirers”	(p.	172).	Just	
as	individual	are	accountable	for	individual	acts,	“we	are	responsible	for	how	we	act	
collectively.	Epistemic	virtue	is	needed	at	both	individual	and	structural	scales”	(Anderson,	
2012,	p.	171).	Anderson	connects	epistemic	injustice	and	structural	injustice	by	asserting	
that	educational	injustice	is	simultaneously	structural	and	epistemic.	Because	it	is	
structural,	it	requires	structural	remedies	in	addition	to	individual	ones	so	marginalized	
individuals	and	groups	can	exercise	full	epistemic	agency.		
Conclusion	
This	chapter	presented	foundational	literature	on	social	epistemology	which	helps	
us	to	understand	knowledge	and	knowledge	making	as	both	situated	and	relational.	This	
was	followed	by	a	detailed	explication	of	Miranda	Fricker’s	(2007)	account	of	epistemic	
	 	
	 	
77 
injustice	as	testimonial	(when	a	hearer	wrongs	a	speaker	in	the	speaker’s	capacity	as	a	
giver	of	knowledge)	and	hermeneutical	(when	a	gap	in	the	dominant	framework	wrongs	a	
social	group	by	systemically	excluding	it,	and	its	members,	from	the	social	production	of	
knowledge).	This	chapter	then	used	recent	critiques	of	Fricker’s	account	to	broaden	
epistemic	injustice	to	include	not	just	the	testimony	but	also	the	epistemic	resources,	
strategies,	and	advocacy	of	persons	and	groups	with	target	social	identities.	Additionally,	
this	chapter	offered	a	review	of	current	and	extended	theorizing	about	Fricker’s	account	of	
epistemic	justice.	Taken	together,	philosophers	describe	epistemic	justice	as	including	the	
following	characteristics:	
(a) Dominant	knowers	correcting	for	flaws	in	their	credibility	judgments	through	
critical	reflection	(Fricker,	2007);	
(b) Dominant	knowers	accepting	that	marginalized	knowers	develop	epistemic	
resources	from	their	situations/standpoints;	privileged	knowers	trusting	
marginalized	knowers	and	their	situated	knowledges;	and	dominant	knowers	
actively	learning	how	to	utilize	structurally	marginalized	knowledge	(Pohlhaus,	
2012);	
(c) Dominant	knowers	engage	their	responsibility	to	seek	out	marginally	situated	
hermeneutically	resources	(Dotson,	2012);	
(d) Dominantly	(and	subordinately)	situated	knowers	restructure	habits	and	
affective	structures	to	enable	them	to	simultaneously	engage	different	
perspectives	and	viewpoints	without	polarizing	them	(develop	a	kaleidoscopic	
consciousness),	and	engage	in	collective	agency	and	action	taking	toward	
political	and	cultural	transformation	(Medina,	2013).	
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The	following	chapters	in	this	dissertation	will	call	upon	these	four	characteristics	of	
epistemic	justice	while	exploring	the	guiding	questions	detailed	in	chapter	one:	do	students	
experience	epistemic	injustice	in	education	settings,	can	social	justice	pedagogy	help	to	
address	epistemic	injustice,	and	what	are	the	theoretical	implications	for	considering	
epistemic	justice	as	it	relates	to	educational	institutions.		
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Chapter	3	
Identity	Matters:	Schooling	and	Knowledge	Making	
	
“African	American	students	are	gifted	and	brilliant.	They	do	not	have	a	culture	of	poverty	
but	a	culture	of	richness	that	can	be	brought	into	classrooms	to	facilitate	learning.	African	
American	students	learn	when	they	are	taught.	They	must	be	helped	to	overcome	the	
negative	stereotypes	about	themselves	and	their	communities	that	permeate	our	culture”	
	–Lisa	Delpit	(2012,	p.25).		
	
As	Delpit	(2012)	argues,	student	identity	matters	in	the	classroom.	This	chapter	
offers	responses	to	two	questions	raised	in	the	introduction.	First:	In	what	ways	do	students	
with	marginalized	racial	social	identities	experience	epistemic	injustice	in	educational	
settings?	This	chapter	will	use	the	Department	of	Education’s	recent	data	to	give	an	account	
of	the	ways	in	which,	as	social	groups,	marginalized	students	experience	a	systemic	form	of	
educational	inequality.	Specifically,	reporting	by	the	Department	of	Education	in	the	
Condition	of	Education	2015	(Kena	et	al.,	2015)	and	in	The	Digest	of	Education	Statistics	
2016	(Snyder,	de	Brey,	&	Dillow,	2016)	offer	a	comprehensive	account	of	student	academic	
performance	as	measured	by	standardized	exams	across	the	nation	at	consistent	grade	
levels	(for	example,	fourth	and	eighth	grade);	these	data	are	important	as	they	represent	
the	government’s	own	reporting	on	the	outcomes	of	public	education.	Additionally,	the	
governments’	reporting	(Kena	et	al.,	2015;	Snyder	et	al.,	2016)	is	consistent	with	scholarly	
research	on	inequality	in	education	(Orfield	&	Frankenberg,	2014;	Orfield	et	al.,	2016)	
further	explored	below.	Providing	depth	and	context	for	the	reported	government	data,	
this	chapter	then	reviews	some	analysis	offered	by	scholars	of	color	researching	the	
experiences	of	marginalized	students	to	understand	how	some	of	this	systemic	
marginalization	occurs.	Finally,	the	chapter	then	explores	the	voices	of	students	
experiencing	epistemic	injustice	themselves.	By	reviewing	literature	on	Youth	
Participatory	Action	Research	(YPAR)	and	youth	involved	in	programs	based	in	intergroup	
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dialogue	(IGD)	pedagogy,	the	second	half	of	this	chapter	begins	to	unpack	question	two	
raised	in	the	introduction:	Can	social	justice	pedagogies	interrupt	the	production	of	
knowledge	inequalities	in	the	educational	setting?	
Creating	Knowers	&	Lesser	Knowers:	Identity	and	Education	
	
At	its	most	basic,	epistemic	injustice,	occurs	due	to	gaps	in	the	dominant	
interpretive	framework	(Fricker,	2007).	Described	in	detail	in	chapter	two,	philosophers’	
characterizations	of	epistemic	injustice,	most	specifically	the	hermeneutic	type,	include:	
• When	a	lacuna	in	the	collective	interpretive	framework	puts	members	of	
subordinate	social	groups	at	a	disadvantage	when	making	meaning	of	their	
own	experiences,	rendering	it	difficult	to	make	the	experiences	of	those	with	
subordinate	social	identities	intelligible	to	those	who	only	utilize	the	
dominant	interpretive	framework	(Fricker,	2007);	
• When	members	of	marginally	situated	groups	can	name	and	describe	shared	
phenomena	even	when	a	lacuna	exists	in	the	dominant	interpretive	frame.	
Coalition	with	others	who	share	a	marginalized	experience	can	be	an	
epistemic	resource	(Mason,	2011);	
• When	tools	developed	by	marginally	situated	knowers	are	not	
acknowledged	by	dominantly	situated	knowers	(Pohlhaus,	2012;	Dotson,	
2012);	
• When	marginally	situated	knowers	are	silenced	because	dominantly	
situated	knowers	assume	they	do	not	have	a	contribution	to	share	
(Hookway,	2010);	
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• When	knowers	do	not	maintain	multiple	perspectives	simultaneously	
(Medina,	2013).		
Across	characterizations,	hermeneutic	injustice	harms	members	of	subordinated	groups	by	
barring	them	from	equal	epistemic	participation	(at	the	very	least).	The	first	half	of	this	
chapter	asks:	Do	schools	(pre-primary	through	university)	do	this?	Do	schools	create	
environments	in	which	students	with	subordinate	social	identities—for	example	students	
of	color	and	low-income	students—do	not	and	cannot	thrive	academically?	Are	schools	
environments	that,	instead	of	developing	the	intellectual	abilities	and	habits	of	all	students,	
functionally	track	students	into	groups	of	“knowers”	and	“lesser	knowers”	based	on	social	
identity?	Let	us	start	answering	these	questions	by	reviewing	data	that	make	clear	how	
learners	fare	in	public	institutions	in	the	United	States	based	on	their	social	identities.			
Patterns:	Preprimary.	The	Federal	Government	shared	data	looking	at	the	
demographics	of	students	through	the	2013	academic	year	(Orfield	et	al.,	2016;	Kena	et	al.,	
2015;	Orfield	&	Frankenberg,	2014)	and	offered	a	broad	sketch	of	students’	identities	in	
relation	to	features	and	outcomes	of	education.	Differential	educational	experiences	across	
social	identity	groups	begin	at	age	three,	when	students	begin	to	enroll	in	preprimary	
programs	focused	on	children	ages	three	to	five	(Kena	et	al.,	2015).	The	National	Center	for	
Education	Statistics	found	that	41%	of	white	students,	31%	of	Hispanic9	students,	37%	of	
Black	students,	and	41%	of	Asian	students	were	enrolled	in	preprimary	education	
programs	(Snyder	et	al.,	2016,	p.64).10	The	National	Center	for	Education	Statistics	further	
found	that	enrollment	in	preprimary	programs	varied	by	parents’	highest	level	of	
education	(Snyder	et	al.,	2016).11		
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Preprimary	programs,	while	not	required,	play	a	significant	role	in	preparing	
children	for	the	elementary	school	experiences.	Kindergarten	teachers	assess	“approaches	
to	learning”	at	the	start	of	kindergarten;	positive	approaches	to	learning	include	behaviors	
such	as	completing	tasks	independently,	paying	attention	in	class,	organizing	materials,	and	
following	classroom	rules;	these	positive	behavior	traits	are	associated	with	academic	
achievement	in	kindergarten	and	first	grade	(Kena	et	al.,	2015).	As	part	of	the	Early	Child	
Longitudinal	Study,	teachers	ranked	members	of	the	2010-11	kindergarten	class	on	their	
“approaches	to	learning”	based	on	a	four-point	scale	where	a	rating	of	one	equated	to	a	
child	never	demonstrating	a	behavior	while	a	ranking	of	four	equated	to	a	child	
demonstrating	a	behavior	very	often	(Kena	et	al.,	2015).	Students	with	the	most	access	to	
preprimary	programs	demonstrated	greater	positive	approaches	to	learning	than	those	
students	who	did	not	have	access	to	preprimary	programs.	The	average	rankings	were	
higher	for	Asian	(3.1)	and	white	(3.0)	kindergarteners	than	they	were	for	Hispanic	(2.9)	or	
Black	(2.8)	students	(Kena	et	al.,	2015).		
Just	as	the	there	is	a	synchronicity	between	the	races/ethnicities	of	children	
attending	preprimary	school	and	students	demonstrating	positive	approaches	to	learning	
(as	conceptualized	in	this	report)	in	kindergarten,	there	is	also	a	parallel	synchronicity	to	
parent(s)’	highest	levels	of	educational	attainment.		In	2013,	the	percentage	of	children	
attending	a	preprimary	program	was	highest	for	children	whose	parent(s)	obtained	a	
graduate	degree	or	higher	and	lowest	for	children	who	parent(s)	obtained	a	less	than	a	
high	school	credential;	75%	verses	55%	respectively	(Kena	et	al.,	2015).		As	noted	
previously,	students	with	the	most	access	to	preprimary	programs	demonstrated	greater	
positive	approaches	to	learning	than	those	students	who	did	not	have	access	to	preprimary	
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programs.		Students’	household	incomes	are	similarly	parallel.	Snyder	et	al.	(2016)	reports	
that,	“Approaches	to	Learning	rating	was	highest	for	kindergartners	in	households	with	
incomes	at	or	above	200	percent	of	the	federal	poverty	level	(3.1)	and	lowest	for	those	in	
households	with	incomes	below	the	federal	poverty	level	(2.8)”	(p.	4).	In	2013,	13%	of	
white	and	Asian	students,	32%	of	Hispanic	students,	and	39%	of	Black	students	under	the	
age	of	18	lived	in	poverty	(Kena	et	al.,	2015,	p.52).	
Thus,	by	age	five,	white	and	Asian	students	who	are	most	likely	to	have	a	parent	
with	a	college	or	graduate	degree,	more	likely	to	have	higher	income	levels,	and	who	are	
most	likely	to	attend	preprimary	school	are	also	most	likely	to	demonstrate	high	levels	of	
positive	approaches	to	learning	at	the	start	of	kindergarten	(based	on	the	criteria	
measured	by	Kena	et	al.,	2015).	Conversely,	by	age	five,	Black	and	Hispanic	students,	who	
are	most	likely	to	live	in	poverty	and	to	not	attend	preprimary	school,	and	whose	parents	
are	less	likely	to	have	college	degrees	demonstrate	lower	levels	of	academic	preparation	
based	on	the	teachers’	assessment	of	their	approaches	to	learning	(Kena	et	al.,	2015).	
Patterns:	Public	Elementary	&	Secondary	School.	From	fall	2002	through	the	2012	
school	year,	the	number	of	students	enrolled	in	public12	elementary	school	increased	and	
the	racial/ethnic	identities	of	the	students	enrolled	shifted	dramatically	(Kena	et	al.,	2015;	
Orfield	&	Frankenberg,	2014).	The	number	of	white	students	enrolled	in	public	schools	
decreased	from	28.6	million	to	25.4	million	(decreasing	their	share	of	public	enrollment	
from	59	to	51%),	and	the	number	of	Black	students	decreased	from	8.3	million	to	7.8	
million	(17%	to	16%);	the	number	of	Hispanic	students	increased	from	8.6	million	to	12.1	
million	(from	18%	to	24%)	(Kena	et	al.,	2015,	p.	80).	However,	the	number	of	students	
enrolled	by	racial/ethnic	identity	is	not	the	most	striking	characteristic	of	the	demographic	
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shifts	impacting	public	schools	in	the	United	States.	Rather,	when	looking	at	which	students	
are	attending	schools	together,	we	learn	that	64	years	after	the	Supreme	Court’s	Decision	
in	Brown	v	The	Board	of	Education	of	Topeka	Kansas,	schools	are	indeed	still	deeply	and	
problematically	separate	(Orfield	et	al.,	2016).					
After	years	of	residential	re-segregation	and	court	ruling	limiting	the	impact	of	
Brown,	the	public	schools	in	the	United	States	are	now	comprised	of	largely	white	or	largely	
student	of	color	populations	(Orfield	&	Frankenberg,	2014).	Specifically:	
At	a	national	level,	the	typical	white	student	is	now	in	a	school	whose	student	
composition	is	nearly	three-fourths	white,	one-eighth	Latino	and	one-twelfth	
black…That	is,	in	a	classroom	of	30	students,	the	classmates	of	the	typical	white	
student	would	include	22	whites,	2	blacks,	4	Latinos,	one	Asian	and	one	“Other.”	On	
the	other	hand,	the	typical	black	or	Latino	student	would	have	8	white	classmates	
and	at	least	20	black	and/or	Latino	classmates.	The	typical	Asian	student	would	
have	12	white	classmates	and	7	Asian	classmates,	meaning	about	two-thirds	of	the	
classmates	of	the	Asian	student	would	be	from	groups	with	higher	average	parent	
education	levels,	higher	incomes	and	considerably	higher	levels	of	test	scores.	These	
data	begin	to	sketch	out	the	divergence	in	the	experience	of	different	student	
groups.	The	typical	Latino	student	is	now	in	a	school	that	is	57	%	Latino,	more	
segregated	than	black	students	are	with	fellow	blacks	and	second	only	to	whites	in	
the	level	of	in-group	isolation.	Nationally	black	students	are	in	schools	that	are	
already	more	than	one-sixth	Latino,	with	much	higher	ratios	in	some	regions	
(Orfield	&	Frankenberg,	2014,	p.12).		
Regardless	of	geographic	setting,	the	majority	of	white	students	are	enrolled	in	majority	
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white	schools;	they	are	learning	in	relative	racial	isolation.	Meanwhile	Black	and	Latino	
students	have	low	exposure	to	white	students	in	large	metropolitan	areas,	midsize	central	
cities	and	rural	areas	(Kena	et	al.,	2015;	Orfield	&	Frankenberg,	2014).	Black	students	will	
have	greater	exposure	to	white	students	in	suburbs	than	Latino	students	will	(Kena	et	al.,	
2015;	Orfield	&	Frankenberg,	2014).	This	means	Black	and	Latino	students	are	exposed	
mostly	to	students	of	color	while	white	students	are	exposed	mostly	to	other	white	
students.		Does	this	matter?	
Resoundingly	yes.	While	the	experience	of	students	enrolled	in	re-segregated	
schools	in	the	United	States	will	be	explored	below,	let	us	return	to	the	link	between	socio-
economic	status	and	students’	racial/ethnic	social	identities.	During	the	2011-12	school	
year,	45.8%	of	all	public	school	students	were	designated	as	low	income;	however,	the	
schools	with	the	highest	concentrations	of	low-income	students	were	also	schools	with	the	
lowest	concentrations	of	white	and	Asian	students	(Orfield	&	Frankenberg,	2014).	The	Civil	
Rights	Project	refers	to	the	concentration	of	Black	and	Latino	students	in	schools	where	
there	is	also	a	concentration	of	low-income	students	as	“double	segregation”	(Orfield	&	
Frankenberg,	2014,	p.	15).	The	pernicious	implications	of	double	segregation	are	expressed	
through	both	student	learning	and	attainment	outcomes.		
	 On	national	reading	assessment	exams,	white	and	Asian	students	score	higher	than	
their	Black	and	Hispanic	counterparts	(see	Table	2	below	based	on	Kena	et	al.,	2015).	In	
fact,	white	students’	performance	on	the	fourth	grade	reading	test	improved	in	2013	(over	
2011)	when	no	other	racial	group	experienced	a	significant	increase	in	performance	(Kena	
et	al.,	2015).	Student	test	scores	reveal	that	in	fourth,	eighth	and	twelfth	grades	(grades	in	
which	national	exams	are	administered)	white	and	Asian	students	consistently	score	
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higher	than	their	Hispanic	and	Black	counterparts.	In	2013,	NES	(2015)	reports	that	exam	
scores	(on	a	scale	of	0	to	500)	in	the	fourth	grade	by	race	were:	232	for	white	students,	235	
for	Asian	students,	206	for	Black	students,	207	for	Hispanic	students	(p.	135).	In	2013,	
eighth	grade	reading	test	scores	by	race	were	276	for	white	students,	280	for	Asian	
students,	250	for	Black	students,	256	for	Hispanic	students	(Kena	et	al.,	2015,	p.	135).	For	
twelfth	graders	in	2011,	reading	test	scores	by	race	were	297	for	white	students,	296	for	
Asian	students,	268	for	Black	students,	276	for	Hispanic	students	(Kena	et	al.,	2015,	p.	136).	
	 Consistent	with	reading	scores,	the	same	racialized	differential	exists	in	
mathematics	scores	for	fourth,	eighth,	and	twelfth	graders	tested	in	2013	(see	Table	3	
below	based	on	Kena	et	al.,	2015).		In	2013,	fourth	graders	by	race	scored	the	following	on	
national	math	exams:	250	for	white	students,	258	for	Asian	students,	224	for	Black	
students,	231	for	Hispanic	students	(Kena	et	al.,	2015,	p.	142).	For	eighth	graders	during	
the	2013	school	year,	math	scores	were:	294	for	white	students,	306	for	Asian	students,	
263	for	Black	students,	272	for	Hispanic	students	(Kena	et	al.,	2015,	p.	142).	Twelfth	grade	
scores	(measured	on	a	scale	of	0-300)	were	162	for	white	students,	172	for	Asian	students,	
132	for	Black	students,	141	for	Hispanic	students	during	the	2013	school	year	(Kena	et	al.,	
2015,	p.	144).	
Student	Population	 Fourth	Grade	
Scale	0-500	
Eight	Grade	
Scale	0-500	
Twelfth	Grade	
Scale	0-500	
White	Students	 232	 276	 297	
Asian	Students	 235	 280	 296	
Black	Students	 206	 250	 268	
Hispanic	Students	 207	 256	 276	
	
Table 2. Summary of National Reading Test Results by Race. Based on Kena et al., 2015, The Conditions of 
Education 2015, US Department of Education National Center for Educational Statistics. 
	
	 	
	 	
87 
Student Population Fourth Grade 
Scale 0-500 
Eight Grade 
Scale 0-500 
Twelfth Grade 
Scale 0-300 
White Students 250 294 162 
Asian Students 258 306 172 
Black Students 224 263 132 
Hispanic Students 231 272 141 
 
Table 3. Summary of National Math Test Results by Race. Based on Kena et al., 2015, The Conditions of Education 
2015, US Department of Education National Center for Educational Statistics. 
	
	 Across	academic	school	years	and	across	years	(1973-2013),	white	and	Asian	
students	scored	higher	on	national	reading	and	math	exams	than	did	Black	and	Hispanic	
students	(Kena	et	al.,	2015.).	Given	Orfield	and	Frankenberg’s	(2014)	descriptions	of	the	
double	(re)segregation	of	schools—white	and	Asian	students	both	attend	schools	that	are	
predominantly	white	and	middle-high	socio-economic	status	while	Black	and	Hispanic	
students	mostly	attend	schools	that	are	majority	Black	and	Hispanic	and	low	socio-
economic	status—we	see	from	student	test	scores	Black	and	Hispanic	students’	learning	is	
negatively	linked	to	demographic	isolation	in	public	schools.		
These	harmful	racialized	patterns	continue	as	students	graduate	from	both	high	
school	and	secondary	education	institutions.	During	the	2011-12	school	year,	81%	of	high	
school	students	graduate	on	time	with	a	regular	high	school	diploma	(Kena	et	al.,	2015,	p.	
174).	On	time	regular	graduation	rates	by	race	were	93%	for	Asian	students,	85%	for	white	
students,	76%	for	Hispanic	students	and	68%	for	Black	students	(Kena	et	al.,	2015,	p.	175).	
After	graduating	from	high	school,	66%	of	high	school	graduates	immediately	enrolled	in	
college	during	the	2012-13	school	year	(Kena	et	al.,	2015,	p.	184).	However,	when	
differentiated	by	race,	81%	of	Asian	students,	67%	of	white	students,	66%	of	Hispanic	
students	and	57%	of	Black	students	immediately	enrolled	in	college	after	graduating	on	
	 	
	 	
88 
time	from	high	school	(Kena	et	al.,	2015,	p.	187).	By	income,	for	the	2012-13	school	year,	
college	enrollment	rates	for	high	school	students	who	graduated	on	time	with	a	regular	
diploma	were	31	percentage	points	higher	for	high	income	students	than	the	rates	from	
those	in	low	income	families	(Kena	et	al.,	2015,	p.	186).		
It	is	not	only	that	low-income	students	and	students	of	color	were	less	likely	to	
directly	enroll	in	college;	we	must	also	consider	the	intersections	of	race	and	class	which	
disproportionately	leave	low	income	students	of	color	outside	the	“Ivory	Tower”	and,	
therefore,	outside	the	cycle	of	economic	and	educational	advancement.	This	summary	of	
recent	Department	of	Education	reports	on	the	state	of	education	in	the	United	States	
(Kena	et	al.,	2015;	Snyder	et	al.,	2016),	illustrates	a	not	only	a	pernicious	cycle	but	also	a	
two-tiered	education	system.	Low-income	students,	and,	most	specifically,	low-income	
students	of	color,	enter	pre-school	demonstrating	fewer	school	readiness	markers	then	
their	high-income	and	Asian	and	white	peers.	This	trajectory	continues	with	decreased	test	
scores	in	reading	and	math	through	elementary	and	middle	school,	and	it	culminates	in	
decreased	high	school	graduation	and	college	enrollment	rates.		
Government	data	reporting	the	relationship	between	post-graduate	earnings	and	
students’	identities	demonstrates	the	intersections	of	race	and	gender	in	terms	of	level	of	
education	and	related	economic	achievement;	specifically,	white	men	earn	more	than	men	
and	women	of	color	and	white	women.	In	2013,	men	with	a	Bachelor’s	degree	earned	67%	
more	than	men	with	a	high	school	degree	as	their	highest	level	of	educational	attainment;	
women	with	a	Bachelor’s	degree	earned	65%	more	than	woman	with	a	high	school	degree	
as	their	highest	level	of	educational	attainment	(Snyder	et	al.,	2016,	p.	746).	Again,	social	
identities	matter	as	women	with	Bachelor’s	degrees	earn	32%	less	than	their	male	
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counterparts,	while	women	with	high	school	degrees	earn	31%	less	than	men	with	high	
school	degrees	as	their	highest	level	of	educational	attainment	(Snyder	et	al.,	2016,	p.	746).	
This	gender-based	wage	gap	can	also	be	differentiated	by	race.	Specifically,	in	2015,	white	
women	earned	82%	of	the	hourly	wage	as	white	men,	while	Asian	women	earned	87	cents	
per	dollar	of	white	men,	and	Black	women	earned	65	cents	per	dollar	of	white	men,	while	
Hispanic	women	earned	58	cents	per	dollar	earned	by	white	men	(Patten,	2016).		
Ability	to	participate	in	shared	public	life,	both	economically	(pay	gap)	and	
intellectually	(“achievement”	gap),	is	negatively	linked	to	education	inequality.	
Importantly,	these	inequalities	mean	that	students	of	color	and	low-income	students	are	
less	likely	to	thrive	in	schools	and	not	persisting	from	pre-school	through	to	college.	If	
these	students	are	not	present,	their	experiences	are	not	present.	The	knowledges	they	
bring	from	their	homes	and	communities	are	not	present.	As	philosophers	have	argued,	
hermeneutic	injustice	occurs	when	the	epistemic	resources	and	interpretations	of	those	
marginally	situated	are	not	acknowledged	(Dotson,	2012;	Mason,	2011;	Pohlhaus,	2012).	A	
curriculum	in	which	marginally	situated	knowers	are	being	positioned	as	“under-
performing”	and	in	which	marginally	situated	knowers	are	pushed	out	as	they	age	through	
the	educational	system,	is	one	in	which	the	experiences,	interpretations	and	knowledge	
resources	of	those	students	are	not	acknowledged.	Given,	marginalized	students	and	their	
intellectual	tools	are	not	acknowledged	in	educational	systems,	dominant	knowers	(and	to	
some	extent	marginalized	knowers)	are	not	able	to	develop	kaleidoscopic	perspectives;	
they	cannot	maintain	multiple	perspectives	simultaneously	if	only	one	dominant	
perspective	is	present	in	schools;	this	is	also	a	form	of	hermeneutic	injustice	(Medina,	
2013).		
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Perniciously,	marginalized	students	are	not	then	developed	as	“knowers”	in	the	
education	system.	Their	identities	as	knowers,	as	givers	of	knowledge,	in	the	public	sphere	
(the	dominant	socio-political	framework)	is	diminished	because	these	students	experience	
systemic	marginalizing	in	education	systems.	To	be	clear,	this	dissertation	does	not	argue	
that	this	marginalization	is	merely	passive.	These	statistics	do	not	merely	show	that	
marginally	situated	students	are	not	benefiting	from	the	education	system.	Rather,	as	will	
be	argued	more	below,	education	systems	are	intentionally	marginalizing	the	knowledges	
of	non-dominant	students	at	the	expense	of	students’	academic	achievement.	Take,	for	
example,	the	Federal	court	case	over	Arizona’s	law	barring	ethnic	studies	in	schools	as	a	
response	to	the	growth	of	“La	Raza”	studies	courses	focused	on	Latino/Hispanic	students	
(Depenbrock,	2017).		
In	the	1990’s,	teachers	in	the	Tucson	Unified	School	District	sought	to	address	the	
“achievement”	gap	experienced	by	Latino	students	by	offering	courses	that	not	only	
focused	on	Latino	history	but	also	developed	confidence	and	self-esteem	among	Latino	
students	(Depenbrock,	2017).	Students	enrolled	in	these	elective	courses	graduated	from	
high	school	at	higher	rates	than	their	peers	and	also	scored	higher	on	state-wide	exams	
(Cabrera,	Milem,	Jacquet,	&	Marx,	2014).	Even	though	courses	that	(1)	acknowledged	the	
cultural	histories,	experiences	and	perspectives	of	Latino	students	while	(2)	celebrating	
their	identity	as	learners	improved	student	outcomes,	the	Arizona	legislature	outlawed	
ethnic	studies	courses.	Legislators	argued	that	courses	should	not	focus	on	race,	on	
students’	identities,	or	acknowledge	systems	of	oppression.	Elected	government	officials	
are	attempting	to	prevent	marginally	situated	knowers	from	(1)	learning	about	their	
histories	and	culture,	(2)	collectively	interpreting	their	histories	and	experiences	together	
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as	part	of	their	schooling	and	from	(3)	naming	the	marginalization	they	experience	within	
the	context	of	structural	inequality	(oppression)	(Planas,	2017).	This	is	hermeneutic	
injustice	operating	in	and	being	reproduced	in	the	education	system.	
What	of	the	broader	implications?	One	could	ask	if	these	government	data	thus	far	
presented	reflect	not	a	lack	in	a	collective	system,	but	rather	if	they	perhaps	point	to	
deficiencies	students	bring	to	education	systems.	Inferring	that	students	from	particular	
social	identity	groups	consistently	experience	less	positive	outcomes	in	education	settings	
because	of	a	flaw	in	their	families	or	communities	is	a	prime	example	of	a	false	narrative	
appearing	plausible	due	to	a	lacuna	in	their	shared	knowledge	resource.	Education	
scholars,	particularly	researchers	of	color,	have	researched	and	thoroughly	rebutted	this	
deficit	perspective	(Delpit,	2012;	Ladson-Billings,	2006).	It	is	not	because	of	students	or	
families	that	students	with	subordinate	identities	are	systemically	disadvantaged	in	
education	systems.	It	is	because	of	systemic	inequality	that	marginalized	students	and	their	
experiences	are	left	out	of	the	public	production	of	“knowers”	in	the	primary,	secondary	
and	post-secondary	education	systems.		
Further,	it	is	because	of	hermeneutic	injustice—a	gap	in	the	shared	dominant	
knowledge	resource—that	conversations	about	academic	success	focus	on	poverty	and	
racial	identities	as	pathologies	and	“risk	factors”	(Noguera,	2009)	instead	of	focusing	on	
factors	such	as	teacher	quality	and	turnover,	implementation	of	culturally	relevant	
curriculum	and	pedagogies,	and	school	structures	that	do	not	disproportionately	punish	
Black	students	with	severe	penalties	like	suspension	(Delpit,	2012;	Noguera,	2009;	Madrid,	
2011).		
Delpit	(2012)	compiled	her	decades	of	research	and	current	work	in	Baton	Rouge,	
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Louisiana,	and	generated	a	ten-point	list	of	characteristics	that	would,	taken	together,	
create	quality	public,	urban	schools.	In	contrast	to	the	current	standardized	test	focused	
model	of	education,	which	punishes	students,	teachers,	principals	and	schools	based	on	
test	scores,	a	successful	urban	school	focuses	on	teaching.	Delpit	calls	for	a	focus	on	good	
teaching,	on	offering	more	content,	not	less,	to	poor,	urban	students,	on	critical	thinking	
while	also	teaching	fundamentals;	providing	students	with	socio-emotional	support;	on	
building	from	and	recognizing	students’	strengths;	on	using	metaphors	and	experiences	
from	the	children’s	lived	experiences	to	connect	them	with	knowledge	taught	in	the	school	
room;	on	building	a	sense	of	community	in	the	classroom	and	in	the	school;	on	continually	
assessing	students’	needs	and	utilizing	diverse	strategies	to	address	them;	on	respecting	
children’s	home	cultures;	on	fostering	students’	connections	to	their	communities	outside	
of	school.		
Delpit’s	list	is	a	comprehensive	prognosis	for	what	must	be	done	to	close	the	
“achievement	gap”	documented	with	the	most	current	Department	of	Education	in	the	first	
half	of	this	chapter.	These	data	are	necessary	to	provide	an	account	of	the	ways	in	which	
students	suffer	or	benefit	differently	from	education	institutions	from	pre-school	through	
college	based	on	their	social	identities;	students	of	color	and	low-income	students	suffer	
from	systemic	marginalization	while	white	students	benefit	from	a	system	in	which	they	
benefit	most	and	are	allowed	to	operate	as	the	“achievers,”	as	the	standard	knower	that	
other	students	are	not	measuring	up	to.	However,	too	often,	we	(we	include	well-meaning	
researchers	and	educators	as	well	as	the	general	public	and	politicians)	look	at	these	
differential	education	outcomes	and	ask:	Why	aren’t	Black	students	becoming	proficient	
readers?	Why	are	Latino	students	struggling	with	math?	Or	Why	are	low-income	students	less	
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prepared	for	school	than	their	middle	and	high-income	peers?	We	are	placing	the	onus	and	
responsibility	for	systemic	problems	in	education	on	learners,	on	families,	on	social	groups	
(Delpit,	2012;	Milner,	2013;	Ladson-Billings,	2006).		
As	Milner	(2013)	argues,	the	consequences	of	focusing	on	an	“achievement	gap”	
include:	forcing	the	comparison	of	“culturally	diverse	students	with	White	students”	out	of	
context	or	without	an	understanding	of	“the	reasons	undergirding	and	behind	the	causes	of	
disparities	and	differences	that	exist	between	and	among	groups”	(p.4);	holding	white	
students	as	the	norm	to	which	other	students	are	compared	which	may	“covertly	and	
tacitly	construct	[white	students]	as	intellectually	and	academically	superior	to	others”;	
prevent	researchers	and	others	from	focusing	on	the	assets	that	students	and	families	with	
education	“deficits”	bring	with	them;	and	achievement	gap	explanations	and	explorations	
focus	on	social	groups	and	not	the	inequitable	structures,	systems,	contexts,	policies	and	
practices	that	lead	to	a	perceived	achievement	gap	(p.	5).	Milner	argues	that	deficit	laden	
achievement	gap	explanations	focus	on	outcomes	from	standardized	tests,	graduation	
rates,	school	discipline	and	what	students	do	not	have	(i.e.	certain,	narrowly	defined	
knowledge	and	skills);	they	do	not	focus	on	the	opportunities	that	students	are	denied.		
Expanding	the	Hermeneutic	Frame:	The	Educational	Opportunity	Gap	
Rather	than	focus	on	an	achievement	gap	based	social	group	membership,	some	
education	scholars	have	argued	we	must	shift	the	narrative	or,	to	place	in	the	context	of	
epistemic	justice,	expand	the	hermeneutic	framework,	to	instead	focus	on	the	“opportunity	
gap”	(Darling-Hammond,	2012;	Torre	&	Fine,	2011)	or	“education	debt”	(Ladson-Billings,	
2006).	Drawing	from	the	work	of	Darling-Hammond,	Torre	&	Fine	(2011)	launched	the	
Opportunity	Gap	Project	with	youth	gathered	from	across	the	New	York	City	tri-state	
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region.	Working	with	youth	across	race,	class	and	geographic	boundaries,	Torre	and	Fine	
set	out	to	document	the	“racialized	distributions	of	opportunities	in	local	schools”	(p.	112).	
Some	“opportunities”	that	students	from	the	diverse	regions	found	salient	were	those	of	
school	finance	inequality,	racialized	academic	tracking,	the	differential	impact	of	high	
stakes	standardized	testing	based	on	class,	race	and	ethnicity;	and	suspension-school	
discipline	inequality.	Students,	with	the	support	and	guidance	of	university	researchers	and	
involved	high	school	teachers,	developed,	distributed	and	analyzed	surveys.		
They	did	not	stop	at	analyzing	their	data,	the	students	(and	researchers)	set	out	to	
present	it	to	stake	holders	in	their	communities	and	on	their	school	boards.	Torre	and	Fine	
share	(2011),	however,	that	when	students	presented	their	data	to	school	boards,		
	 Evidence	of	‘disparities’	became	an	opportunity	to	blame	children	of	color	and	
	 poverty	for	their	own	failures.	Mistaking	the	dependent	variable	of	racial	
	 disparities	to	be	the	independent	variable,	the	cause	of	the	problem,	audiences	
	 peppered	us	with	questions	pointing	to	poor	youth	and	youth	of	color—What’s	
	 wrong	with	them?	(p.	115).		
Responding	to	this	seemingly	reflexive	move—to	harken	back	to	the	dominant	deficit	
narrative—the	students	and	researchers	turned	to	developing	performances	and	artistic	
artifacts	that	would	not	only	document	their	findings	but	also	give	voice	to	their	feelings	
and	experiences	in	segregated	schools.	Collectively,	the	students	and	researchers	called	
their	performance	the	“Educational	Opportunity	Gap	Project”	(EOGP)	and	they	turned	the	
legal,	social,	and	political	history	of	re-segregated	public	schools	into	poetry	and	
performances.	Powerfully,	students	participating	in	the	EOGP	were	able	to	identify	that	
their	differential	educational	experiences	were	not	the	result	of	deficiencies	among	
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particular	student	populations,	but	structural	characteristics	imbedded	in	school	systems,	
and	they	developed	a	language	for	communicating	this	through	academic	presentation	but	
also	performance	art.	This	is	an	example	of	disrupting	the	dominant	interpretive	frame	and	
then	expanding	it	to	include	the	experiences	and	perspectives	of	those	most	marginalized	
through	alternative	means	of	knowledge	dissemination	(i.e.	performance).		
Ladson-Billings	(2006)	similarly	disrupts	and	expands	the	dominant	interpretive	
frame	observing	that	“focus	on	the	‘Achievement	Gap’	moves	us	towards	short	term	
solutions	that	are	unlikely	to	address	the	long-term	underlying	problems”	(p.	4).	Instead	of	
focusing	on	the	achievement	gap,	we	must	instead	focus	on	the	education	debt	owed	to	
students	with	non-dominant	social	identities.	The	educational	debt	Ladson-Billing	(2006)	
describes	is	based	on	race;	she	looks	particularly	at	Black,	Latino	and	Native	students	and	
traces	the	debt	historically,	economically,	socio-politically	and	morally.		
Historically,	Ladson-Billings	(2006)	traces	the	education	debt	to	the	very	founding	
of	the	United	States	during	the	time	of	slavery	when	the	education	of	Black	slaves	was	
forbidden.	After	emancipation,	Ladson-Billings	(2006)	writes,	schools	maintained	the	
servant	class	and	the	need	for	farm	labor	meant	Black	students	only	attended	school	for	
about	4	months	out	of	the	school	year.	When	they	did	attend	schools	during	the	time	of	
legalized	segregation,	Black	students	attended	schools	in	which	books	and	materials	were	
the	used	cast	offs	of	white-only	schools.	For	Native	Americans,	the	historical	context	of	
formal	education	is	equally	as	harmful	and	unjust.	Mission	schools	attempted	to	convert	
Native	American	children	and	to	“use	Indian	labor	to	further	the	cause	of	the	church”	
(Ladson-Billings,	2006,	p.	5).	Schools	were	vehicles	for	forced	assimilation	and	cultural	
violence.	Ladson-Billings	(2006)	reports	similar	disparities	in	the	education	of	Latino	
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students	dating	back	to	1848.	This	historical	debt	extends	far	beyond	school	regulations	
(e.g.	segregated	schools).		
The	historical	education	debt	includes	more	progressive	schools	in	New	England	
benefitting	from	the	labor	of	enslaved	Black	people	in	the	south.	For	example,	in	1827	
Massachusetts	made	all	grades	of	public	school	free	of	charge	and	open	to	the	public	
(Ladson-Billings	2006).	In	1837,	a	wealthy	factory	owner,	Edmund	Dwight,	supplemented	
the	budget	of	the	newly	formed	Massachusetts	State	Board	of	Education	because	he	felt	an	
educated	labor	force	was	essential	for	the	state.	How	did	Dwight	accumulate	his	wealth?	
Through	his	textile	mills,	mills	that	used	cotton	grown	in	the	South.	The	Northeast	
developed	a	complex	economy	complete	with	banks,	insurance	companies	and	railroads	off	
of	100	million	pounds	of	Southern	cotton.	This	cotton	was,	as	we	know,	farmed	by	Black	
slaves.	Public	schools	and	school	boards	were	created	in	the	Northeast	using	the	unpaid,	
abusive	labor	of	Black	Americans	who	were	denied—among	every	other	basic	human	
rights—the	right	to	an	education.		
Moving	from	her	summary	of	the	historical	debt,	Ladson-Billings	(2006)	turns	to	
look	at	the	economic	debt	owed	to	students	of	color	in	the	United	States.	She	documents	
how	predominantly	white	school	districts	spend	more	per	pupil	than	do	school	districts	in	
which	students	of	color	comprise	the	majority	of	the	school	population.	Given	the	pervasive	
school	re-segregation	documented	(Orfield	et	al.,	2016)	above,	it	is	especially	alarming	that	
white	dominant	schools	are	often	the	most	financially	well	resourced.	Similarly,	Ladson-
Billings	(2006)	reports	that,	economically,	students	with	more	schooling	will	earn	more	
than	students	with	less	schooling	throughout	the	course	of	their	lives.	We	see	this	earning	
discrepancy	documented	above	as	well	(Snyder	et	al.,	2016).	Less	possibility	for	earnings	
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leads	to	a	long-term	wealth	gap	that	results	in	a	decrease	of	social	and	political	influence	
for	people	and	communities	of	color	(Ladson-Billings,	2006).		
This	lack	of	social	and	political	influence	is	what	Ladson-Billings	(2006)	calls	the	
sociopolitical	debt.	Damagingly,	the	sociopolitical	debt	“reflects	the	degree	to	which	
communities	of	color	are	excluded	from	the	civic	process.	Black,	Latina/o,	and	Native	
communities	had	little	or	no	access	to	the	franchise,	so	they	had	no	true	legislative	
representation”	(Ladson-Billings,	2006,	p.	7).	This	separates	families	of	color	from	the	
decision	making	about	the	quality	of	education	their	children	are	receiving.	This	lack	of	
participation	for	families	of	color	include	the	parent-teacher	organization	level,	school	site	
councils,	and	larger	city,	state	and	federal	education	agency	appointments	and	decisions.	
One	could	suggest	this	is	all	the	more	salient	today,	when	the	future	of	public	education	is	
often	held	in	tension	to	the	future	of	charter	schools	and	parent	choice	in	the	form	of	school	
vouchers	(Westervelt,	2016).	
Finally,	Ladson-Billings	(2006)	concludes	that	taken	together,	the	historical,	
sociopolitical	and	economic	debt	owed	to	students	of	color	amount	to	a	moral	debt.	
Students	of	color	have	been	wronged	as	a	matter	of	policy	and	law	repeatedly	and	in	
multiple	ways	with	respect	to	education.	If	we	do	not	address	the	moral	debt,	Ladson-
Billings	argues,	we	cannot	create	a	better	educational	future	for	students	of	color.	We	
cannot	address	differences	in	students’	educational	outcomes	and	attainment	if	we	do	not	
address	the	debt	owed	to	students	of	color.	The	language	and	narrative	discourse	of	
“achievement	gap”	does	not	and	cannot	even	begin	to	capture	the	weight,	the	cost,	and	the	
moral	responsibility	owed	to	students	of	color	because	of	the	continuing	impact	of	state	
accumulated	educational	debt.		
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The	first	aim	of	this	chapter	was	to	respond	to	question	two	posed	in	the	preface:	In	
what	ways	do	students	with	marginalized	racial	social	identities	experience	epistemic	
injustice	in	educational	settings?	As	asked	above:	do	schools	create	environments	in	which	
students	with	subordinate	social	identities	(for	example	students	of	color	and	low-income	
students)	do	not	and	cannot	thrive	academically?	Are	school	environments	functionally	
tracking	students	into	groups	of	“knowers”	and	“lesser	knowers”	based	on	social	identity	
(e.g.	Oakes,	2005)?	This	chapter	has	presented	Department	of	Education	data	that	shows	
students	of	color	and	low-income	students	do	not	benefit	from	pre-k	through	higher	
education	experiences	in	the	same	ways	as	white	and	middle-high	income	students.	This	
chapter	then	provided	descriptions	from	scholars	of	color	that	explain	how	students	of	
color	and	low-income	students	historically	have	been	and	presently	continue	to	be	
marginalized	by	educational	institutions.	These	analyses	of	students’	experiences	in	
education	provide	a	counter-interpretive	framework	for	understanding	student	
educational	outcomes.		
As	Tatum	(1997)	describes,	none	of	us	as	individuals	or	as	social	agents	can	step	
outside	of	the	dominant	interpretive	framework.	In	Tatum’s	profound	words,	“Prejudice	is	
one	of	the	inescapable	consequences	of	living	in	a	racist	society.	Cultural	racism—the	
cultural	images	and	messages	that	affirm	the	assumed	superiority	of	Whites	and	the	
assumed	inferiority	of	people	of	color—is	like	smog	in	the	air”	(p.	6).	As	members	of	
society,	we	are	all	always	breathing	the	smog;	on	same	days	it	may	be	more	apparent	than	
others,	but	we	cannot	avoid	breathing	it	in.	Yes,	the	extent	to	which	we	perceive	or	are	
oblivious	to	the	smog	may	very	well	depend	on	our	social	identities	(i.e.	dominant	
members	of	society	may	be	least	aware	of	the	smog),	but	we	are	all	live	with	the	negative	
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consequences	of	the	smog.	However,	as	both	Tatum	(1997)	and	philosophers	of	
epistemology	(Fricker,	2007;	Pohlhaus,	2012;	Dotson,	2012;	Medina,	2013)	argue,	it	is	our	
responsibility—as	individuals	and	also	social	institutions—to	broaden	our	understanding	
and	make	visible	that	which	we	do	not	know,	namely	the	experiences	and	perspectives	of	
those	most	marginalized.	To	that	end,	we	turn	now	to	the	experiences	of	students	in	the	US	
education	system.		
Creating	Knowers	&	Lesser	Knowers:	Identity	and	the	Educational	Experience	
	
Presenting	these	data,	as	a	roadmap	displaying	the	ways	in	which	students’	
identities	impact	their	educational	experience	and	prospects,	one	might	conclude	the	intent	
of	this	chapter	is	to	make	a	case	solely	that	educational	injustice	exists,	and	that	it	exists	
most	specifically	as	an	example	of	distributive	injustice	or	the	unequal	distribution	of	
society’s	goods	(Gewirtz,	2006).	However,	such	a	conclusion	would	only	partially	capture	
the	unjust	nature	of	public	education	system	in	the	United	States.	To	be	sure,	there	is	no	
defense	for	an	education	system,	an	institution	that	should	be	a	vehicle	for	public	
participation	and	active	engagement	with	democracy,	to	unfairly	benefit	those	with	the	
greatest	economic	advantages	and	racial	identity	privilege	while	those	from	less	resourced	
economic	classes	and	students	of	color	experience	an	inferior	system	where,	at	every	step	
of	the	way,	there	is	less	educational	opportunity	and	therefore	less	possibility	for	economic	
mobility.	But	this	chapter	aims	for	more.	Education	and	concomitant	economic	inequality	
has	been	well	documented	for	decades,	if	not	a	century.	Thus	far,	this	chapter	has	
presented	recent	government	data	documenting	those	inequalities,	and	analysis	from	
scholars	of	education	who	provide	a	critical	race	re-framing	of	deficient	analysis	of	these	
demographic	data.	
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However,	understanding	that	marginally	situated	students	may	be	disadvantaged	
because	of	their	identities	is	insufficient.	Rather,	as	Paula	Moya	(2006)	asserts,	“To	the	
extent	that	we	are	interested	in	transforming	our	society	into	one	that	is	more	socially	and	
economically	just,	we	need	to	know	how	identities	work	in	order	to	effectively	work	with	
them”	(p.	99).	Therefore,	this	chapter	also	seeks	to	connect	inequalities	based	on	identity	to	
knowledge	making;	this	chapter	puts	forward	the	argument	that	educational	injustice	is	
distinctly	epistemic	as	students’	identities	impact	them	not	only	as	participants	in	society	
and	society’s	goods,	but,	more	specifically,	as	knowers	and	knowledge	producers	in	society.	
With	this	goal	in	mind,	we	turn	now	to	scholars	across	disciplines	who	are	working	with	
youth	to	offer	accounts	of	the	ways	in	which	students	of	color	and	low-income	students	
create	new	knowledges	that	speak	directly	to	the	structural	inequalities	within	the	
education	system.	It	is	these	epistemic	contributions	that	bring	to	light	the	ways	that	
marginalized	learners	resist	and	persist	in	unequal	education	situations.	It	is	also	these	
epistemic	contributions	that	high-income	students	and	predominantly	white	students	miss	
out	on	because	their	educational	environments	are	persistently	segregated.		
Learning	from	Youth	of	Color:	Voices	from	the	Margins	
	
How	do	marginalized	students	interpret,	discuss,	and	speak	back	to	the	systemically	
unequal	education	experience	described	above?	The	energized	and	growing	body	of	
research	about	Youth	Participatory	Action	Research	(YPAR)	projects	are	a	particular	type	
of	scholarly	research/pedagogy	that	offer	insight	into	student’s	perspectives,	insights	that	
cannot	be	gleaned	from	test	scores,	graduation	rates,	or	even	traditional	scholarly	research	
in	education.	YPAR	is	characterized	by	students	learning	about	social	injustices,	mobilizing	
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for	change,	and	students	addressing	injustices;	in	these	ways	it	is	not	dissimilar	to	other	
types	of	social	justice	education	(Cammarota	&	Fine,	2008).		
Critically,	YPAR	also	includes	students	learning	about	and	participating	in	research	
as	members	of	a	collective;	the	collective	structure	allows	students	to	work	together	to	
address	a	shared	concern	or	problem	(e.g.	lack	of	educational	opportunity	for	students)	
across	identities,	generations	and	perspectives.	Members	of	these	collectives	are	“insiders”	
or	“they	are	stakeholders	within	a	particular	institution,	organization	or	community”	
(Cammarota	&	Fine,	2008,	p.	5).	While	there	are	additional	features	of	YPAR	pedagogy	and	
projects,	the	collective	nature	of	researchers	and	the	research	products	means	students	
perspectives	and	voices	are	highlighted	in	both	the	research	content	(i.e.	the	research	
questions,	goals,	collection	processes,	data	analysis)	and	also	the	research	products	(e.g.	
papers,	presentations,	performances,	installations).	Because	YPAR	foregrounds	students’	
perspectives,	YPAR	projects	are	a	helpful	source	for	trying	to	uncover	how	students	
process	their	experiences	with	educational	institutions.		
	 The	Social	Justice	Education	Project	(SJEP).	The	SJEP	offered	through	the	Tucson	
Unified	School	District	provides	an	example	of	YPAR	work	with	students	enrolled	in	a	
public	high	school	through	core	course	offerings	in	US	History/US	Government	courses	
(Romero,	Cammarota,	Dominguez,	Valdez,	Ramirez,	Hernandez,	2008).		The	central	
organizing	goals	of	the	Social	Justice	Education	Project	are	to	meet	the	needs	of	Latino/a	
students—culturally,	socially,	intellectually—through	curriculum	and	pedagogy	that	
centers	social	justice,	critical	race	theory	and	the	intentional	inclusion	of	students’	
perspectives	and	experiences	(Romero	et	al.,	2008).	As	part	of	these	courses,	students	
conducted	PAR	projects	rising	from	the	very	problems	that	limit	or	prohibit	them.	Students	
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presented	these	research	findings	to	elected	officials	from	the	local	to	district	to	the	
national	level.	Students	participating	in	the	Social	Justice	Education	Project	(SJEP)	
produced	concrete	results	as	a	result	of	learning	about	and	actively	researching	the	
educational	inequalities	they	experienced	daily	in	their	schools.	Specifically,	Cohort	1	
influenced	school	district	officials	to	address	serious	infrastructure	problems	like	missing	
urinals	in	bathrooms,	falling	tiles	in	the	gym	ceiling,	and	water	fountains	from	which	no	
water	would	flow	(Romero	et	al.,	2008).	Later	cohorts	successfully	argued	for	updated	
books	in	the	libraries	and	actual	classrooms	for	students	in	the	“exceptional	students”	
program	instead	of	a	former	woodshop	with	heavy	and	dangerous	equipment	in	it	(Romero	
et	al.,	2008).	
For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	SJEP	is	highlighted	because	the	project	is	grounded	
in	a	“dialogical	authoring	process,	in	which	students	take	ownership	over	their	education	
by	consistently	voicing	their	concerns,	thoughts,	and	opinions	in	the	classroom”	(Romero	et	
al.,	2008,	p.136).	The	authors	do	not	merely	state	this,	students	helped	co-produce	
intellectual	products	that	articulate	their	positions	as	teacher	and	student	in	the	SJEP	
classroom.	When	asked	by	Professor	Cammarota	why	students	chose	to	attend	their	SJEP	
course	but	intentionally	avoid	(or	skip)	others,	students	state	that	they	are	interested	in	
SJEP	because	it	is	grounded	in	learning	about	their	school	and	what	is	going	on	there:	“we	
are	the	ones	putting	in	all	the	input	so	it	was	cool.	We	had	a	part	in	it.	That	is	why.	We	had	a	
big	part.”	(Romero	et	al.,	2008,	p.	137).	Another	student	shared,	“‘Cuz	in	other	classes	we	
had	no	part	at	all-we	are	just	chillin’	in	the	back.”	(Romero	et	al.,	2008,	p.	137).	Students	are	
describing	their	willingness	to	attend	and	participate	in	the	class	precisely	because	they	
find	themselves	in	it:	in	the	content,	in	the	questions,	in	the	direction.		
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Even	the	way	SJEP	is	presented	in	current	YPAR	literature	centers	students’	
authorship	more	than	other	very	critical	and	robust	YPAR	projects.	Given	students’	crafted	
two-thirds	of	the	Romero	et	al.	(2008)	research	paper	explored	here,	this	chapter	could	
very	well	simply	list	quotes	from	the	students	to	animate	their	perspective.	As	the	purpose	
of	our	review	is	to	put	a	spotlight	on	the	ways	in	which	youth	enrolled	in	public	education	
interpret	and	make	sense	of	the	educational	inequality	the	experience,	relevant	quotes	are	
presented	that	offer	an	introduction,	a	sketch,	of	what	students	are	describing	in	their	own	
words.	So,	for	example,	student	Kim	Dominguez	wrote	that	she	began	to	fail	classes	and	not	
attend	school	during	middle	school.	But	she	writes:	
I	loved	writing	and	history,	but	I	hated	the	history	classes	that	I	was	forced	to	take	in	
order	to	meet	graduation	requirements,	and	I	hated	reading	the	boring	English	
assignments	with	boring	typical	White	authors	because	I	had	nothing	to	write	about	
afterwards.	In	a	society	in	which	most	successful	people….all	needed	education	to	
achieve	their	success,	our	schools,	communities,	and	institutions	were	setting	up	the	
youth	of	color	and	the	impoverished	youth	to	join	the	military	or	drop	out	of	the	
irrelevant	Eurocentric	schools	that	supposedly	lead	us	to	a	‘career’	after	high	school	
or	maybe	a	community	college	with	equally	as	high	drop-out	rates	(Romero	et	al.,	
2008,	p.140).	
Dominguez’	entire	section,	but	particularly	the	quoted	excerpt,	shines	a	light	on	the	deep	
feelings	of	alienation	students	feel	in	our	nation’s	schools,	the	painful	awareness	of	how	
important	education	is	for	them	to	succeed,	and	their	decreased	chances	of	obtaining	this	
success	in	their	school	precisely	because	they	are	students	of	color	or	low-income	students.			
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	 Louis	Valdez	shares	the	emotional	significance	of	participating	in	an	education	
project	that	provided	emotional	support	through	positioning	him	as	an	important	knower	
and	knowledge	maker.	He	writes:	
Being	involved	with	the	project	also	meant	that	I	would	constantly	be	surrounded	
by	very	positive	adults	that	I	could	look	up	to—on	nearly	an	everyday	basis,	dozens	
of	people	who	have	graduated	college	and	now	have	very	successful	careers:	
teachers,	college	professors	and	administrators	who	I	can	identify	with.	These	were	
people	who	work	to	change	the	structure	of	the	entire	system	to	make	these	
opportunities	more	relevant	to	all	people	and	not	just	the	ruling	class	(Romero	et	al.,	
2008,	p.142).	
This	liberatory	model	of	education	allows	students	who	experience	historically	entrenched	
inequality	every	day	to	feel	valuable	and	relevant	in	educational	environments.	Shouldn’t	
public	school	be	like	this	for	all	students?		
	 Liz	Hernandez	writes	with	great	ownership	about	her	community	organizing,	“This	
past	spring,	I	was	one	of	the	key	organizers	for	the	walkouts	in	Tucson,	Arizona.	We	
protested	the	racist	bill	HR4437	that	would	criminalize	my	people…we	made	history	by	
coming	together	in	solidarity	to	help	others”	(Romero	et	al.,	2008,	p.145).	As	a	result	of	her	
history	course	focused	on	her	identity,	her	culture,	her	value	as	a	member	of	civil	society,	
Liz	organized	fellow	high	school	students	for	large	scale	protest	for	equity	and	justice.	This	
is	remarkable	and	powerful.	It	provides	hope	that	public	education	that	“sees”	students	can	
itself	be	illuminated	by	students’	perspectives.	
	 The	SJEP	program	helps	researchers	to	understand	how	students	can	feel	alienated	
from	school	because	of	irrelevant	content	and	poor	physical	conditions,	and,	perhaps	more	
	 	
	 	
105 
importantly,	how	disenfranchised	students	can	be	drawn	back	into	school-based	learning	
by	a	curriculum	and	pedagogy	that	mobilizes	their	identities,	life	experiences	and	future	
hopes	inside	and	outside	of	the	classroom.		
The	Youth	Dialogue	on	Race	and	Ethnicity	(YDRE).	Another	way	researchers	and	
activists	are	working	with	students	to	(re)engage	students	in	learning	and	active	civic	
participation	is	through	the	combination	of	youth	participatory	action	research	pedagogy	
and	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy.	The	Youth	Dialogue	on	Race	and	Ethnicity	(YDRE)	
program	based	at	the	University	of	Michigan	in	collaboration	with	community	groups	
throughout	the	city	and	suburbs	of	Detroit	provides	an	example	of	a	longstanding	program	
that	combines	both	YPAR	and	IGD	pedagogy	towards	youth	co-inquiry,	democratic	
knowledge	making,	and	active	civic	engagement.	Checkoway	and	Aldana	(2013)	summarize	
intergroup	dialogue	as:	
a	form	of	civic	engagement	which	features	face-to-face	structured	discussions	about	
	 social	identities—such	as	gender,	race-ethnicity,	and	religions—and	systems	of	
	 power—such	as	racism,	sexism,	and	heterosexism—between	identity	groups	(p.	
	 1896).		
The	Youth	Dialogues	on	Race	and	Ethnicity	in	Metropolitan	Detroit	is	an	eight	week	
summer	program	offered	to	high	school	youth	across	identity	backgrounds	drawing	from	
both	urban	and	suburban	metropolitan	Detroit	and	from	across	socio-economic	
boundaries.	Students	are	brought	together	through	a	collaboration	of	community	groups	
and	the	University	of	Michigan.	University	facilitators	guide	students	through	an	intergroup	
dialogue	to	“discuss	racial	and	ethnic	issues	within	and	across	their	communities”	(Aldana,	
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Rowley,	Checkoway,	&	Richards-Schuster,	2012,	p.	124).		The	two-months	long	program	
culminates	in	a	retreat	focused	on	youth	activism	and	social	activism	skills.		
Thus,	pedagogically,	through	the	eight	weeks	long	intergroup	dialogue	on	race	and	
ethnicity	and	the	intensive	advocacy	training,	high	school	students	participating	in	the	
Youth	Dialogues	on	Race	and	Ethnicity	experience	a	program	designed	for	youth	that	
bridges	the	content	and	process	of	IGD	pedagogy	with	the	civic	action	focus	of	YPAR	
pedagogy.	Bridging	both	types	of	pedagogy,	the	YDRE	program	begins	with	the	
foundational	premises	that	young	people	are	collective	knowledge	makers	and	that	they	
can	and	should	be	active	agents	of	change	(Richards-Schuster	&	Aldana,	2013).	Research	
studies	conducted	on	the	YDRE	find	that	students	participating	in	the	dialogues	increase	
their	understanding	of	their	own	racial	and	ethnicity	identities,	increase	their	knowledge	
about	others	who	are	different/have	social	identities	that	are	different	than	their	own,	
increase	their	understanding	of	the	structural	role	of	race	and	ethnicity	in	society	and	
increase	their	willingness	to	take	action	against	racism	and	segregation	(Aldana	et	al.,	
2012;	Richards-Schuster	&	Aldana,	2013).	
Richards-Schuster	and	Aldana	(2013)	conducted	a	case	study	of	student	participant	
evaluation	data,	including	the	student	co-produced	participatory	program	evaluation,	from	
the	Youth	Dialogues	on	Race	and	Ethnicity	(Summer	2007	cohort)	to	explore	youth	
engagement	and	learning	about	race	in	a	group	setting.	The	results	of	their	study	offer	
insights	into	students’	learning	and	perceptions	in	the	students’	own	words,	highlighting	
how	students	express	their	own	learning.		
In	their	coding	of	the	program	materials,	Richards-Schuster	and	Aldana	(2013)	
identified	four	major	themes	throughout	the	students’	feedback	and	student	generated	
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participatory	program	evaluation.	Themes	include	learning	to	critically	discuss	race,	
communication	skills	across	differences,	learning	about	intersecting	systems	of	privilege	
and	oppression,	and	leadership	skills.	In	an	effort	to	center	the	voices	of	students	who	live	
the	epistemic	injustice	of	re-segregated	schools	with	white-dominant	curricula	and	
pedagogies,	this	chapter	will	focus	on	the	student	quotes	presented	in	Richards-Schuster	
and	Aldana’s	(2013)	analysis.	
As	an	example	of	students	talking	about	naming	the	opportunity	to	actively	discuss	
race	and	ethnicity	as	a	result	of	participating	in	the	race	dialogues,	the	authors	offer	quotes	
from	students	across	race	and	location.	An	African	American	youth	from	a	suburb	of	
Detroit	shared,	“Once	it	is	all	out	in	the	air,	we	can	remove	the	façade”	(Richards-Schuster	
&	Aldana,	2013,	p.	338).	Richards-Schuster	and	Aldana	(2013)	identify	this	as	students	
getting	an	opportunity	for	both	new	knowledge	and	for	the	sharing	of	life	stories.	From	the	
lens	of	this	chapter,	though,	it	seems	like	this	student	is	additionally	highlighting	the	hidden	
nature	of	race	and	ethnicity	in	the	United	States	context.	Race,	and	sometimes	ethnicity,	are	
often	visually	marked	on	peoples’	bodies;	they	can	be	seen	regardless	of	one’s	effort	to	
observe	race	and	ethnicity	or	not.	And	yet,	as	the	student	highlights,	race	and	ethnicity	are	
often	not	“out	in	the	air”	because	colorblind	rhetoric	and	white-dominant	narratives	and	
structures	push	race	insights	out	of	the	classroom	(Bonilla-Silva,	2009).	Take,	for	example,	
the	Arkansas	state	legislature’s	introduction	of	a	bill	to	prohibit	publicly	funded	public	and	
charter	schools	from	teaching	the	work	of	Howard	Zinn,	historian	and	author	of	A	People’s	
History	of	the	United	States	(2003),	a	text	which	intentionally	disrupts	white	dominant	
narratives	by	offering	a	historical	narrative	that	centers	the	experiences	of	women,	
workers,	and	people	of	color	(Arkansas	Bill	Would	Ban,	2017).	The	State	Legislature	of	
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Arkansas	is	trying	to	ban	the	work	of	an	author	who	explicitly	sought	to	expand/correct	the	
hermeneutic	frame,	so	getting	issues	of	race	and	ethnicity	out	into	the	air	is	no	simple	act,	
and	it	is	a	first	step	for	students	developing	new	knowledges.	
Richards-Schuster	and	Aldana	(2013)	also	provide	quotes	highlighting	the	ways	
students	identified	particular	lessons	about	stereotypes	as	opportunities	to	critically	
discuss	race	and	ethnicity.	An	Asian	American	youth	from	the	suburbs	wrote,	“Personally,	it	
[learning	about	stereotypes]	helped	me	want	to	change	the	way	I	think	and	want	to	help	
others	feel	the	way	I	did	and	change”	(Richards-Schuster	&	Aldana,	2013,	p.	399).	This	
quote	highlights	knowledges	and	knowings	ability	to	change	student	behavior.	Chapter	two	
of	this	dissertation	explored	epistemic	justice—the	ameliorative	response	to	epistemic	
injustice	which	Fricker	(2007)	grounds	in	a	knowers	ability	to	use	new,	more	full,	
information—to	change	their	knowledge	behaviors.	The	student	quoted	is	speaking	
directly	towards	this	shift;	the	student	says	the	new	information	learned	about	stereotypes	
leads	to	a	change	in	the	way	they	think.		
Reflecting	on	the	same	lesson,	a	white	youth	from	the	suburbs	wrote,	“It	was	the	
hardest	part	but	it	made	us	face	some	things	that	we	didn’t	want	to”	(Richards-Schuster	&	
Aldana,	2013,	p.	340).	White	students,	the	people	who	benefit	the	most	from	epistemic	
injustice,	must	do	the	work	of	facing	something	unfortunate	and	difficult	(i.e.	white	
privilege)	in	order	to	make	the	epistemic	shifts	necessary	to	not	perpetuate	epistemic	
injustice	and,	ideally,	work	towards	epistemic	justice.	But	learning	to	think	critically	about	
race	and	ethnicity	is	not	only	about	learning	about	one’s	own	feelings	or	about	the	
experiences	of	others.	It	is	also	about	making	sense	of	one’s	own	experiences	as	a	member	
of	social	groups.	An	Arab-American	youth	from	the	city	wrote,	“I	also	learned	many	
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historical	facts	about	my	group	and	other	groups”	(Richards-Schuster	&	Aldana,	2013,	p.	
340).	As	this	student	describes,	intergroup	dialogue	can	be	empowering	for	marginally	
situated	students.	Intergroup	dialogue	provides	students	with	knowledge	making	spaces	
and	practices	that	school	and	institutional	structures	either	fail	to	provide	or	intentionally	
withhold.	Namely,	intergroup	dialogue	offers	marginalized	students	the	opportunity	to	
learn	about	and	make	sense	of	their	own	experiences	in	a	structural	and	historical	way.		
The	second	outcome	researchers	identified	in	their	analysis	of	students’	evaluations	
was	that	of	learning	communication	skills	(Richards-Schuster	&	Aldana,	2013).	Some	of	the	
quotes	provided	include:	“I	think	I’ve	become	more	caring	of	others.	I	want	to	help	make	an	
equal	playing	field	for	everyone”	(white	suburban	youth),	and	“I	have	learned	how	to	work	
with	many	people	with	different	points	of	view.	How	to	address	race	and	racism”	(African	
American	youth	from	the	city)	(Richards-Schuster	&	Aldana,	2013,	p.	341).	The	ability	to	
work	across	difference	and	to	use	the	knowledge	of	how	to	communicate	across	difference	
to	create	social	change	are	two	abilities	not	traditionally	focused	on	in	schools	(Tatum,	
2007).	Communicating	critical	analysis	(e.g.	how	to	address	racism)	is	essential	for	
disrupting	the	errors	and	intentional	gaps	in	our	shared	knowledge	resource	that	lead	to	
exclusion	of	and	false	narratives	about	subordinate	peoples;	participating	in	the	Youth	
Dialogues	on	Race	and	Ethnicity	helped	students	from	dominant	and	subordinate	racial	
and	ethnic	groups	to	develop	this	communication	skill.	Learning	communication	skills	is	
valuable	to	students;	one	African	American	youth	from	the	city	wrote,	“I	learned	so	much	
about	myself	and	how	I	communicate…I	learned	about	why	I’m	like	this.	I	just	really	
understand	what	might	be	ahead	and	I	interpreted	my	past	really	well	also”	(Richards-
Schuster	&	Aldana,	2013,	p.	341).	Building	the	meta-cognitive	skills	to	help	students	
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understand	why	they	think	the	way	they	think	is	a	first	step	to	helping	students	understand	
their	own	biases	and	the	socialized	ways	of	interpreting	others;	it	helps	students	develop	
critical	consciousness.	The	development	of	critical	consciousness	works	towards	correcting	
unjust	epistemic	practices.		
Richards-Schuster	and	Aldana	(2013)	also	provide	reflections	from	white	students	
that	highlight	intergroup	dialogue’s	ability	to	help	student	with	dominant	identities	
become	aware	of	their	epistemic	privilege	and	their	complicity	in	reproducing	white	
normative	narratives	in	the	dominant	social	frame.	For	example,	one	white	suburban	
student	reflected,	“I	realized	so	many	things…even	though	I	didn’t	feel	privileged,	I	am	
because	of	my	skin	color	and	that	needs	to	change.	It	will	impact	me	to	work	harder	to	
change	the	amount	of	racism	in	the	US	and	the	world”	(Richards-Schuster	&	Aldana,	2013,	
p.	343).	Another	white	suburban	student	wrote,	“After	this	program,	I	think	when	I	see	
racial	things	on	TV,	I	won’t	just	change	the	channel,	I’ll	do	something	about	it.”	(Richards-
Schuster	&	Aldana,	2013,	p.	344).	The	white	youth	participating	in	this	educational	
opportunity	across	race	and	geography	learn	to	name	and	began	to	see	the	racialized	
aspects	of	their	experiences	while	learning	how	race	impacts	the	experiences	of	people	of	
color	in	the	United	States.	This	knowing	that	takes	account	of	race,	both	in	structure	(inter-
racial	group	learning)	and	in	content,	is	a	stark	contrast	to	what	students	experience	in	
public	schools	(Tatum,	2007).		
Student	action	taking	includes	presenting	to	their	communities’	stakeholders.	
Significantly,	students	also	express	a	desire	to	be	action	takers,	to	be	members	of	society	
who	act	on	issues	of	racial	and	ethnic	injustice.	One	African	American	student	from	the	
suburbs	wrote	that	participating	in	the	dialogue	“has	made	[him]	step	out	there	and	believe	
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that	[he]	can	make	a	difference	and	face	controversial	issues	that	we	face	today.”	(Richards-
Schuster	&	Aldana,	2013,	p.	343).	Some	students	were	so	eager	to	work	on	action	taking,	
they	requested	to	continue	working	with	the	University	of	Michigan	facilitators	throughout	
the	academic	year	on	Youth	Participatory	Action	Research	projects	(Aldana,	Ruckards-
Schuster,	&	Checkoway,	2016).	In	fact,	in	2015,	the	Detroit	Free	Press	reported	that	
students	from	the	Detroit	Youth	Dialogues	met	with	policymakers	to	discuss	needed	
changes	to	the	state	history	curriculum	(Hinkley,	2015).	
Spotlighting	Justice:	Youth	Dialogue	&	Program	Evaluation	in	Syracuse.	Similarly,	the	
intergroup	dialogue	program	at	Syracuse	University13	has	offered	youth	dialogues	for	
urban	and	suburban	high	school	students	in	the	Central	New	York	area	and,	consistent	with	
the	Detroit	Youth	Dialogues,	found	that	students	developed	a	greater	sense	of	awareness,	
agency	and	engagement	(Lopez	&	Nastasi,	2012).	Specifically,	Syracuse	University’s	
intergroup	dialogue	program	collaborated	with	both	a	high	school	in	the	Syracuse	City	
School	District	(comprised	predominantly	of	students	of	color)	and	a	neighboring	suburban	
high	school	(comprised	predominantly	of	white	students)	for	five	years	to	develop	and	
implement	a	unique	partnership.	This	collaboration	featured	students	in	both	high	schools	
taking	the	same	simultaneously	taught	English	elective	focused	on	race	and	inequality	in	
the	United	States;	students	visited	one	another	in	their	respective	schools	twice	a	year,	and	
students	from	both	courses/schools	attended	a	once	a	year	high	school	institute	day	at	
Syracuse	University	organized	and	facilitated	by	the	faculty	and	staff	of	the	intergroup	
dialogue	program	(Lopez	&	Nastasi,	2012).		
After	the	completion	of	the	fourth	high	school	institute,	themed	“Raising	our	Voices,”	
the	intergroup	dialogue	program	conducted	a	program	evaluation	centering	two	questions:	
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what	do	students	take	away	from	the	day-long	institute	premised	on	dialogic	principles	
and	facilitated	by	university	staff	and	students	and	also	what	do	teachers	and	university	
facilitators	observe	or	believe	students	learn	from	the	experience.	To	address	these	
questions,	Lopez	&	Nastasi	(2012)	provided	a	summary	of	student	work	and	an	analysis	of	
students’	responses	to	survey	questions.	Our	findings	on	student	learnings	are	similar	to	
the	Detroit	Youth	Dialogue’s	evaluation	analysis,	which	also	explored	student	learning	in	an	
inter-district	collaboration	premised	on	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy.	
During	the	high	school	institute,	high	schoolers	worked	in	small	groups	of	six	to	
seven	students	from	across	both	schools	partnered	with	one	university	facilitator.	For	the	
morning	portion	of	the	institute,	the	students	listened	to	guest	speakers	and	poets	discuss	
self-expression	and	the	power	of	language	to	communicate	complex	ideas.	In	the	afternoon,	
students	worked	on	an	advocacy	project	that	applied	the	lessons	of	the	morning’s	speakers	
to	their	own	lived	experiences	and	concerns.	Together,	the	students	discussed,	agreed	on,	
and	generated	an	outline	for	an	advocacy	letter;	students	were	not	given	topics.		Rather,	
students	were	encouraged	to	discuss	their	personal	concerns	within	their	small	group	and	
to	agree	upon	the	issue	of	greatest	shared	concern.		Each	group	shared	a	summary	of	their	
proposed	action	letter	to	the	full	institute	group;	groups	chose	to	write	to	audiences	such	
as	fellow	students,	the	New	York	governor,	the	United	States	Secretary	of	Education,	and	
stakeholders	like	local	teachers	and	school	administrators.	Students	wrote	about	issues	like	
lack	of	socially	diverse	interactions	among	students	in	their	school,	classroom	
environments	and	unequal	opportunities	across	schools,	school	segregation	and	the	cost	of	
education.	
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Following	the	institute,	students	were	asked	to	complete	open-ended	surveys,	
which,	as	in	the	case	of	the	Detroit	Youth	Dialogues,	offered	access	to	students	describing	
their	experiences	and	perceptions	in	their	own	words.	In	an	analysis	of	student	responses	
on	the	program	evaluations,	three	themes	emerged:	students	talked	about	growing	
awareness,	agency	and	engagement	(Lopez	&	Nastasi,	2012).		
Students	from	both	the	urban	and	suburban	schools	discuss	their	new	realizations	
about	the	social	contexts	in	which	they	lived.	Discussing	education,	a	student	from	the	
urban	school	wrote,	“It	surprised	me	how	many	of	the	groups’	presentations	were	about	
the	schooling	system,	shows	how	much	it	really	has	to	change”	(Lopez	&	Nastasi,	2012,	p.	
151).	Similarly,	a	student	from	the	suburban	high	school	wrote,	“One	group	talked	about	
education	and	that	it	should	be	equally	available	to	everyone.	I	already	agreed	with	this,	
but	hearing	other	kids’	perspectives	made	me	realize	it	is	an	issue	everywhere”	(Lopez	&	
Nastasi,	2012,	p.	151).	Additionally,	students	from	both	schools	made	connections	to	and	
about	racism.	An	urban	high	school	student	wrote,	“Something	that	I	got	out	of	being	part	
of	this	was	that	racism	has	always	been	there,	and	if	we	as	people	don’t	try	and	do	anything	
nothing	would	change”	(Lopez	&	Nastasi,	2012,	p.	151).	Congruously,	a	student	from	the	
suburban	high	school	wrote,	“I	learned	how	much	racism	is	still	in	society…I	knew	racism	
was	a	big	problem	throughout	the	world,	and	when	I	left	I	discovered	new	ways	to	stand	
against	racism”	(Lopez	&	Nastasi,	2012,	p.	151).	These	students,	from	geographically	close	
yet	very	differently	resourced	public	schools,	together	were	learning	and	sharing	about	
developing	new	understandings	while	simultaneously	beginning	to	understand	their	roles	
as	change	agents.		
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Students	from	both	schools	further	discussed	and	raised	the	issue	of	agency	by	
talking	about	voice	and	“coming	to	voice”	(Lopez	&	Nastasi,	2012).	A	student	from	the	
suburban	high	school	wrote,	“I	think	writing	and	speaking	for	one’s	self	can	become	an	
enormous	tool	for	many	obstacles	in	one’s	life.	I	learned	that	our	voices	can	change	an	
entire	room	and	in	turn	can	change	the	false	perceptions	of	the	racially	charged	and	
ignorant	words	that	are	used”	(Lopez	&	Nastasi,	2012,	p.	151).	This	student	is	expressing	
the	power	of	language	for	not	only	communicating	for	one’s	self	but	for	also	changing	
narratives,	changing	perceptions,	and	for	correcting	for	falsehoods	based	on	race.		
Perhaps	the	most	hopeful	theme	to	emerge	from	students’	responses	to	the	
evaluation	survey	was	the	expression	of	a	strong	desire	for	continued	engagement	with	
each	other.	A	student	from	the	urban	high	school	wrote,	“I	would	change	the	time.	I	wish	
we	had	more	time	so	we	could	discuss	more”	(Lopez	&	Nastasi,	2013,	p.	152).	Similarly,	a	
student	from	the	suburban	high	school	wrote,	“I	think	we	should	go	[to	campus]	more	than	
once	but	also	have	less	scheduled.	Let	our	interests	drive	the	time	limits”	(Lopez	&	Nastasi,	
2013,	p.	152).	The	sentiments	of	these	two	students	were	echoed	repeatedly	across	the	
evaluations	from	both	schools.	These	high	school	youth,	who	spent	an	entire	academic	year	
learning	the	same	content,	visiting	each	other’s	schools,	communicating	via	email	and	other	
forms	of	digital	technology,	wanted	more.	Urban	youth,	predominantly	students	of	color,	
and	suburban	youth,	predominantly	white	students,	separated	geographically	by	school	
district	and	residential	re-segregation,	clearly	expressed	a	desire	to	interact	more	with	
each	other	and	to	talk	with	each	other	about	issues	of	race,	access	and	inequality.	Not	only	
did	they	want	more	opportunity	to	dialogue	and	engage,	but	they	also	wanted	the	
opportunity	to	lead	and	provide	guidance	for	the	content	of	these	exchanges.	This	is	an	
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expression	of	both	agency	and	engagement.	Students	wanted	not	only	the	opportunity	to	
trouble	dominant	narratives	about	identity	and	school	outcomes,	but	they	wanted	even	
more	leadership	and	authority	in	the	process.		
One	of	the	key	features	of	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	is	that	it	is	responsive	to	
the	needs	of	students—to	use	a	common	education	colloquialism—intergroup	dialogue	
embraces	“meeting	students	where	they	are	at.”	In	the	case	of	the	High	School	Institute,	the	
Intergroup	Dialogue	Program	hosting	the	institute	worked	to	meet	the	expressed	interests	
of	the	students	and	the	teacher	at	the	majority	student	of	color	urban	high	school	(Lopez	&	
Nastasi,	2012)	by	piloting	a	full	year	academic	partnership	during	the	2011-2012	school	
year	(Lopez,	Nastasi,	&	Benedetto,	2012).	The	aim	of	this	partnership	was	to	incorporate	
intergroup	dialogue’s	pedagogical	process	and	content	into	an	established	tenth	grade	
English	class.	A	team	from	the	Intergroup	Dialogue	Program	which	included	the	faculty	
director,	program	coordinator,	and	an	experienced	facilitator	(myself)	of	intergroup	
dialogue	on	race	and	ethnicity14,	partnered	with	the	English	teacher	from	the	urban	high	
school	that	had	previously	participated	in	the	High	School	Institute.	The	partnership	was	
designed	to	incorporate	dialogic	communication	and	content	on	race	and	identity	within	
the	learning	standards	and	outcomes	of	the	English	curriculum	(Lopez	et	al.,	2012).		
This	section	draws	from	the	co-authored	evaluation	report	that	was	compiled	at	the	
end	of	the	2011-2012	school	year	by	members	of	the	intergroup	dialogue	team	(the	
Intergroup	Dialogue	Program’s	Faculty	director	and	facilitator	and	the	high	school	English	
teacher).	This	section	uses	the	information	compiled	in	the	evaluation	report	(Lopez	et	al.,	
2012)	exclusively	to	describe	how	the	project	grew	from	YPAR	and	IGD	traditions	in	ways	
that	were	responsive	to	students’	intellectual	engagement	and	development	(this	is	
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different	from	the	evaluation	report	which	provides	a	rich	summary	of	the	program’s	
development,	initiatives	and	reported	outcomes).	Although	this	program	evaluation	
approach	builds	from	preceding	work,	including	the	Detroit	Youth	Dialogues	and	YPAR	
studies	described	earlier	in	this	chapter	(Checkoway	&	Aldana,	2013;	Cammarota	&	Fine,	
2008),	there	are	important	limitations	to	note.	The	evaluation	materials	included	
reflections	and	evaluative	surveys	from	students,	teachers,	administrators	and	parents.	The	
materials	do	not	include	interviews	or	focus	groups,	and	clearly	conducting	interview	or	
focus	groups	with	stakeholders	would	provide	valuable	information	on	how	participants	
perceived	the	collaboration	and	what	they	perceived	the	outcomes	to	include.	
Furthermore,	these	evaluation	data	are	based	on	self-reported	experiences	and	reflections	
or	perspectives.	While	there	are	limits	to	self-reported	materials	such	as	these,	there	is	also	
a	need	to	share	out	the	perceived	outcomes	of	community/youth	initiatives	(Cammarota	&	
Fine,	2008).	
Developed	during	the	Fall	2011	academic	term,	the	in-class	collaboration	extended	
from	the	English	curriculum	in	line	with	the	New	York	State	literacy	standards.	Although	
the	course	began	in	September,	by	October,	the	students	were	suggesting	and	advocating	
for	changes.	The	students	felt	the	class	period	was	too	short	and	the	English	curriculum	
limited	their	freedom	to	explore	topics	of	immediate	importance	and	urgency	to	them.	The	
students	suggested	an	after	school	club	that	would	meet	once	a	week	after	school;	the	club	
would	use	intergroup	dialogue	processes	as	the	standard	for	communication	and	would	
focus	on	the	“hot	topics”	of	direct	interest	in	students’	lives.	By	the	end	of	November	2011,	
the	twenty-four	students	participating	in	the	class--morphed	into	a	club,	had	experienced	
phases	one	and	two	of	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy,	learning	to	practice	dialogic	
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communication	and	learning	about	social	identities	(Zuñiga,	Nagda,	Chesler,	Cytron-
Walker,	2007).	The	students	named	the	club	Spotlighting	Justice	because	their	primary	goal	
was	to	put	a	spotlight	on	issues	of	justice	directly	impacting	their	lives.	To	this	end,	the	
students	generated	a	short	yet	clear	club	mission	statement:		
As	a	group	we,	the	members	of	Spotlighting	Justice,	would	like	to:	Bring	
	 attention	to	the	social	issues	that	are	not	normally	focused	on.	These	issues	
	 include:	sexism,	marriage	inequality,	helping	young	children	understand	
	 inequality	and	injustice,	school	culture,	racism,	teen	bullying.	We	will	work	
	 together	to	address	these	issues	with	other	members	of	our	community	(Lopez	et	
	 al.,	2012,	p.	10).	
While	not	all	students	involved	in	the	club	participated	in	the	previous	year’s	High	School	
Institute,	the	themes	that	students	focused	on,	including	school	culture,	marriage	inequality	
and	racism,	were	areas	of	interest	that	students	raised	and	cited	wanting	to	engage	more	at	
the	High	School	Institute.	The	club	was	providing	students	with	a	channel	to	deepen	their	
learning	and	activism	around	these	issues.	
In	November	and	December	of	2011,	students	were	engaged	in	phase	3	of	the	
intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy,	hot	topics.	The	students,	majority	young	women,	wanted	to	
use	the	analytical	skills	we	were	honing	(critiquing	media,	analyzing	reports	and	publically	
available	data)	to	examine	the	gender	pay	gap.	Students	worked	collaboratively	to	compile	
data	about	the	pay	gap	while	also	giving	attention	to	the	intersectional	nature	of	social	
identity,	probing,	for	example,	how	the	wage	gap	is	not	simply	pay	inequality	between	
those	who	identify	as	men	and	women,	but	also	exists	between	women	based	on	race,	
geography	and	degree	of	education	debt	(Miller,	2018).	The	club’s	exploration	of	the	
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gender	pay	gap	allowed	the	students	to	actively	use	their	dialogic	communication	skills	and	
their	growing	critical	analysis	skills	to	further	their	understanding	of	an	issue	of	
importance	and	interest	to	them.	
In	December	2011,	students	began	to	focus	on	phase	four	of	the	intergroup	dialogue	
curriculum:	collective	action	taking.	Students	began	to	repeatedly	raise	the	issues	of	
conflict	in	school	and	what	they	perceived	as	the	total	absence	of	talking	about	race,	
specifically	Black	history	and	culture,	in	their	school.	Specifically,	students	expressed	
frustration	with	the	conflict	between	students	and	between	students	and	teachers;	they	
described	feeling	like	if	“everyone”	knew	how	to	communicate	dialogically,	if	everyone	
would	just	“change	their	tone”	then	there	would	be	less	conflict	in	school	and	less	students	
receiving	punishment	for	insubordinate	behavior	in	class.		
To	address	these	concerns,	the	students	began	to	plan	Spotlighting	Justice	Presents:	
An	Evening	of	Black	History	Then	and	Now	to	take	place	at	the	high	school	on	the	last	
evening	of	February	(Black	History	Month)	in	2012;	they	also	began	planning	Change	Your	
Tone,	a	dialogic	workshop	planned	and	facilitated	by	club	members	for	fellow	students,	
teachers,	and	administrators.		Working	in	collaboration	with	school	stakeholders,	namely	
their	assistant	principal	and	principal,	the	students	not	only	planned	but	also	implemented	
programs	in	their	school	space	that	centered	their	voices,	their	experiences,	and	their	
values.	Throughout	February	2012,	club	members	shared	information	about	Black	History	
during	the	morning	announcements	and	hosted	tabling	sessions	during	lunch	periods	to	
share	information	about	Black	History,	and	to	express	to	fellow	students,	faculty,	
administrators	and	school	visitors	why	it	was	important	for	them	to	ensure	this	
information	was	shared	within	the	context	of	their	majority	student	of	color	school.	These	
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announcements	and	tabling	sessions	laid	the	foundation	for	their	Spotlighting	Justice	
Presents:	An	Evening	of	Black	History	Then	and	Now.		The	evening,	attended	by	students,	
faculty,	administrators,	family	members	and	community	members,	featured	a	Civil	Rights	
era	speaker	talking	about	her	personal	experience	as	a	life-long	participant	in	social	justice	
action,	a	dance	performance,	a	power	point	presentation	prepared	by	club	members	
focused	on	the	historical	roots	and	significance	of	anti-racists	civil	action	in	the	US,	and	an	
open	mic	featuring	poetry	by	students,	community	members	and	school	teachers	and	
coaches.	
Over	80	participants	attended	Spotlighting	Justice	Presents:	An	Evening	of	Black	
History	Then	and	Now.	As	participants	left	the	event,	they	were	asked	to	comment	on	poster	
board	responding	to	the	prompt	“I	thought…”.	Participants	commented	that	the	evening	
was:	“Beautiful!	Especially	the	poetry!	Should	have	them	more	often!”;	“Please	again	with	
more	next	year	all	year.”;	“Empowerment”;	“Best	event	I’ve	been	to.”;	“This	was	awesome	
and	I	am	glad	[Central]	finally	has	a	space	for	this	kind	of	work!	See	you	at	the	next	event!	
Congratulations!!”	(Lopez	et	al.,	2012,	p.	13).	Attendees	expressed	a	sense	of	celebration	at	
the	students’	achievement	of	bringing	this	informative	and	entertaining	event	to	their	
school,	and	they	also	expressed	a	desire	for	more	events	like	these,	just	like	the	students	
did.		
At	the	club	meeting	following	Spotlighting	Justice	Presents:	An	Evening	of	Black	
History	Then	and	Now,	students	were	asked	to	practice	critical	reflection	on	their	activism.	
Specifically,	they	were	asked	to	think	about	how	the	event	was	important	to	them,	their	
school	and	their	community.	Student	reflections	on	why	the	event	was	important	to	them	
include:	“It	is	important	to	learn	about	part	of	my	heritage.”;	“Because	I	feel	like	I	need	to	
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remember	an	important	part	of	my	culture;	it	is	important	to	know.”;	“Because	it	is	
important	to	learn	about	my	history.”	(Lopez	et	al.,	2012,	p.	10).	On	reflecting	why	the	
event	was	important	for	their	school,	students	shared:	“To	learn	about	people	not	usually	
focused	on.”;	“Because	many	people	in	our	school	know	the	basics	or	not	very	much	at	all.	
In	this	multicultural	school,	it	gives	everyone	a	chance	to	learn	about	African	American	
culture/struggles.”;	“It	is	good	to	have	cultural	exchanges	in	school;	it	is	important	for	a	
school.	It	is	especially	important	for	people	to	understand	black	history.”	(Lopez	et	al.,	
2012,	p.	11).	In	reflecting	why	the	event	was	important	for	their	community,	students	
wrote:	“Because	everyone	should	know	about	black	history	no	matter	what	their	race	is.”;	
“Our	community	should	become	empowered	with	knowledge	and	to	give	people’s	
questions	to	Black	History	Month	an	end.”;	“We	live	in	a	very	diverse	community	where	lots	
of	cultures	are	celebrated	including	black	history.”	(Lopez	et	al.,	2012,	p.	12).	In	their	
reflections,	students	repeatedly	highlighted	that	their	identities	matter	in	their	education;	
they	want	their	identities,	histories	and	cultures	not	only	to	be	acknowledged	at	school	but	
to	be	a	part	of	their	school	experience	in	their	learning	and	in	their	co-curricular	
engagements.	
In	March	2012,	the	Spotlighting	Justice	students	began	to	organize	and	plan	their	
Change	Your	Tone	dialogic	communication	workshop.	High	School	administrators	gave	
permission	for	the	club	to	host	the	workshop	(which	took	all	tenth	graders	out	of	class	for	
an	entire	period)	for	two	reasons.	Firstly,	administrators	were	eager	to	discern	productive	
ways	to	address	conflict	between	students	and	teachers	that	were	leading	to	disciplinary	
measures,	and	the	administrators	felt	included	in	the	club’s	activity	and	mission	because	of	
the	long	standing	collaboration	and	open	communication	between	the	university’s	
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Intergroup	Dialogue	Program	and	the	high	school	English	teacher;	the	club	was	also	
developing	credibility	due	to	the	success	of	Spotlighting	Justice	Presents:	An	Evening	of	
Black	History	Then	and	Now.	
By	April	2012,	students	had	developed	both	a	guiding	rationale	and	desired	
outcomes	for	Change	Your	Tone.	The	rationale	and	goals	for	hosting	Change	Your	Tone	
were:		
• We	want	there	to	be	equality	between	all	speakers	at	[Central]	High	School.	
Regardless	of	who	is	speaking,	a	teacher	or	a	student,	that	person	should	have	
the	respect	of	the	listener;	
• We	are	frustrated	by	the	way	members	of	[Central’s]	community,	teachers	and	
students,	sometimes	talk	to	each	other.	When	people	talk	down	to	others,	it	
makes	everyone	feel	unsafe	and	unwelcome;	
• We	think	there	is	apathy	in	our	community,	where	people	do	not	really	care	
about	our	school,	our	teachers,	our	students;	
• We	would	like	other	members	of	[Central]	to	learn	communication	and	dialogue	
as	a	life	skill;	
• We	would	like	to	build	a	sense	of	belonging	and	community	at	[Central]	so	
learning	can	happen	(Lopez	et	al.,	2012).	
Students	clearly	name	the	tension	that	exists	between	teachers	and	students	and	between	
students	because	of	the	lack	of	understanding	on	how	to	communicate	using	empathy	and	
perspective	taking,	key	dialogic	communication	skills.	They	connect	these	lack	of	
communication	skills	to	apathy	and	a	general	sense	of	disconnect	in	their	school.	Further,	
students	expressed	a	belief	that	this	apathy	was	negatively	linked	to	the	ability	for	students	
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to	learn.	Students	wanted	to	address	these	issues	by	sharing	the	skills	they	learned	by	
practicing	dialogic	communication	as	members	of	Spotlighting	Justice.	
	 The	Spotlighting	Justice	students	generated	learning	outcomes	for	Change	Your	Tone	
participants.	These	outcomes	were:	
• Students	will	develop	skills	for	negotiating	conflict	with	each	other;	
• Students	will	learn	to	think	about	and	reflect	about	their	emotions;	
• Students	and	teachers	will	start	to	build	a	community	with	high	expectations	for	
all	members;	
• Students	will	practice	communication	through	dialogue	(Lopez	et	al.,	2012).	
While	Spotlighting	Justice	students	did	not	read	Delpit	(2012),	they	were	able	to	discern	
key	features	of	her	prescription	for	creating	successful	learning	environments	for	
marginally	situated	students	through	their	own	experiences	as	students	at	[Central]	High	
School.	They	wanted	to	engage	emotion	in	the	classroom,	they	wanted	to	develop	a	sense	of	
community,	and	they	wanted	to	teach/learn	to	navigate—not	avoid—conflict.	
	 Spotlighting	Justice	students	spent	a	day	at	the	Intergroup	Dialogue	Program’s	office	
and	classroom	with	members	of	a	300	course	level	college	dialogue	class.	Together,	the	
college	and	high	school	students,	in	collaboration	with	university	facilitators	and	their	
English	teacher,	brainstormed,	rehearsed	and	devised	activities	and	processes	that	could	
be	used	for	Change	Your	Tone.	Interestingly,	by	this	time	in	the	school	year,	the	Spotlighting	
Justice	students’	confidence	was	incredibly	high;	they	were	identifying	not	only	as	learners	
but	very	much	as	teachers.	They	made	clear	in	their	planning	sessions	with	their	teacher	
and	multiple	members	of	the	Intergroup	Dialogue	Program’s	team	that	this	was	their	show;	
they,	the	student	club	members,	were	going	to	be	the	event’s	facilitators;	however,	they	
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invited	and	wanted	the	university	facilitators	to	help	co-facilitate	small	group	discussions	
and	processing	during	the	event.	Change	Your	Tone	was	an	interdisciplinary,	inter-
generational,	student-led	workshop.	The	agenda	included:	a	welcome	by	the	English	
teacher,	an	introduction	by	a	club	member,	an	ice	breaker	led	by	a	club	member,	two	skits	
performed	by	club	members,	a	skit	processing	session	led	by	two	club	members,	an	opinion	
generating	activity	led	by	two	club	members,	and	an	interactive	dialogue	practice	led	by	6	
facilitation	teams	of	club	members.	During	the	skits,	one	club	member	played	a	teacher	
while	another	played	a	student.	In	the	first	skit,	they	acted	out	a	common	classroom	scene	
of	a	teacher	becoming	exasperated	with	a	disruptive	student	and	forcing	the	student	to	
leave	the	class	to	receive	disciplining	from	an	administrator;	in	the	second	skit,	the	student	
and	teacher	again	experience	conflict	over	the	student’s	classroom	behavior,	but	instead	of	
the	disruptive	student	being	removed	from	class,	both	the	teacher	and	the	student	talk	
through	the	student’s	disruptive	behavior	to	find	a	positive	way	for	the	student	to	
contribute	to	the	class.	The	skits	were	met	with	laughter	from	the	workshop’s	student	
participants	and	spontaneous	exclamations	like,	“yo,	that	is	so	true.”			
	 After	the	Change	Your	Tone	workshop,	members	of	the	Intergroup	Dialogue	
Program’s	team	administered	an	evaluation	to	the	tenth	grade	students	who	participated	in	
the	workshop	that	included	three	open	ended	questions:	If	you	had	to	describe	Change	
Your	Tone	to	a	student	who	did	not	attend,	what	would	you	say?;	Describe	what	you	think	
was	most	the	most	important	part	of	the	workshop;	What	would	you	recommend	we	do	
different	next	time?	(Lopez	et	al.,	2012).	Students’	responses	focused	on	the	importance	of	
learning	how	to	engage	in	dialogic	communication	and	a	shared	feeling	that	this	type	of	
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communication	is	important	for	students	and	teachers	so	more	people	should	attend	the	
workshop.	A	sample	of	students’	responses	included:	
• We	learned	the	difference	between	dialogue	and	debate;	
• It	helps	you	with	communication,	and	it’s	interesting;	
• I	learned	more	about	dialogue	(verses	debate),	and	how	to	be	a	more	intentional	
speaker	when	talking	with	adults	and	students;	
• The	two	skits	really	illustrated	what	Change	Your	Tone	is	about;	
• I	think	the	most	important	part	of	the	workshop	was	when	we	discussed	dialogue	
verses	debate;	
• The	small	groups	and	large	group	helped	with	understanding	dialogue;	
• Would	love	to	see	this	with	a	mix	of	students,	teachers	and	administrations;	
• I	would	recommend	more	people	come	and	participate	(Lopez	et	al.,	2012,	p.	23).	
The	student	participants	expressed	an	interest	and	value	in	learning	about	dialogue;	they	
felt	the	workshops	were	helpful,	and	they	recommended	having	more	time	and	more	
participants	in	the	workshops.	
	 The	students	had	their	request	met;	the	following	year,	Change	Your	Tone	was	
included	as	an	orientation	event	by	the	school	administrators;	club	members	facilitated	
Change	Your	Tone	for	the	entire	incoming	ninth	grade	class	and	their	teachers.	Additionally,	
prompted	by	the	students	urging,	Spotlighting	Justice	transformed	from	a	club	to	an	
independent	elective	during	the	2012-2013	school	year;	students	wanted	to	receive	
academic	credit	for	the	learning	and	teaching	they	were	doing	within	the	scope	of	their	
participation	within	the	Spotlighting	Justice	club.	Again,	the	English	teacher	with	
Intergroup	Dialogue	Program	facilitators	co-facilitated	a	course	that	built	from	Spotlighting	
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Justice’s	mission	statement.	The	course	was	open	to	both	club	members	(most	of	whom	
chose	to	continue	their	engagement)	and	to	interested	students	from	across	grade	levels	at	
the	high	school;	enough	students	enrolled	in	Spotlighting	Justice	to	fill	two	sections	of	the	
course.	Based	on	the	ideas	and	activism	of	the	students,	the	2012-2013	school	year	at	
[Central]	High	School	included	two	sections	of	a	course	based	on	the	student-driven	club,	
the	inclusion	of	their	Change	Your	Tone	workshop	in	orientation	and	Spotlighting	Justice	
Presents:	An	Evening	of	Black	History	Then	and	Now	as	an	anticipated	and	celebrated	annual	
event.	Additionally,	the	Spotlighting	Justice	students	extended	their	work	in	many	ways.	
Two	members	became	active	(one	even	the	president)	of	their	local	NAACP	youth	
organization,	two	members	spoke	as	part	of	the	White	House	Young	America	series	on	
youth	civic	engagement,	multiple	club	members	with	their	facilitators	presented	at	a	
national	conference	focused	on	civic	engagement	and	action	(Cannito-Coville,	Nastasi,	
Lopez,	Smith,	Villasenor,	&	Benedetto,	2013);	and	the	students	have	gone	on	to	study	
disciplines	including	sociology,	women	and	gender	studies,	ethnic	studies	and	social	work	
in	undergraduate	and	now	graduate	school.		
Both	YPAR	and	IGD	pedagogy	prioritize	teaching	students	about	social	injustices,	
mobilizing	student	identity	with	respect	to	their	learning,	and	empowering	students	to	take	
action	towards	greater	equality	(Aldana,	Richards-Schuster,	&	Checkoway,	2016;	
Cammarota	&	Fine,	2008).	Critically,	YPAR	and	IGD	also	center	co-inquiry	or	collective	
learning	and	action	(Zuñiga,	Lopez,	&	Ford,	2012;	Cammarota	&	Fine,	2008),	which	allows	
students	to	work	together—across	differences	in	social	identity—to	address	problems	of	
shared	concern.	YPAR,	in	particular,	engaged	stakeholders	across	generations,	institutions,	
and	degrees	of	power	(i.e.	students	working	with	teachers	and	community	leaders)	
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(Cammarota	&	Fine,	2008).	Spotlighting	Justice	is	an	example	of	a	student-centered,	
student	driven,	collaboration	that	exemplifies	these	shared	characteristics	of	YPAR	and	IGD	
pedagogy.		
Specifically,	the	students	who	participated	in	Spotlighting	Justice	during	the	2011-
2012	school	year	engaged	multiple	stakeholders	across	generations	and	degrees	of	power.	
In	order	to	plan	and	implement	An	Evening	of	Black	History	Then	and	Now,	the	students	
worked	with	teachers,	administrators	and	community	leaders.	When	planning	and	
facilitating	Change	Your	Tone,	the	students	worked	with	college	students	and	graduate	
facilitators,	teachers,	and	school	administrators.	It	is	not	often	that	youth	are	able	to—and	
take	the	initiative	to—work	collaboratively	across	such	varying	degrees	of	institutional	
power.	But	Spotlighting	Justice	students	felt	passionately	about	their	objectives,	
empowered	by	their	learning,	and	supported	by	their	English	teacher	and	university	
facilitators,	allowing	them	to	engage	in	action	with	and	across	degrees	of	social	power.	Like	
Members	of	the	Education	Opportunity	Gap	Project	(described	above),	members	of	
Spotlighting	Justice	created	non-traditional	epistemic	products	that	at	once	highlighted	
their	social	locations	and	their	learning.	Spotlighting	Justice	Presents:	An	Evening	of	Black	
History	Then	and	Now	and	Change	Your	Tone	are	both	examples	of	innovative	and	authentic	
knowledge	making.	Students’	learning	about	structural	inequality	(namely	their	identities	
as	Black	students	and	students	of	color	not	being	incorporated	into	their	schooling	
experience)	and	students’	experiences	of	equality	through	communication	(namely	
learning	how	to	engage	in	dialogic	communication)	led	to	and	guided	their	creation	of	
these	events.	Students	critically	centered	the	knowledge	that	was	structurally	excluded	
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from	their	traditional	learning	and	made	it	accessible	to	other	students,	teachers,	
administrators	and	community	members.		
Consistent	with	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy,	students	learned	about	structural	
inequality	and	how	to	take	action	to	collectively	address	them,	and	they	also	became	
empowered	as	knowers.	The	Spotlighting	Justice	students	not	only	researched,	planned,	
and	facilitated	their	events,	but	they	also	demanded	that	they	be	the	teachers.	Particularly	
in	the	case	of	Change	Your	Tone,	the	Spotlighting	Justice	students	provided	the	information	
and	the	processing	for	their	fellow	students	throughout	the	workshop.	This	was	non-
negotiable	for	the	club	members;	they	clearly	communicated	to	their	English	teacher,	their	
university-based	facilitator,	and	to	the	assistant	principal	that	Change	Your	Tone	was	their	
opportunity	to	share	information—a	dialogic	process—they	had	learned	with	other	
students	and	teachers	in	ways	that	were	accessible	and	relevant	to	those	constituents.	
Spotlighting	Justice	also	created	institutional	change	by	establishing	an	elective	course	and	
an	orientation	workshop.	The	desire	of	students	empowered	by	intergroup	dialogue	and	
youth	participatory	action	research	pedagogy	to	produce	and	share	knowledge	is	relevant	
to	this	dissertation’s	broader	engagement	with	the	pursuit	of	epistemic	justice;	
implications	for	what	these	pedagogies	may	contribute	to	education	towards	epistemic	
justice	are	discussed	below.		
Conclusion	&	Implications	
This	chapter	sought	to	provide	an	account	of	how	social	identity(ies)	matter	in	
education	and	to	illustrate	how	social	justice	pedagogies	can	interrupt	unjust	epistemic	
practices.	In	the	first	half	of	the	chapter,	recent	research	in	education	demographics	
compiled	by	the	Department	of	Education	and	university	researchers	was	presented	to	
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map	the	ways	in	which	students	experience	disadvantage	or	benefit	from	participation	in	
educational	institutions	based	on	their	racial/ethnic	and	socio-economic	class	identities.	
The	chapter	then	turned	to	scholars	of	education	to	provide	a	critical	race	lens	with	which	
to	interpret	these	data	in	order	to	prevent	assuming	a	deficit	perspective	on	marginally	
situated	students’	academic	opportunity.	Next,	this	chapter	turned	to	the	perspectives	of	
marginalized	students	themselves	as	shared	through	social	justice	initiatives	that	include	
Youth	Participatory	Action	Research	and	Intergroup	Dialogue.		
As	explored	in	chapter	one,	philosophers	describe	epistemic	justice	as	including:	
accepting	that	marginalized	knowers	develop	epistemic	resources	from	their	
situations/standpoints;	privileged	knowers	trusting	marginalized	knowers	and	their	
situated	knowledges;	and	dominant	knowers	actively	learning	how	to	utilize	structurally	
marginalized	knowledge	(Pohlhaus,	2012);	and	dominantly	(and	subordinately)	situated	
knowers	to	restructure	habits	and	affective	structures	to	enable	them	to	simultaneously	
engage	different	perspectives	and	viewpoints	without	polarizing	them	(develop	a	
kaleidoscopic	consciousness),	and	engage	in	collective	agency	and	action	taking	toward	
political	and	cultural	transformation	(Medina,	2013).	IGD	and	YPAR	help	facilitate	youth	
reflections	and	action	taking,	provide	examples	of	how	social	justice	pedagogy	can	
interrupt	the	reproduction	of	epistemic	injustice	in	educational	settings.	
Specifically,	in	the	YPAR	and	IGD	youth	programs	presented	in	this	chapter,	
marginalized	youth,	and	marginally	situated	youth	in	collaboration	with	dominantly	
situated	youth	(The	Detroit	Youth	Dialogues,	the	High	School	Institute	and	Spotlighting	
Justice)	created	and	disseminated	new	knowledges	from	their	perspectives	and	
experiences.	Dominantly	situated	youth	actively	learned	to	acknowledge	the	perspectives	
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of	youth	of	color	while	learning	to	practice	perspective	taking	and	holding	multiple,	
sometimes	conflicting	perspectives,	at	once.	Additionally,	these	youths	took	action	to	
change	their	schools	and	communities	(Aldana	et	al.,	2012;	Lopez	et	al.,	2012;	Torre	&	Fine,	
2011).	Through	their	participation	in	social	justice	education,	these	youths	are	practicing	
the	habits	necessary	for	epistemic	justice	while	learning	to	work	for	the	types	of	
institutional	and	structural	changes	necessary	to	make	epistemic	justice	possible.	
I	was	able	to	work	with	the	students	participating	in	the	High	School	Institute	and	
Spotlighting	Justice	as	a	facilitator.	During	this	time,	I	was	engaged	in	academic	coursework	
as	a	philosopher	of	education	learning	about	epistemic	injustice,	and	I	was	also	developing	
my	practitioner	skills	as	a	social	justice	educator	learning	and	practicing	intergroup	
dialogue	and	YPAR	facilitation.	Even	as	someone	developing	a	great	deal	of	content	
knowledge,	I	cannot	adequately	express	how	much	I	learned	about	education	for	epistemic	
justice	from	the	youth	at	Central	High	School.	My	goal	in	partnering	with	the	English	
teacher	at	Central	was	to	re-create	the	intergroup	dialogue	on	race	and	ethnicity	that	I	was	
facilitating	at	the	university	level	to	the	high	school	level.	Even	in	retrospect,	I	am	amazed	
by	how	high	school	students	in	the	tenth	grade	transformed	that	goal	and	made	it	into	
something	so	much	richer,	developing	skills	and	knowledge	among	themselves,	their	
school	and	their	community.	The	next	chapter	in	this	dissertation	(chapter	four)	is	linked	
to	my	work	as	a	facilitator	of	intergroup	dialogue	at	the	university	level.	Chapter	four	
explores	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	at	the	university	level;	specifically,	I	analyze	the	
course	documents	of	students	who	participated	in	an	intergroup	dialogue	on	race	and	
ethnicity.	Through	this	analysis,	I	seek	to	respond	to	question	three	outlined	in	the	
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introduction:	How	might	intergroup	dialogue,	as	a	particular	type	of	social	justice	pedagogy,	
facilitate	epistemic	justice	in	educational	settings	including	higher	education.		
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Chapter	4	
Teaching	for	Epistemic	Justice	
	
“For	as	long	as	white	people	maintain	power	and	black	and	brown	people	are	their	
subordinates	we	will	never	have	to	address	the	race	issue.	Ultimately,	race	is	one	of	those	
privileges	white	people	have	the	benefit	of	deflecting.	White	people	can	go	through	there	
(sic)	day	to	day	and	avoid	people	of	color	where	as	unfortunately	people	of	color	can’t	do	
the	same.		My	ultimate	hope	for	this	class	was	to	create	a	set	of	conscious	people,	especially	
conscious	white	people	so	they	can	go	back	to	their	communities	and	help	begin	to	fix	the	
issues	in	their	own	communities	as	people	of	color	continue	to	improve	and	further	advance	
their	own.”		
–Alyssa15	(emphasis	added)	
	
Alyssa,	a	participant	in	intergroup	dialogue	on	race	and	ethnicity,	powerfully	
describes	the	normative	architecture	undergirding	how	white	people	know	relative	to	her	
hopes	and	goals	for	a	college	level	intergroup	dialogue	course	on	race	and	ethnicity.	As	
Alyssa	insightfully	surfaces,	white	people	have	the	privilege	of	not	knowing	how	race	
influences	the	daily	experiences	of	people	of	color	in	U.S.	society.	As	described	in	chapter	
one,	intergroup	dialogue	is	a	specific	type	of	social	justice	education	that	brings	students	
together	across	differences	in	identities	and	power	to	explore	social	inequality	while	
mobilizing	students	towards	collective	action	(Gurin	et	al.,	2013).	This	chapter	continues	to	
explore	students’	descriptions	of	learning	through	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	and	
practices	by	pivoting	from	the	high	school	setting	to	the	college	setting.	Specifically,	this	
chapter	analyzes	student	course	writing	across	two	sections	of	intergroup	dialogue	on	race	
and	ethnicity.	Student	writing	was	analyzed	to	develop	an	understanding	of	how	students	
describe	the	impact	of	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	and	course	content	focused	on	race	
and	ethnicity	on	their	learning	and	thinking.	In	the	context	of	the	overall	dissertation	
project,	this	chapter	thoughtfully	takes	up	question	four	raised	in	the	introduction:	How	
might	intergroup	dialogue,	as	a	particular	type	of	social	justice	pedagogy,	facilitate	epistemic	
justice	in	educational	settings?	This	chapter	begins	with	a	brief	review	of	research	about	
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intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	with	particular	attention	to	research	that	utilizes	qualitative	
content	analysis	as	it	relates	to	the	study	described	below.	After	describing	the	themes	that	
emerged	from	students’	course	writings,	the	chapter	begins	to	make	connections	between	
how	students	are	describing	the	impact	of	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	on	their	learning	
and	teaching	for	epistemic	justice;	these	connections	will	be	further	explored	in	the	next	
chapter	of	this	dissertation.	
Literature	Review	
Intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	
	 Intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	refers	to	a	specific	type	of	social	justice	pedagogy	
developed	at	the	University	of	Michigan	and	practiced	nationally	in	higher	education	
(Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007).	By	dialogue	it	refers	to	sustained,	co-facilitated	face-to-face	
communication	over	the	course	of	a	semester.	By	intergroup,	it	refers	to	the	bringing	
together	of	students	across	differences	in	identities	(e.g.	race,	gender,	social	class).	
Particular	forms	of	communication	are	emphasized	in	the	dialogic	classroom;	these	include	
active	listening	and	the	practices	of	empathy	and	perspective	taking	to	build	understanding	
across	difference.	In	emphasizing	the	development	of	understanding	across	differences,	
practitioners	facilitate	a	critical	analysis	of	social	issues	with	and	among	students;	this	
criticality	incorporates	the	dynamics	of	structural	inequality	in	“addressing	issues	of	social	
identity	and	social	location	in	the	context	of	power	and	privilege”	(Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007,	p.	
vii).	Students	are	encouraged	to	consider	taking	action	towards	social	justice.	
	 On	most	campuses,	intergroup	dialogue	takes	place	over	four	phases	(Dessel	&	
Rogge,	2008);	an	overview	was	provided	earlier	in	this	dissertation	(see	Table	1	adapted	
from	Zúñiga,	et	al.,	2007,	pp.	27-28).	Phase	one	provides	a	space	for	students	to	form	
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relationships	and	to	learn	about	and	practice	dialogic	communication.	Phase	two	facilitates	
the	exploration	of	commonalities	and	difference	across	group	identities	and	an	
examination	of	power.	Phase	three	engages	students	in	the	exploration	of	hot	topics	in	
which	students	explore	systems	of	power	and	privilege	relative	to	current	or	historical	
events	introducing	“students	to	critical	histories	[offering]	new	pathways	of	understanding	
how	today’s	racist	society	evolved”	(Rozas	&	Miller,	2009,	p.	29).	Phase	four	focuses	on	
action	taking	and	alliance	building.	Students	work	in	small	groups	on	action	projects;	these	
are	called	Intergroup	Collaborative	Projects	(ICP).	Since	action	is	taking	place	in	
conjunction	with	learning	about	race	with	others	across	social	identities,	students	with	
dominant	identities	are	prevented	from	re-centering	power	through	“doing	for”	(Nagda,	
Gurin,	Sorensen,	Gurin-Sands,	&	Osuna,	2009).	Similarly,	subordinate	groups	are	not	forced	
or	reified	as	“doing	it/making	it	on	their	own.”	Instead,	students	are	taught	to	and	practice	
working	with	one	another	across	differences	in	identities—they	can	practice	alliance	
making.	
	 Intergroup	dialogue	is	co-facilitated.	The	co-facilitation	format	demonstrates	
multiple	epistemic	markers	of	Intergroup	Dialogue.	Firstly,	knowledge	is	seen	as	belonging	
to	members	of	multiple	social	identity	groups;	facilitators	represent	both	the	marginalized	
and	dominant	identities	centered	in	the	dialogue	(e.g.	a	facilitator	who	identifies	as	a	
person	of	color	and	one	who	identifies	as	white	in	a	dialogue	on	race	and	ethnicity).	
Secondly,	co-facilitation	embodies	the	practice	of	democratic	knowledge	making,	or	making	
meaning	with.	Zúñiga	et	al.	(2012)	call	this	process	“co-inquiry.”	Co-inquiry	models	alliance	
building	and	action	across	differences	in	identities	and	inequalities	for	the	purpose	of	social	
justice	action	(Nagda,	Timbang,	Fulmer,	&	Tran,	2011).		
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Research	on	Intergroup	Dialogue	Pedagogy	
	 Findings	from	research	across	intergroup	dialogue	programs	at	nine	participating	
universities	finds	that	students	enrolled	in	intergroup	dialogue	developed	greater	
awareness	of	inequality,	empathy	and	motivation	to	bridge	difference,	and	efficacy	in	
taking	action	than	did	wait-list	students	who	were	interested	in	but	not	able	to	enroll	in	
intergroup	dialogue	courses	the	same	semester	(Gurin	et	al.,	2013;	Lopez	&	Zúñiga,	2010).		
Students	enrolled	in	intergroup	dialogue	courses	have	also	demonstrated	increased	
perspective-taking	and	more	complex	thinking	about	differences	across	social	identity	
groups	(DeTurk,	2006).	Intergroup	dialogue	courses	have	also	been	shown	to	decrease	
belief	in	stereotypes	and	prejudice	among	participants,	while	also	increasing	racial	identity	
awareness	among	white	students	and	students	of	color	(Dessel	&	Rogge,	2008).	In	higher	
education	settings	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	has	repeatedly	demonstrated	an	increase	
in	awareness	and	understanding	of	others	while	building	students’	confidence	to	take	civic	
action	towards	greater	social	justice.	More	recently,	intergroup	dialogue	researchers	have	
studied	and	analyzed	intragroup	dialogue	courses	(Ford	&	Malaney,	2012;	Ford	&	
Orlandella,	2015).	Intragroup	dialogue	courses	allow	students	to	learn	and	analyze	the	
same	or	very	similar	content	of	traditional	intergroup	dialogue	course,	while	allowing	
students	to	engage	these	learnings,	topics	and	issues	in	an	in-group	setting	(e.g.	among	
students	who	identify	as	multi-racial	or	as	white).		
	 Ford	&	Malaney	(2012)	conducted	an	IRB	approved	analysis	of	students’	papers	in	
five	sections	of	intergroup	dialogue	(comprised	of	students	of	color	and	white	students)	on	
race	and	ethnicity	and	one	section	of	a	multiracial	intragroup	dialogue16	on	race	and	
ethnicity	(enrolling	students	who	identify	as	multiracial/students	of	color	students	only,	
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providing	the	opportunity	for	multiracial	students/students	of	color	to	explore	race	among	
similarly	identifying	peers);	the	study	including	a	sample	of	31	students.	Ford	&	Malaney	
(2012)	conducted	an	inductively	derived	qualitative	analysis	of	students’	four-page	
preliminary	paper	and	of	their	eight-page	final	papers	at	a	small,	pre-dominantly	white	
liberal	arts	college	in	the	Northeast.	Students	reflected	on	their	experiences	and	
understandings	of	race	for	both	papers;	students	were	asked	questions	about	social	
identities,	social	structures,	and	about	their	experience	with	the	dialogue	course	(Ford	&	
Malaney,	2012).		
In	an	analysis	of	student	writing,	Ford	&	Malaney	(2012)	found	students	self-
reported	growth.	Furthermore,	students	learning	was	coded	into	seven	themes:	(1)	
saliency	and	meaning	of	racial	identity,	(2)	complexity	of	racial	identity	development,	(3)	
relationship	between	skin	color	and	self-esteem,	(4)	individual	biases	and	prejudices,	(5)	
structures	of	power	and	privilege/agent	and	target	identities,	(6)	experience	of	race	at	the	
college,	and	(7)	personal	accountability	and	responsibility.		At	the	start	of	the	race	
dialogues,	most	students	of	color	expressed	a	nuanced	understanding	of	race	and	racism,	
which	“is	not	surprising	given	the	socio-historical	context	of	race	relations	in	the	U.S.;	
generally,	targeted	racial	identity	groups	are	more	aware	of	systematic	dis/advantage	
based	on	power	structures”	(Ford	&	Malaney,	2012,	p.	23).	These	students	emphasized	the	
centrality	of	race	at	the	start	of	the	dialogue	and	were	able	to	further	re-define	or	
communicate	the	significance	of	race	at	the	end	of	their	dialogue.		
In	the	multi-racial	intra-group	dialogue	(MRID)	students	discussed	the	complexity	
of	racial	identity	development	in	their	preliminary	papers.	Some	MRID	students	discussed	
identity	confusion	even	including	some	cases	of	internalized	oppression/self-hatred	(Ford	
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&	Malaney,	2012).		Some	students,	for	example,	described	feeling	torn	between	identities;	
one	biracial	man	wrote	he	was	teased	about	being	the	“least	black,	black	kid”	by	his	Black	
peers,	while	being	treated	like	the	“token	black	kid”	by	his	white	peers	(Ford	&	Malaney,	
2012,	p.	25).	According	to	Ford	&	Malaney	(2012),	the	multiracial	students	who	expressed	
a	sense	of	being	torn	between	identities	at	the	beginning	of	the	semester	moved	to	
describing	how	they	were	making	sense	of	a	fluid	racial	identity	by	the	end	of	the	semester;	
they	began	to	embrace	complexity.	The	same	biracial	man	who	felt	neither	at	home	among	
Black	or	white	peers	at	the	start	of	the	semester	described	himself	as	“not	divided	within	
myself…these	realizations	inspired	a	satisfaction	with	and	growth	of	my	character,	and	I	
now	harbor	more	pride	in	my	race	than	I	had	ever	before”	(Ford	&	Malaney,	2012,	p.	25).	
In	terms	of	skin	color	and	self-esteem,	Ford	&	Malaney	(2012)	found	that	students	
of	color	in	both	inter	and	intragroup	dialogues	struggled	with	positive	racial	sense	of	self	in	
their	initial	papers,	and	they	expressed	a	more	positive	sense	of	self	and	future	outlook	in	
their	final	papers.	Similarly,	students	from	both	dialogues	were	also	able	to	more	fully	
articulate,	dissect	and	express	an	awareness	of	their	individual	biases	and	prejudices	from	
the	preliminary	to	the	final	papers.	One	Black	woman	wrote	in	her	final	paper,	“Like	all	
problems,	the	first	step	is	to	acknowledge	that	it	is	there…Not	only	do	I	have	biases	against	
other	races,	but	I’ve	learned	that	I	have	several	against	my	own	race	as	well”	(Ford	&	
Malaney,	2012,	p.	27).		
While	the	students	of	color	and	the	multiracial	students	in	both	the	inter	and	the	
intragroup	dialogue	generally	began	the	course	with	a	deeper	understanding	of	race,	
power	and	privilege	than	their	white	counterparts,	students	of	color	and	multiracial	
students	from	across	both	courses	developed	a	deeper	appreciation	of	these	issues	through	
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their	engagement	with	the	dialogue	(Ford	&	Malaney,	2012).	As	a	result	of	participating	in	
the	inter/intra	group	dialogue	course,	“SOC/multiracial	students	began	to	more	fully	
recognize	the	complicated	structures	of	power	and	privilege	in	the	US	as	well	as	its	
relationship	to	racial	hegemony”	(Ford	&	Malaney,	2012,	p.	28).	Additionally,	many	of	the	
students	of	color	and	multiracial	students	developed	a	more	complex	understanding	of	
their	multiple	and	intersecting	identities,	furthering	their	understandings	of	
advantage/disadvantage.		
For	students	of	color	and	multiracial	students	across	both	dialogue	courses,	the	
experience	of	being	students	with	non-dominant	racial	identities	at	their	predominantly	
white	college	was	a	challenge	at	the	beginning	and	the	end	of	the	course.	Students	found	
the	racially	homogeneous	environment	to	be	shocking	and	isolating	(Ford	&	Malaney,	
2012).	However,	participating	in	these	courses	helped	students	identify	that	they	are	not	
alone	in	their	struggle.	Students	of	color	and	multiracial	students	described	growing	in	
their	sense	of	personal	accountability	and	responsibility	in	creating	social	change	from	
their	preliminary	to	their	final	papers.	One	Asian	American	woman	wrote	in	her	final	
paper,	“I	also	found	through	this	class,	how	to	empower	my	target	status,	to	de-victimize	
myself,”	while	a	Latino	man	wrote,	“Gone	are	the	days	where	I	would	not	speak	up	when	
someone	uses	a	derogatory	comment.	I	will	not	conform	and	accept	the	privileges	that	
come	with	it.	I	will	use	my	knowledge	to	challenge	the	status	quo”	(Ford	&	Malaney,	2012,	
p.	30).	Students	across	both	dialogues	expressed	a	desire	to	create	positive	social	change.		
Using	similar	methodology,	Ford	(2012)	analyzed	the	shifting	ideological	scripts	of	
white	students	participating	in	inter	and	intragroup	race	dialogues.	In	the	IRB	approved	
qualitative	study,	researchers	conducted	content	analysis	of	student	papers	at	a	private,	
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predominantly	white,	liberal	arts	college	in	the	Northeast,	Ford	(2012)	analyzed	the	
writings	of	white	students	in	a	student	of	color-white	student	intergroup	dialogue	on	race	
and	ethnicity	and	the	writings	of	white	students	in	an	intragroup	white	student	dialogue	on	
race	and	ethnicity.	Both	of	these	dialogues	were	consistent	with	the	four-phase	model	
described	in	detail	above;	the	primary	difference	in	the	two	courses	“was	the	emphasis	on	
learning	about	race	(generally)	and	whiteness	(specifically)	across	or	within	their	racial	
identity	group”	(Ford,	2012,	p.	144).		
Ford	(2012)	conducted	an	inductively	derived	qualitative	analysis	of	white	students	
four-page	preliminary	papers	and	their	eight-page	final	papers.	These	papers	(98	total)	
required	students	to	reflect	on	race	by	specifically	addressing	social	identities,	social	
structures,	and	their	experience	in	the	dialogue	course.	Ford	(2012)	found	that	white	
students	across	both	sections	self-reported	growth	in	their	understanding	of	course	
content	learning	and	in	engaging	the	dialogue	process.	While	students	reported	growth	in	
their	understanding	of	racial	identity,	some	students	also	communicated	aspects	of	
resistance.	For	example,	one	white	student	in	the	intragroup	dialogue	section	questioned	
the	intra	group	format	asking,	“What	can	I	learn	from	other	White	people?”	(Ford,	2012,	
146).	This	question	is	a	significant	one;	it	is	even	raised	by	students	during	intergroup	
dialogue	courses.	Ford	(2012)	calls	this	an	example	of	cognitive	dissonance,	or	an	inability	
of	students	to	process	information	that	stands	in	contradiction	to	the	world	view	they	
possess.	Ford	(2012)	reports	that	intragroup	dialogue	students	initially	exhibited	
resistance	in	the	form	of	denial,	defensiveness,	and	even	anger	at	the	intragroup	structure	
of	their	course;	however,	at	the	end	of	the	course,	these	white	students	exhibited	what	Ford	
(2012)	calls	script	changes	by	demonstrating	a	more	nuanced	perspective	on	whiteness,	
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white	privilege	and	white	identity	development.	White	students	in	the	intragroup	dialogue	
course	also	demonstrated	similar	growth;	however,	their	learning	was	often	more	broadly	
focused	on	race	relations	instead	of	whiteness.		
Across	sections,	significant	themes	emerged	that	included:	white	students	reflecting	
on	how	they	were	socialized	to	view/not	view	race,	the	meaning	of	whiteness	and	white	
privilege,	feelings	of	shame	and	guilt,	intersectional	awareness	of	multiple	social	identities,	
and	personal	accountability	for	social	change	(Ford,	2012).	Specifically,	while	many	white	
students	in	both	sections	began	the	course	declaring	they	“do	not	perceive	race,”	their	
ideological	scripts	shifted	to	include	an	understanding	of	how	they	were	socialized	to	
minimize	race.	Similarly,	students	began	the	course	unable	to	identify	specific	lessons	they	
were	taught	about	whiteness,	but,	through	the	course	of	the	semester,	they	learned	that	
whiteness	isn’t	“just	there”;	instead,	the	seeming	invisibility	of	whiteness	(to	white	people)	
is	a	function	of	dominant	racial	hegemony	(Ford,	2012,	p.148).	Ford	(2012)	reports	this	
theme	was	consistent	across	both	dialogues;	however,	there	was	a	distinction.	Namely,	
white	students	who	participated	in	the	intergroup	dialogue	section	focused	primarily	on	
white	skin	privilege	and	its	impact	on	people	of	color,	while	students	in	the	intragroup	
dialogue	section	were	“more	able	to	articulate	the	meaning	of	white	culture,	independent	
of	a	reference	group…they	[were]	able	to	own	the	sociohistorical	process	of	becoming	
white	within	the	U.S.	context”	(Ford,	2012,	p.	148).	The	students	who	participated	in	the	
intragroup	dialogue	were	better	able	to	describe	the	sociohistorical	assimilative	process	by	
which	ethnic	groups	(e.g.	Irish,	German)	became	white.	Students	in	both	sections	were	
assigned	readings	on	this	topic,	but,	since	students	in	the	intragroup	section	describe	the	
deepest	understanding	of	white	identity	development	over	the	course	of	the	semester,	Ford	
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(2012)	suggests	that	the	intragroup	focus	may	result	in	more	critical	and	focused	
examination	of	whiteness	for	all	students	but	especially	for	white	students.		
In	terms	of	feelings	of	guilt	and	shame,	students	from	both	sections	discussed	these	
emotions	via	the	process	of	learning	about	privilege	and	inequality	in	both	their	
preliminary	and	final	papers;	students	in	both	groups	also	expressed	understanding	that	
these	emotions	are	not	productive	and	were	making	steps	to	resolve	internal	conflict	(Ford,	
2012).	Additionally,	students	from	both	sections	grew	their	understanding	of	white	
privilege	from	their	preliminary	script	of	white	privilege	is	“things	I	have	that	others	do	
not,”	to	white	privilege	being	more	complex	and	something	for	which	the	white	students	
felt	responsibility	for	(Ford,	2012,	p.	149).	In	their	final	papers,	white	students	were	able	to	
talk	about	their	privilege	in	terms	of	their	participation	as	beneficiaries	of	a	racist	system	
that	they	needed	to	help	change.	
These	new	understandings,	new	ideological	scripts,	allowed	students	from	both	
sections	to	develop	an	awareness	of	the	structural	nature	of	race	and	racism	while	
simultaneously	growing	an	awareness	of	individual	agency	and	responsibility	(Ford,	2012).	
Ford	(2012)	reports	that	students	in	both	sections	developed	an	understanding	of	a	white	
ally	as	someone	who	seeks	to	empower	(not	to	undermine	or	to	do	for)	the	groups	they	
strive	to	support.	Students	acknowledged	the	importance	of	not	confusing	advocacy	with	
the	hijacking	of	subordinate	groups’	messages	or	stories.	Across	sections,	students	began	to	
understand	they	must	first	understand	their	racial	identity	and	privilege	in	order	to	take	
steps	as	individuals	and	as	members	of	social	justice	groups	to	bring	about	change	(Ford,	
2012).	
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Ford	and	Orlandella	(2015)	extended	this	study	(Ford,	2012)	by	exploring	white	
students’	journeys	to	antiracist	allies	in	their	IRB	approved	content	analysis	of	white	
student	course	writings	in	either	an	intergroup	or	intra	white	student	dialogue	on	race	and	
ethnicity	offered	during	the	2009-2012	academic	years.	The	researchers	conducted	an	
inductively	derived	qualitative	analysis	of	58	students’	eight-page	final	papers	at	a	small,	
private,	predominantly	white	liberal	arts	college	in	the	Northeast.	Students	were	
specifically	asked	to	critically	reflect	on	the	following	questions	in	their	final	papers:	“What	
does	it	mean	to	you	to	be	a	white	person?	What,	if	any,	has	been	the	impact	of	this	dialogue	
on	your	knowledge	about	being	a	white	person	in	the	U.S.?	How,	if	all,	do	you	expect	to	use	
what	you	have	learned	in	the	future?”	(Ford	&	Orlandella,	2015,	p.	292).	While	many	of	the	
themes	and	findings	from	Ford’s	(2012)	study	are	present	across	papers	from	both	the	
intra	and	intergroup	dialogues,	the	findings	in	this	analysis	dig	deeper	into	students’	
descriptions	of	coming	to	understand	whiteness,	privilege,	and	action	taking	for	social	
change	(Ford	&	Orlandella,	2015).	Specifically,	Ford	and	Orlandella	(2015)	analyzed	the	
ways	that	white	students	discussed	the	following	prominent	themes	across	their	final	
papers:	the	defining	characteristics	of	white	allies,	approaches	to	becoming	white	allies,	
and	the	challenges	of	becoming	white	allies.		
When	white	students	discussed	the	important	characteristics	of	a	white	ally,	they	
wrote	about	the	need	for	white	students/allies	to	continually	reflect	about	their	white	
racial	identity,	which	includes	becoming	aware	of	how	their	white	racial	identity	impacts	
their	everyday	lives	(i.e.	need	to	work	against	the	social	racial	invisibility	of	whiteness	in	
our	society)	(Ford	&	Orlandella,	2015).	Students	across	sections	also	discussed	white	
privilege.	Namely,	students	identified	the	need	to	not	only	be	aware	of	white	privilege,	that	
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they	have	it	and	that	it	operates	as	“normal”	in	their	lives,	but	also	to	understand	that	they	
cannot	escape	it	so	it	is	their	responsibility	to	work	to	change	it	(Ford	&	Orlandella,	2015).		
As	white	students	recognized	their	privilege,	they	also	came	to	understand	their	
biases	and—structurally—how	their	biases	are	related	to	racialized	social	patterns	that	
shield	their	whiteness	(Ford	&	Orlandella,	2015).	One	white	woman	wrote,	“I	look	at	many	
of	those	close	to	me	who	are	white,	and	can	see	we	are	all	racist…I	harbor	racist	tendencies	
because	of	my	own	race,	but	nothing	will	change	if	I	myself	do	not	do	something”	(Ford	&	
Orlandella,	2015,	p.	294).	In	their	final	papers,	students	grappled	with	their	biases,	the	
social	nature	of	these	biases	and	their	responsibility	to	be	aware	and	act	against	them.	
Additionally,	many	white	students	expressed	a	desire	to	work	for	social	change	on	
both	individual	and	structural	levels.	Specifically,	some	students	talked	about	overcoming	
their	feelings	of	guilt	to	use	their	white	privilege	towards	working	for	social	justice	(Ford	&	
Orlandella,	2015).	White	students	wrote	about	finding	their	voices	and	using	their	voices	to	
speak	out	about	their	privilege	and	about	racism.	As	the	students	discussed	future	action	
taking,	students	seemed	to	be	describing	two	distinct	approaches	to	becoming	allies:	
helping	people	of	color	or	working	with	(not	for)	people	of	color	(Ford	&	Orlandella,	2015).	
Ford	&	Orlandella	(2015)	describe	the	“helping	people	of	color”	approach	as	well-intended,	
while	acknowledging	it	is	harmful	because	it	reinforces	hegemonic	notions	that	people	of	
color	need	to	be	saved	or	rescued	by	white	people.	Some	white	students	were	able	to	
understand	the	danger	of	the	“helping”	narrative	and,	instead,	expressed	a	desire	to	
collaborate	with	people	of	color	(Ford	&	Orlandella,	2015).	Ford	&	Orlandella	(2015)	
describe	the	collaboration-focused	white	students	as	“understanding	of	the	ways	that	
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systemic	racism	affects	everyone	and	how	challenging	inequitable	racist	structures	will	
liberate”	those	with	dominant	and	subordinate	racial	identities	(p.	296).		
Ford	&	Malaney	(2012),	Ford	(2012),	and	Ford	&	Orlandella	(2015)	use	content	
analysis	of	student	course	documents	to	provide	analysis	on	how	intra	and	intergroup	
dialogue	pedagogy	focused	on	race	and	ethnicity	helps	students	develop	an	understanding	
or	race,	identity,	power	and	privilege,	and	action	taking.	They	use	content	analysis	to	
explore	the	way	students’	learning	and	awareness	develops	and	deepens	in	students’	own	
words.	Content	analysis	allowed	the	researchers	to	discern	changes	in	students’	
perspectives	and	understanding	through	the	course	of	a	semester-long	dialogue.	These	
analyses	provide	an	example	for	how	content	analysis	of	student	papers	can	offer	insight	
into	how	students	unlearn	and	learn	content	related	to	the	very	ways	in	which	students	
relate	to	themselves,	to	members	of	their	social	groups,	and	to	society	at	large.	These	
studies	are	important	in	following	the	quantitative	studies	summarized	at	the	start	of	this	
dissertation	(chapter	one),	studies	that	have	identified	key	outcomes	of	IGD	such	as	
increasing	awareness	and	understanding	of	structural	inequality,	increases	in	critical	
thinking	and	perspective	taking	and	a	decrease	in	prejudice	(Dessel	&	Rogge,	2008).	These	
studies	by	Ford	and	colleagues	contribute	to	a	newer	body	of	research	that	captures	key	
processes	and	student	perspectives	on	learning	through	dialogue.	
Methodology	
	 This	chapter	provides	an	analysis	of	course	writings	from	an	intergroup	dialogue	on	
race	and	ethnicity	(conducted	at	a	private,	predominantly	white,	mid-sized,	research	
institution	in	the	Northeast)	through	a	lens	sharply	focused	on	student	knowledge	
practices,	construction	and	unlearning;	combining	the	literature	and	research	described	in	
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this	and	in	preceding	chapters.	This	chapter	utilizes	analysis	of	student	writing	(Ford	&	
Orlandella,	2015;	Keehn,	2015;	Ford,	2012;	Matias,	2013)	to	animate	the	ways	in	which	
white	students’	epistemic	ignorance	is	surfaced,	unsettled	and	challenged	through	the	
process	of	counter	story	telling	that	occurs	over	the	course	of	an	intergroup	dialogue	on	
race	and	ethnicity.	Education	researchers	utilize	content	analysis	of	student	writing	to	
explore	course-based	learnings	and	insights	(Ford	&	Orlandella,	2015;	Keehn,	2015;	Ford,	
2012;	Matias,	2013).		
	 Qualitative	content	analysis	in	education	includes	the	use	of	document	analysis	(like	
students’	writings),	which	can	be	used	to	understand	themes	in	students’	personal	views	
and	experiences	(Bogdan	&	Biklen,	2007).	Content	analysis	is	useful	in	identifying	trends	
and	patterns	across	documents	(Stemler,	2001).	In	this	study	of	student	course	documents,	
emergent	coding	(Stemler,	2001)	was	utilized	by	the	author	to	develop	codes	based	on	
themes	that	emerged	based	on	a	reading	of	student	papers.	Utilizing	the	process	of	
emergent	coding,	the	author	generated	initial	codes	and	then	re-read	all	of	the	papers	
producing	memos	that	expanded	the	codes	by	focusing	on	themes	across	papers	(Stemler,	
2001;	Bowen,	2009).		
Limitations.	While	such	content	analysis	is	significant,	it	is	also	important	to	name	
limitations	of	the	methodology.	A	limitation	of	this	approach,	content	analysis	of	student	
writing,	may	be	that	students	were	trying	to	please	their	facilitators	(myself	included)	in	
their	papers.	While	this	is	possible,	it	is	clear	in	the	extended	excerpts	provided	(below)	
that	students	share	openly	about	their	difficulties,	their	complex	emotions	(e.g.	confusion,	
anger,	embarrassment),	and	their	struggles	with	the	course	and	the	facilitation.	Students	do	
not	generally	focus	on	their	struggles,	what	they	are	embarrassed	they	did	not	know,	and	
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their	frustration	with	the	instructor,	when	trying	to	impress	their	teacher.	Additionally,	
student	participation	was	requested	two	years	after	the	conclusion	of	their	participation	in	
the	course,	so	participation	in	this	study	was	not	advantageous	in	any	way	in	terms	of	
student	grades	or	relationship	with	the	instructor.	Another	limitation	may	be	researcher	
bias.	I	am	a	white	woman	analyzing	these	papers	written	by	a	diverse	group	of	students.	
This	process	is	consistent	with	Freirean	traditions	in	social	justice	education.	As	Freire	
argued,	all	educators/learners	are	situated	and	grow	because	of	their	critical	reflection	
upon	their	situations	and	their	place	in	those	situations.	Freire	(2009)	wrote,	“Human	
beings	are	because	they	are	in	a	situation.	And	they	will	be	more	the	more	they	not	only	
critically	reflect	upon	their	existence	but	critically	act	upon	it”	(p.	109).	Social	justice	
educators,	including	Tatum	(1992),	critically	reflect	on	their	praxis	through	analyses	of	
their	student	papers.	This	chapter	does	not	argue	that	these	findings	are	generalizable	
across	campuses	at	all	times.	This	is	one	course,	on	one	campus,	at	a	given	socio-political	
moment.		As	such,	this	analysis	creates	a	window	into	student	learning	in	process	–	a	
central	focus	of	the	dissertation.	
Content	analysis	is	often	used	in	combination	with	other	qualitative	research	
methodologies,	like	interviewing;	however,	it	is	not	uncommon	for	it	to	be	used	as	a	stand-
alone	methodology	in	qualitative	studies	(Bowen,	2009).	Specifically,	Ford	&	Orlandella	
(2015)	analyzed	white	student’s	final	papers	in	two	courses,	an	intergroup	dialogue	on	
race	and	ethnicity	and	an	intragroup	dialogue	for	white	students	on	race	and	ethnicity,	to	
explore	how	white	students	develop	an	identity	as	anti-racist	ally.	Ford	(2012)	analyzed	
both	preliminary	and	final	student	papers	in	two	courses,	one	an	intergoup	dialogue	on	
race	and	ethnicity	and	an	intra	group	dialogue	focused	on	white	identity,	to	conduct	a	
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comparative	analysis	of	student	learning.	Keehn	(2015)	analyzed	students’	final	papers	in	a	
social	justice	course	focused	on	race	and	ethnicity.	The	course	Keehn	investigated	focused	
on	racism,	classism,	ableism	and	religious	oppression	to	help	students	develop	the	skills	to	
intervene	and	take	action	for	social	change.	Matias	(2013)	drew	on	experience	as	a	
classroom	teacher	to	develop	a	history	course	focused	on	issues	of	race,	ethnicity	and	social	
identity.	Matias	(2013)	then	analyzed	student	journals	using	critical	race	theory’s	practice	
of	counter-storytelling	(Solorzano,	Ceja,	&	Yosso,	2000)	to	debunk	white	students’	
epistemic	ignorance.	Similar	to	Tatum	(1992),	Matias	analyzed	student	work	
independently,	and	the	current	study	furthers	this	same	approach	in	examining	IGD.	
	 This	chapter’s	content	analysis	of	student	papers	investigates	whether	epistemic	
shifts	can	be	documented	and	described	using	existing	course	design	and	materials	in	an	
intergroup	dialogue	on	race	and	ethnicity	co-facilitated	by	two	doctoral	students	at	a	
private	predominantly	white	research	university	in	the	Northeast.	Whereas	Matias	(2013)	
and	Keehn	(2015)	use	short	excerpts	from	student	papers	to	prompt	counter-storytelling	
and	discussion,	this	paper	uses	longer	excerpts	of	student	papers	to	center	the	students’	
own	thoughts	and	meta-reflections.	This	chapter	starts	with	the	premise	that	the	students’	
thoughts	reveal	not	only	beliefs	but	also	the	stages	of	meta-reflection	and	critical	discovery	
empowered	by	the	dialogic	process.	These	data	analyzed	in	this	chapter	explore	not	only	
students	initial	and	final	papers	to	understand	the	change	in	students’	knowledge	and	
perceptions	over	time	but	also	students’	weekly	journal	writings.	By	including	all	of	
students’	course	writings	over	the	course	of	the	semester,	the	findings	here	demonstrate	
intergroup	dialogue’s	praxis;	they	capture	a	picture	of	students	in	the	process	of	
participating	in	intergroup	dialogue.	Students	return	to	pivotal	moments	in	the	dialogue	
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over	the	course	of	their	semester’s	writing,	so	we	see	not	just	what	they	thought	in	the	start	
and	what	they	think	at	the	end,	but	how	they	are	thinking	through	the	interactions	and	
learnings	throughout	the	course	of	the	semester.		
	 The	papers	analyzed	here	reflect	two	sections	of	Intergroup	Dialogue	on	Race	&	
Ethnicity	that	I	co-facilitated	during	the	2011-2014	academic	years.	My	co-facilitator	
preparation	included	a	graduate	degree	in	education,	graduate	course	work	on	intergroup	
dialogue	research	and	practice,	and	ongoing	participation	in	facilitator	meetings	and	
trainings.	Together,	both	sections	enrolled	an	aggregate	of	15	white	students	(11	women;	4	
men)	and	16	students	of	color	(11	women;	5	men).	Student	participants	varied	across	
academic	grade	level	(2	freshmen,	3	sophomores,	2	juniors,	3	seniors).	The	students	(n=10)	
whose	papers	are	included	in	this	analysis	include	5	white	students	(3	women;	2	men)	and	
5	students	of	color	(3	women;	2	men);	these	students	are	all	traditional	college-aged	(18-
23)	and	self-identify	as	representing	multiple	social	identity	groups	including:	different	
class	years,	different	socio-economic	backgrounds	(e.g.	working,	middle	and	upper),	
sexualities	(e.g.	gay,	bi-sexual),	and	faith	traditions	(e.g.	Jewish,	Christian).		Analysis	of	
papers	focused	on	students’	reflections	on	their	understanding	of	their	racial	and	ethnic	
social	identities	and	the	role	of	social	identities	in	social	structures	and	institutions.				
	 Students	in	this	IRB	approved	analysis	were	recruited	via	email	from	the	author	
(who	was	also	the	course	co-facilitator)	two-three	semesters	after	the	students	completed	
the	course;	15	students	(out	of	27)	emailed17	confirming	their	consent	to	participate.	Of	the	
15	students18	who	responded,	all	of	their	identifying	information	was	stripped	from	their	
papers,	and	they	were	assigned	pseudonyms.	Ten	study	participants	from	the	15	who	
responded	were	chosen	at	random	based	on	social	identity19.	That	is	to	say,	identifying	
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information	was	stripped	so	students	were	labeled	as	their	self-ascribed	identity	and	a	
number.	These	ten	students	were	then	randomly	selected	based	on	self-reported	social	
identity	to	ensure	that	a	particular	identity	group	was	not	over-represented	(hence	5	
students	with	dominant	racial	identities	and	5	students	with	subordinate	racial	identities	
were	selected;	within	each	of	these	groups,	a	3:2	ratio	of	women-men	was	also	
maintained).	The	author	worked	to	ensure	no	one	identity	group	was	over-represented	
because	across	most	institutions	that	offer	intergroup	dialogue	courses,	students	are	
required	to	apply	to	participate	in	the	intergroup	dialogue	courses	to	ensure	that	in	the	
courses	themselves	no	one	identity	group	is	over-represented	(hence	the	make-up	of	the	
courses	described	above,	Gurin	et	al.,	2013);	this	is	an	important	and	intentional	aspect	of	
intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	that	disrupts	demographic	dominance/isolation	prevalent	in	
many	post-secondary	(and	high	school)	classrooms,	and	it	was	important	for	the	author	
that	it	be	represented	in	the	data	analysis.	The	papers	stripped	of	personal	identification	
were	then	loaded	into	a	qualitative	research	software	(Dedoose).	Each	student’s	eight	to	
ten	page	final	papers	and	weekly	two	to	three	page	critical	reflection	papers	(9	per	student;	
90	papers	total)	were	coded	and	analyzed	by	the	author	to	develop	an	understanding	of	
how	students	describe	the	change	in	their	social	understanding,	or	epistemic	resource.	
Memos	were	then	drafted	to	connect	the	emerging	themes	across	student	papers.	
	 Table	4.	below	provides	a	brief	self-identification	from	the	students	who	are	quoted	
or	referenced	(by	other	students)	in	this	paper.	These	identifications	are	not	meant	to	be	
reductive	or	communicate	information	about	the	students	other	than	how	they	self-
identified	relative	to	race	and	ethnicity	during	their	participation	in	the	course	to	help	the	
reader	navigate	the	exchanges	and	reflections	of	students	cited	below.	
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Pseudonym Brief (Self-Identified)Description  Pseudonym Brief (Self-Identified)Description  
Alex white man Jennifer Multiracial (Black & Latina) woman   
Alyssa Dominican, Black woman Kristin white woman 
Brice Black man Lee Asian man  
Carrie white woman Randy white man  
Hannah Black woman Sarah white woman 
 
Table 4. Summary of Student Participants 
Analysis	
	 Building	on	methodology	from	earlier	intergroup	dialogue	research	studies	(Ford,	
2012;	Thomas,	2006),	themes	were	identified	across	journals.	These	themes	are	explored	
using	excerpts	highlighting	each	student’s	individual	voice	and	also	the	dialogue	occurring	
across	students	and	across	semesters.		In	analyzing	students’	papers	for	an	understanding	
of	shifts	in	epistemic	judgments	or	understanding	that	occur	over	the	course	of	a	semester,	
the	over-arching	theme	of	new	knowledge	began	to	emerge.	It	became	clear	that	students	
were	talking	about	new	ways	they	were	perceiving	society	and	their	positionality.	Ford	
(2012)	described	this	development	of	new	knowledge	or	new	awareness	among	white	
students	as	a	“shifting	ideological	script”	(p.	139).	In	Ford’s	(2012)	analysis	of	white	
students’	papers,	she	describes	an	ideological	script	shift	from	“traditional,”	or	consistent	
with	hegemonic	norms,	to	“revisionist,”	which	includes	an	awareness	of	anti-racist	and	ally	
commitments	(p.139).		
	Across	semesters	and	racial	identities,	students	appeared	to	hone	in	on	critical	
moments	that	occurred	during	class	dialogue	over	and	over	again.	The	concept	of	a	critical	
moment	in	dialogue	can	be	found	across	literature	on	dialogue	as	a	social	justice	pedagogy.	
For	example,	Kuby	(2013)	explored	moments	of	emotional	contact	amongst	students	(5	
and	6	year	olds)	participating	in	a	dialogue	on	race;	Arao	&	Clemens	(2013)	look	at	those	
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moments	in	social	justice	dialogue	courses	that	create	“brave	spaces”	where	students	
actively	engage	in	perspective	taking	that	may	cause	them	discomfort.	In	the	analysis	of	
student	writing	discussed	in	this	chapter,	students,	across	social	identity	groups,	discussed	
their	learning	about	whiteness	as	a	social	phenomenon	from	these	critical	moments	in	
dialogue,	and,	unlike	previous	studies,	this	chapter	explores	how	students	reflected	on	
these	moments	throughout	the	course	of	the	semester.	We	see	students’	reflections	not	
only	at	the	end	of	the	semester,	but	throughout	the	semester	as	they	learn	more	content		
and	learn	more	about	the	perspectives	and	views	of	their	classmates.	
Finally,	students	reflected	often	on	how	these	new	knowledges	would	influence	
their	behaviors	moving	forward,	or	dialogue	to	action.	Again,	students’	focus	on	“what	now”	
or	“what	next”	as	a	result	of	participating	in	intergroup	dialogue	is	present	in	findings	from	
other	analysis	of	student	generated	course	writing	(see	for	example	Ford	&	Orlandella,	
2015	and	Ford,	2012).	Across	papers,	the	major	themes	were	coded	as:	critical	moments,	
whiteness	as	a	social	phenomenon,	and	dialogue	to	action.	These	themes	are	described	in	
greater	detail	below.		
New	Knowing:	Critical	Moments	
	 In	analyzing	papers	from	both	semesters,	critical	moments	during	the	dialogues	
emerged	as	catalysts	for	students’	on-going	reflection	and	interpretation.	Interestingly,	
instead	of	applying	the	concepts	they	were	learning	in	class	primarily	to	social	institutions	
in	general	(as	was	anticipated	by	the	co-facilitators),	students	developed	the	habit	of	
applying	weekly	learning	to	actual	incidents	within	the	course;	the	students	began	to	
actively	participate	in	critical	self	and	group	(i.e.	the	class)	reflection.	Three	key	events	
emerged.	The	first	event	was	the	caucus	group	session20	(Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007);	during	this	
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session	in	intergroup	dialogues	on	race,	students	are	separated	along	self-identified	racial	
lines	to	discuss	race	intra-group.	Facilitators	in	this	section	intentionally	ask	white	students	
to	leave	the	classroom	space,	which	geographically	serves	to	hold	the	dialogue,	and	with	
the	white	identified	co-facilitator	occupy	a	new	space	to	discuss	whiteness	while	students	
of	color	remain	in	the	regular	classroom	to	discuss	race	in-group.	During	the	caucus	group,	
both	groups	of	students	reflect	on	their	racial	identit(ies)	in-group.	Students	are	asked	
questions	like:	what	does	your	race	mean	for	you	in	your	daily	life?,	what	makes	you	proud	
of	your	race?,	can	you	describe	a	time	on	campus	your	race	was	salient?		
	 During	the	caucus	group	dialogue	session,	two	students	of	color	made	comments	
that	would	be	returned	to	in	many	dialogue	sessions	and	reflection	papers	hence.	Alyssa21,	
a	Dominican	woman	who	self-identifies	as	Black,	jokingly	said	she	was	glad	that	for	once	it	
was	white	people	who	were	being	inconvenienced,	having	to	leave	a	place,	as	white	
students	left	the	room.	Then,	during	the	caucus	groups	another	student,	a	Black	woman,	
shared	that	some	days	she	wakes	up	hating	white	people;	this	was	shared	with	the	white	
students	during	a	fishbowl.	The	fishbowl,	or	sharing	out	activity,	occurs	during	the	class	
session	following	caucus	groups.	During	the	fishbowl,	the	students	of	color	and	the	white	
students	take	turns	sharing	out	their	discussions	and	experiences	during	the	caucus	group.	
The	student	groups	choose	to	disclose	as	much	or	as	little	of	the	intra-group	dialogue	that	
occurred	as	they	are	collectively	comfortable	sharing.	The	third	catalytic	experience	
followed	the	fish	bowls.	During	this	dialogue	session,	two	students	(a	student	of	color	and	
white	student)	disagreed	on	white	guilt	or,	in	their	words,	the	nature	of	“feeling	bad”	and	
whiteness	during	a	whole	group	dialogue.		
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	 Students	are	quoted	in	long	excerpts	without	any	correction	to	their	writing	to	
honor	the	embodied	and	dynamic	nature	of	their	reflective	process:	students	make	
meaning	while	writing,	and	it	is	important	we	honor	their	epistemic	production.	Citing	
students’	reflections	within	the	context	of	their	longer	excerpts	also	acts	as	a	safeguard	
against	the	author	co-opting	students’	experiences	for	the	purposes	of	developing	a	
particular	narrative.	Additionally,	citing	longer	portion	of	student	writing,	as	was	done	in	
chapter	three,	allows	for	a	richer	analysis	of	shifts	in	students’	thinking.	In	most	research	
on	intergroup	dialogue,	short	quotes	from	students	are	used	to	demonstrate	particular	
outcomes.	The	long	quotes	here	focus	less	on	describing	a	particular	outcome	of	dialogic	
praxis,	and	more	on	exploring	how	students’	ways	of	thinking	and	understandings	change	
through	the	course	of	their	participation	in	an	intergroup	dialogue	on	race	and	ethnicity.	
	 Critical	Moment	1:	Caucus	groups.	Alyssa	recalled	the	following	about	the	caucus	
group	session:	
Till	this	day	one	of	my	favorite	Intergroup	Dialogue	classes	had	to	be	the	caucus	
	 groups.	I	truly	felt	like	it	was	a	turning	point	in	the	class.	It	was	one	of	those	classes	
	 where	not	only	was	the	tension	felt	in	the	class	but	you	can	see	the	discomfort.	It	was	
	 one	of	the	most	honest	and	truly	liberating	moments	all	semester.	It	was	also	one	of	
	 the	biggest	moments	in	which	we	really	explored	the	difference	in	what	it	means	to	be	
	 black	and	white	…When	we	broke	up	in	to	the	groups	I	said,	“yes,	the	people	of	color	
	 stay	back	for	once,	we	don’t	have	to	get	up”.	Granted	that	was	meant	to	be	a	joke	but	I	
	 would	be	lying	if	I	didn’t	think	there	were	some	underlying	truths	to	it.	That	was	one	of	
	 the	first	things	we	discussed	in	our	caucus	groups.	
	
		 The	caucus	group	for	the	people	of	color	felt	more	like	a	“coming	to	Jesus”.	A	“coming	
	 to	Jesus”	is	when	you	get	a	group	of	people	who	usually	share	close	ties	or	relations	
	 and	they	get	off	their	chest	how	they	feel	about	one	another.	Everyone	is	honest	and	no	
	 one	takes	things	personal.	This	is	what	our	caucus	discussion	reminded	me	of.	We	were	
	 brutally	honest	with	one	another	about	the	things	that	bother	us	and	the	different	
	 things	we	have	dealt	with	over	the	years.	It	felt	like	a	sense	of	camaraderie	to	just	sit	
	 around	with	people	who	look	just	like	you	and	say	whatever	you	want….In	the	white	
	 caucus	group	they	spoke	about	race	but	they	danced	and	sugar	coated	around	the	
	 issue	whereas	the	students	of	color	laid	it	out	completely.	We	presented	it	on	a	silver	
	 platter	like	“this	is	what	it	is”.	It	made	me	think	of	the	article	we	read	by	Lena	
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	 Williams.	Williams	wrote:	It's	the	little	things:	Everyday	interactions	that	get	under	
	 the	skin	of	Blacks	and	whites.	The	article	expressed	a	lot	of	the	sentiments	and	stories	
	 that	we	shared	with	one	another	in	the	caucus	group.	When	I	mentioned	it	before	
	 about	how	people	of	color	can	speak	about	race	with	no	apprehension	it	is	because	it	
	 more	often	than	not	stems	from	sitting	around	and	telling	personal	stories.	There	isn’t	
	 a	black	or	brown	child	out	there	that	doesn’t	have	a	testimony	when	it	comes	to	race	
	 that	they	don’t	remember.	Children	remember	everything	especially	the	things	that	
	 open	their	eyes	and	make	them	question	and	look	at	the	world	differently.	Whether	it	
	 be	being	bullied	on	the	playground,	or	the	first	time	they	were	called	a	Nigger	or	being	
	 told	you’re	not	black	or	Latino	enough.	Those	are	things	that	stick	with	them	for	the	
	 rest	of	their	lives.	These	are	the	things	that	we	want	white	people	to	know.	Children	
	 are	being	forced	to	deal	and	grapple	with	race	at	such	a	young	age	that	by	the	time	
	 you’re	a	teenager	you	don’t	have	a	choice	but	to	internalize	and	try	to	make	sense	of	
	 these	things.		
	
Alex,	a	white	man,	shares	the	following	reflection	of	the	white	caucus	group:	
	 The	caucus	group	activity	was	also	very	interesting.	It	was	perhaps	one	of	the	most	
	 frustrating	classes	of	the	year.	It	was	incredibly	difficult	to	have	a	conversation	with	
	 just	white	people	about	race.	The	conversation	kept	swinging	back	to	what	the	other	
	 group	was	talking	about.	It	was	the	least	productive	dialogue	we	had	all	semester.	I	
	 felt	like	I	was	pulling	teeth	trying	to	get	people	to	talk	at	all.	During	the	fishbowl	
	 activity	it	was	even	worse.	We	just	kind	of	stared	at	each	other,	barely	making	any	
	 discussion	at	all.	I	accept	responsibility	for	this	too.	I	was	talking	far	less	in	the	
	 fishbowl	than	in	the	caucus.	This	resulted	in	my	lowest	feelings	toward	the	class	all	a	
	 year.	It	seemed	to	affirm	a	lot	of	the	discussion	about	how	things	will	not	change	
	 regarding	race	relations.	We	thought	we	had	made	progress,	and	the	caucus	showed	
	 us	that	there	is	still	so	much	to	be	done.		
	
Alyssa	and	Alex	describe	two	different	epistemic	experiences.	Alyssa	captures	the	
ways	in	which	in-group	caucus	can	be	empowering	for	students	of	color	because	their	
identities	mobilize	shared	knowledge	resources.	Eloquently,	she	describes	how,	while	of	
course	students	of	color	do	not	have	monolithic	experiences,	the	shared	racial	identity	
marker	means	they	can	express	and	make	intelligible	to	one	another	what	it	means	to	
experience	racism	in	lived	daily	experience.	Experiencing	racism	is	not	about	it	being	“so	
sad”	that	this	still	happens,	but,	more	importantly,	an	awareness	of	repeated	social	
interactions	that	are	unfair	and	commonplace.	Speaking	together	allows	for	a	raising	of	
voices,	a	collective	testimonial	process	that	brings	individuals	who	do	not	know	each	other	
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well	together	as	a	collective.	The	script	is	shifted	from	what	people	of	color	are	the	“victims	
of”	to	what	white	students	cannot	know.	Alyssa	clearly	identifies	that	white	students	are	
not	able	to	discuss	race	with	openness	and	with	clarity	in	respect	to	systems	and	
widespread	analysis.		
Alex,	a	white	man,	is	able	to	identify	this	same	phenomenon	in	the	caucus	group.	We	
hear	his	shock	at	the	inability	of	white	students	to	discuss	race	in-group	by	this	midpoint	in	
the	semester.	He	calls	the	dialogue	the	“least	productive.”	He	acknowledges	his	
responsibility	in	not	moving	the	discussion	forward	and	also	understands,	at	this	point,	
that	white	peoples’	unwillingness	and	inability	to	discuss	race	is	a	barrier	to	social	change.	
While	Alex	cannot	discuss	the	caucus	group	with	a	sense	of	epistemic	empowerment	as	
Alyssa	can,	he	does	demonstrate	an	epistemic	shift:	he	sees	how	whiteness	inhibits	
knowledge	growth.		
Also	thinking	about	the	caucus	group,	Lee22,	an	Asian	man,	expresses	subtle	
awareness	of	dialogic	practice	in	an	early	reflection	paper.	He	shares:	
	 To	reflect	on	the	caucus	group	dialogue	last	time,	I	have	a	mixed	feeling	in	my	head.	
	 One	of	the	feelings	I	had	was	that	how	open	and	expressive	my	group	members	are.	It	
	 almost	looks	like	my	group	members	have	kept	a	lot	of	things	to	themselves.	For	
	 instance,	one	of	my	group	member	claimed	that	she	have	given	up	the	hope	for	white	
	 people	to	understand	them,	which	means	white	people	could	actually	understand	
	 black	people.	I	partially	agree	to	the	fact	that	even	after	the	civil	rights	movement	had	
	 long	past,	white	people	or	people	racially	identify	as	white,	still	have	little	
	 improvement	over	issue	with	their	privileges.	The	reason	I	agree	with	this	is	not	
	 because	I	was	subjected	towards	the	incorrect	judgment	made	by	white	people,	but	
	 from	what	I	heard.	[Summarizes	fellow	classmate	of	color	sharing	she	was	called	a	
	 racial	epithet	on	campus.]	I	was	furious	when	I	heard	the	story	but	relating	to	the	
	 point	my	other	classmate	make	about	she	think	it’s	hopeless	for	white	people	to	
	 understand	black	people,	I	thought	the	same.	No	matter	how	society	as	a	whole	
	 recognize	the	issue	with	race	and	ethnicity,	there	is	always	going	to	be	people	who	still	
	 hold	unfair	view	against	other	race.	The	issue	with	racism	and	privilege	is	never	going	
	 to	be	completely	disappeared.	Although,	unlike	my	classmate	who	was	completely	
	 given	up	hope,	I	still	believed	that	as	long	as	marginal	changes	were	made,	things	will	
	 eventually	become	better.	
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The	caucus	groups	allow	for	students	to	practice	in-group	perspective	taking.	While	Lee	
asserts	he	himself	has	not	experienced	an	incident	where	the	saliency	of	his	race	produced	
a	sense	of	hopelessness	for	social	change,	he	was	able	to	understand	how	his	classmate	
would	feel	this	because	of	his	empathetic	response	to	her	experience	of	racism	on	campus.	
As	a	student,	through	the	caucus	group	and	the	dialogic	practices	of	perspective	taking	and	
empathic	listening,	Lee	was	better	able	to	understand	his	peer’s	position	even	though	it	
was	different	than	his	own	even	during	an	in-group	conversation.		
	 Kristin,	a	white	woman,	also	describes	reflecting	on	the	structure	and	content	of	the	
dialogue	in	her	processing	of	the	white	student	caucus	group.	Kristin	writes:	
When	first	asked	to	break	into	caucus	groups,	I	did	not	understand	what	we	were	
	 doing.	I	completely	did	not	understand	the	question	at	all.	At	first,	I	though	class	was	
	 over,	then	I	thought	[the	facilitator]	was	joking	when	she	asked	for	the	students	who	
	 identified	as	White	to	follow.	It’s	interesting	thinking	back	that	a	request	so	simple	
	 could	go	over	my	head	so	easily.	I	do	not	know	why	I	did	not	grasp	the	concept	of	
	 breaking	into		caucus	groups.	I	may	have	just	not	been	listening.	Part	of	me,	however,	
	 believes	that	I	did	not	think	breaking	off	into	racial	groups	was	fair,	and	I	did	not	know	
	 how	to	respond	to	it.	Looking	back	on	the	caucus	group	exercise,	I	realize	that	talking	
	 with	groups	along	my	racial	and	ethnic	lines	made	me	feel	more	comfortable	when	
	 talking	about	issues	dealing	with	race	and	ethnicity.	
	 	
	 At	first,	I	felt	awkward	when	put	into	the	caucus	group.	I	also	felt	awkward	because	I	
	 wondered	if	our	classmates	who	identified	as	students	of	color	were	offended	that	we	
	 were	separated.	I	did	not	want	them	to	feel	like	I	felt	superior,	or	that	I	felt	like	we	
	 should	be	separated.	I	felt	like	I	noticed	many	different	feelings	expressed	by	my	peers	
	 during	the	caucus	group.	I	think	some	of	them	also	felt	awkward,	while	others	
	 expressed	that	they	felt	more	comfortable	discussing	race	and	ethnicity	issues	with	
	 classmates	with	the	same	race	and	ethnicity	that	they	had.	I	found	this	interesting,	
	 because	that	is	how	I	felt	at	the	beginning	of	the	year.	When	I	first	joined	the	
	 intergroup	dialogue	course,	I	was	uncomfortable	talking	about	race	and	ethnicity	with	
	 people	who	shared	different	races	and	ethnicities	than	my	own.	I	was	worried	I	would	
	 offend	someone.	However,	as	time	passed,	I	realized	that	to	get	the	most	out	of	the	
	 dialogue	I	would	have	to	be	honest	with	my	peers,	and	be	as	comfortable	with	them	as	
	 possible.	I	realize	that	race	and	ethnicity	is	a	very	difficult	topic	to	talk	about,	but	I	feel	
	 that	if	the	people	you	are	discussing	the	issues	with	are	open	to	discussion,	questions	
	 and	understanding,	you	can	learn	a	lot	about	other	groups	of	people.	I	realized	that	
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	 being	white,	it	is	often	hard	to	talk	with	other	races	and	ethnicities	about	their	
	 backgrounds	because	White	people	have	privilege.		
	
	 For	Kristin,	a	white	woman,	reflecting	on	dialogic	practice	and	learning	relative	to	
her	participation	in	the	white	student	caucus	group	was	frustrating;	at	the	heart	of	this	
reflection	is	Kristin	struggling	to	figure	out	and	name	why	the	caucus	group	bothered	her.	
She	shares	that,	at	first,	she	assumed	her	white	co-facilitator	was	playing	some	sort	of	trick	
or	was	up	to	something.	Initially	she	thinks	separating	by	race	and	ethnicity	is	inherently	
unfair;	after	all,	the	focus	of	intergroup	dialogue	is	contact	across	differences.	But	then	she	
puts	the	uneasiness	back	on	herself—“why	am	I	uncomfortable?”	She	realizes	it	is	because	
there	is	a	level	of	comfort	in	discussing	race	and	ethnicity	in-group.	This	realization	comes	
with	some	feelings	of	guilt;	Kristin	wonders	what	the	students	of	color	thought,	what	they	
felt.	This	can	be	a	way	of	her	evaluating	her	own	feelings,	asking	if	her	classmates	of	color	
felt	awkward	or	comfortable	while	admitting	she	did	feel	a	sense	of	comfort.	
	 Lee	and	Kristin’s	reflections	demonstrate	students	thinking	about	how	they	are	
thinking	during	the	course	of	participating	in	intergroup	dialogue	and	specific	moments,	
like	the	caucus	groups.	For	Lee,	perspective	taking	and	empathetic	listening	led	to	a	deeper	
understanding	of	how	dialogue	members	who	share	a	subordinate	racial	identity	might	feel	
differently	than	he	and	share	a	different	(in	this	case	more	pessimistic)	view.	For	Kristin,	
critical	self-awareness	is	helping	her	to	more	deeply	understand	her	own	knee-jerk	
responses;	she	describes	feeling	surprise,	anger,	reticence	and	then	a	degree	of	self-
awareness.	The	ability	to	reflect	critically	on	one’s	own	opinions	and	reactions	are	essential	
for	experiencing	epistemic	shifts.	Both	of	these	students	describe	their	processes	of	critical	
self-reflection.		
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Critical	Moment	2:	Fishbowls.	During	the	fishbowl	activity,	members	of	the	student	of	
color	caucus	group	discussed	a	member	of	their	group	sharing	that	she	sometimes	wakes	
up	hating	white	people.	Hannah,	a	woman	who	identifies	as	Black,	describes	the	
conversation	about	“hating	white	people”	as	follows:	
In	knowing	a	person	it	is	important	to	note	the	similarities	and	dissimilarities,	both	in	
	 characteristics	and	opinions.	From	the	class	the	noticeably	biggest	disagreement	was	
	 about	halfway	through	the	semester	when	[one	of	the	students]	jokingly	stated	that	
	 she	wakes	up	and	hates	white	people.	This	statement	wasn’t	taken	so	heavily	amongst	
	 the	minorities	because	not	only	are	we	accustomed	to	hearing	racially-fueled	jokes,	
	 but	we	understand	the	frustration	that	can	come	from	the	statements	or	actions	a	
	 white	person	does….	However,	for	non-minorities	who	aren’t	accustomed	to	such	jokes,	
	 this	joke	didn’t	go	over	well	at	all.	From	their	perspective,	[she]	was	saying	something	
	 terribly	racist	and	getting	away	with	it	because	she’s	Black.	I	recall	[a	white	woman]	
	 saying	she	felt	that	if	she	herself	had	said	she	wakes	up	every	morning	and	hates	black	
	 people	it	would	be	taken	a	far	different	way.	And	she’s	right.	It	would	have	been	
	 because	there		are	enough	instances	of	whites	being	blatantly	racist,	many	very	public	
	 ones,	that	even	if	a	white	person	is	just	joking	it	will	still	stir	memories	of	all	the	times	
	 white	people	weren’t	joking.	Some	see	this	as	a	terrible	double-standard,	but	I	think	
	 it’s	a	miniscule	exchange	for	the	years	of	oppression	minorities	have	suffered	and	
	 continue	to	in		America.	I	personally	would	take	white	privilege	over	the	ability	to	
	 make	a	black	joke,	any	day.	But	that’s	just	me.		
	
[She]	really	took	one	for	the	team	with	the	joke	because	though	she	said	it,	she	wasn’t	
the	only	minority	thinking	it.	All	the	minorities	laughed	at	it	when	she	said	it	in	front	of	
the	class	and	yet,	the	class	only	credited	her	for	having	these	thoughts.	Not	just	that	
one	day,	either.	The	statement	was	mentioned	two	weeks	after	it	was	said	and	talked	
about	for	a	while.	While	I	feel	[she]	responded	in	a	way	that	didn’t	exactly	bring	more	
understanding,	I	understand	her	being	frustrated	that	people	were	constantly	pointing	
out	how	bad	a	statement	they	felt	it	was.	And	then	after	[she]	had	told	others	“I	don’t	
care”,	[a	white	woman]	said	to	her,	“Oh,	no.	We’re	not	saying	what	you	did	was	bad”.	
But,	in	fact,	that	is	exactly	what	everyone	was	doing…It’s	this	fear	that	whites	have	
that	prevents	them	from	saying	what	is	on	their	mind	and	consequently	that	prevents	
them	from	gaining	understanding	and	enlightenment	on	race-relations.		
	
	 Carrie,	a	white	woman,	reflects	on	the	exchange	and	its	impact	on	the	class:	
	 During	the	other	session	when	we	reflected	on	[the	caucus	groups]	many	classmates	
	 expressed	that	they	wanted	to	hear	more	honesty.	They	felt	that	our	class	needed	to	
	 have	a	break	through	and	be	more	honest	with	one	another.	We	talked	about	how	we	
	 should	not	have	to	worry	about	being	judged	and	that	we	can	ask	each	other	questions	
	 and	that	everyone	has	their	own	opinion.		Before	this	session	we	were	not	fully	honest	
	 with	one	another.	We	talked	about	the	fear	of	making	bold	comments	and	that	we	had	
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	 to	get	over	it	and	trust	one	another.	People	kept	brining	up	the	fact	that	they	really	
	 enjoyed	how	honest	[The	Black	student]	was	when	she	said	that	she	hated	white	
	 people.	Another	disagreement	arose	because	of	this.	[She]	felt	that	everyone	in	the	
	 class	was	picking	on	her	and	angry	for	what	she	said.	She	took	it	the	wrong	way.	Our	
	 class	was	actually	praising	her	for	her	truthfulness.	People	asked	questions	and	
	 reassured	[her]	that	those	were	not	the	intentions.	This	was	huge	for	our	class.	It	was	
	 the	first	time	that	everyone	was	fully	honest	with	one	another…During	this	
	 disagreement	I	learned	that	it	is	okay	to	be	honest	and	to	ask	questions.	I	also	learned	
	 that	certain	disagreements	could	help	bring	out	and	repair	other	conflicts	that	people	
	 never	discussed	before.	
	 	
For	Hannah,	this	incident	reveals	white	students’	propensity	to	see	themselves	as	
individuals	instead	of	members	of	a	social	group.	Because	students	of	color	have	shared	
experiences	of	racialized	oppression,	they	understand	the	feeling	of	“hating	white	people,”	
even	if	this	feeling	is	not	reflective	of	their	general	orientation	towards	white	people.	
However,	white	students	who	see	themselves	as	individuals,	as	“good	whites,”	(Applebaum,	
2010)	are	hurt	by	the	very	notion	that	they	could	be	hated	because	of	their	white	racial	
identity.	White	students	struggle	to	see	this	articulation	of	hate	as	a	socialized	response;	
instead,	perhaps	as	an	enactment	of	white	privilege,	they	perceive	this	form	of	hate	as	an	
interpersonal	emotion	directed	at	them	just	like	racism	is	directed	at	people	of	color.	It	was	
only	after	extended	class-wide	exploration	of	the	statement	that	white	students	were	able	
to	ask	questions	to	uncover	the	social	nature	of	racial	animus.	While	white	students	like	
Carrie	found	this	uncovering	to	be	helpful,	students	of	color	like	Hannah	describe	feeling	a	
sense	of	frustration	at	having	to	explain	this	emotive	response	to	white	students.	This	
conflict	is	not	solely	about	emotion—it	is	about	epistemic	resource.	Because	white	students	
do	not	understand	what	Mills	(1997)	calls	the	normative	function	of	whiteness,	they	cannot	
understand	a	socialized	response	to	whiteness,	they	perceive	primarily	an	affective	
response	to	their	white	skin.	It	is	this	epistemic	cluelessness	that	frustrates	students	of	
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color,	who	clearly	recognize	the	notion	of	animosity	towards	racial	dominance	as	
frustration,	as	a	defense,	a	method	of	coping.		
	 While	it	is	the	case	that	students	of	color	were	better	able	to	understand	and	
contextualize	the	comment,	it	is	not	the	case	that	all	students	of	color	agreed	with	it.	Brice,	
a	Black	man,	reflected	on	the	incident	in	his	weekly	reflection	paper	bridging	it	with	
disagreement	over	“feeling	bad”	that	will	be	discussed	below.	Brice	writes:	
The	one	thing	that	was	said	that	made	me	think	more	about	race	and	ethnicity	is	
	 [the]	statement	that	deep	down	we	(people	of	color)	do	in	some	way	hate	white		people.	
	 Initially	I	wanted	to	say	that	not	all	people	of	color	have	some	sort	of	hatred	towards	
	 white	people,	and	then	others	in	our	group	started	agreeing	with	[it].	I		 perceived	that	
	 amongst	our	group	that	there	was	a	consensus	that	we	all	do	dislike	white	people	in	
	 some	way	or	another.		After	considering	this	statement	in	my	mind	and	reflecting	on	
	 my	life	experiences	and	experiences	with	race	and	ethnicity	I	asked	my	self,	“Is	there	
	 some	part	of	me	deep	down	that	dislikes	or	hates	white	people?”	I	ended		up	expressing	
	 to	the	group	that	I	did	not	and	realized	that	I	disagreed	with	this	notion.	There		was	a	
	 cohesive	sentiment	amongst	the	most	of	the	[people	of	color	caucus]	that	we	all	do	
	 hate	whites	in	some	way.	Due	to	this	overwhelming	consensus	Elizabeth		Martinez’s	
	 statement	that	“The	task	of	building	solidarity	among	people	of	color	promises	to	be	
	 more	necessary	and	difficult	than	ever”	(Martinez,	1995)	might	be	coming	to	fruition.	
	 It	somewhat	astounded	me	that	there	was	an	overall	consensus	of	disliking	whites.	I	
	 have	always	expressed	my	resentment	at	the	system,	white	domination	economically,	
	 politically,	and	socially	but	I	have	never	translated	that	resentment	into	a	dislike	of	
	 white	people.	Perhaps	I	am	naive	in	thinking	that	there	is		not	just	a	common	hatred	
	 amongst	people	of	color	towards	white	people.	I	understand	that	there	is	resentment,	
	 but	the	use	of	the	word	hate	really	got	to	me	and	up	to	now	while	I	am	writing	this	I	
	 am	examining	if	I	have	hatred	towards	white	people.	I	do	not	know	if	I	am	blowing	this	
	 out	of	proportion,	perhaps	studying	rhetoric	leads	me	to	over	analyze.		
	
After	reading	about	how	racism	is	institutionalized	I	feel	that	everyone	has	an	
	 experience	of	institutionalized	racism,	whether	we	benefit	from	it	or	not….I	feel	that	
	 white	privilege	puts	others	at	a	number	of	disadvantages,	from	economic,	and	
	 educational	inequality	to	negative	stereotypes	not	only	does	white	privilege	
	 marginalize	others	it	also	hurts	white	people.	One	aspect	of	white	privilege	that	has	
	 not	often	been	discussed	and	does	not	appear	to	be	a	privilege	is	ignorance	of	racism	
	 and	oppression,	which	often	leads	to	guilt.	White	privilege	is	often	accompanied	by	
	 segregation	and	minimal	experiences	[interracial	interaction]	and	when	racial	
	 oppression	is	realized	by	white	[people,]	guilt	is	followed	by	this	realization		
	
	 Our	caucus	discussed	guilt	and	many	concurred	that	whites	should	feel	guilty	about	
	 their	oppression.	I	agree	that	whites	should	recognize	their	privilege,	but	I	do	not	know	
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	 if	guilt	helps.		
	
Brice	teases	out	numerous	features	of	these	exchanges	including	how	they	are	
interrelated.	Brice	is	able	to	trouble	the	notion	of	hate	as	an	emotion;	instead,	he	articulates	
it	as	a	response	to	institutionalized	inequality.	Since	perspective	taking	is	emphasized	in	
dialogue,	it	is	valuable	to	observe	that	Brice	does	not	only	name	that	institutionalized	
inequality	impacts	those	with	subordinate	identities;	it	also	impacts	those	with	dominant	
identities	because	they	do	not	as	readily	“see”	or	understand	institutionalized	inequality.	
As	philosophers	and	social	theorists	have	long	argued	and	documented,	when	white	people	
are	forced	to	be	aware	of	their	structural	advantages,	cognitive	dissonance	arises	(Fricker,	
2007),	and	white	people	feel	confused	and	often	guilty	about	the	privileges	they	are	newly	
aware	of.	As	a	result	of	intergroup	dialogue,	Brice	is	able	to	describe	white	epistemic	
ignorance,	albeit	with	different	language,	and	to	offer	an	analysis	of	his	classmates’	
emotions	relative	to	this	epistemic	practice.	What’s	more,	he	is	able	to	critique	white	guilt	
as	unproductive	both	epistemically	and	in	terms	of	creating	justice.		
	 Critical	Moment	3:	Perspectives	on	white	guilt.	In	reflecting	on	the	caucus	groups	and	
fishbowls,	two	women	engaged	in	a	disagreement	about	white	students’	emotive	response	
to	awareness	of	inequality.	This	interaction	is	described	by	students	below.		
Carrie,	a	white	woman,	wrote:	
	 [An	Asian	American	and	a	white	woman]	got	into	a	big	disagreement	during	one	of	the	
	 sessions.	It	was	during	the	session	that	occurred	after	our	group	was	split	up	according	
	 to	color.	This	was	a	very	tense	and	emotional	time	for	many	people.	During	this	session	
	 we	did	the	fish	bowl	activity	where	the	white	people	explained	how	guilty	they	felt	
	 being	away	from	the	other	half	of	the	group.	The	people	of	color	explained	they	really	
	 enjoyed	it	and	found	it	humorous	and	fun.	I	think	everyone	became	a	little	tense	during	
	 it,	but	no	one	really	became	honest	until	[they]	began	to	fight.	It	was	a	heated	
	 argument	that	turned	away	from	dialogue	and	into	more	of	a	debate.	The	two	girls	felt	
	 they	had	to	defend	themselves	according	to	their	races	and	ethnicity.	[One	woman]	
	 started	off	by		saying	she	knows	that	she	has	white	privilege	and	feels	guilty	because	of	
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	 it.	This	offended	[Asian	American	student]	because	she	does	not	want	people	to	feel	
	 badly	for	her…Now	I	believe		that	this	disagreement	was	good	for	our	group.	It	was	the	
	 first	time	people	were	honest.	Both	[students]	explained	that	they	resolved	their	
	 problem	after	the	class	and	that	they	hoped	that	other	members	would	have	real	and	
	 honest	dialogue	like	that.		
	
Jennifer,	a	Black	woman,	described	the	same	situation:	
Two	disagreements	come	to	mind	that	we	in	our	sessions	where	I	might	have	come	
	 across	as	silent	but	my	mind	was	running	a	thousand	miles	a	minute.	The	first	was	
	 when	[two	women]	were	having	a	“discussion”	on	white	privilege.	I	think	[the	white	
	 woman]	was	being	really	honest	when	she	said	something	in	the	realms	of	“I	can’t	help	
	 that	I	come	from	a	privileged	background	and	that	I	grew	up	in	a	nice	neighborhood”	
	 and	[the	Asian	American	woman]	got	really	upset	and	offended	then	[the	white	
	 woman]	got	defensive.	As	much	as	I	agreed	with	the	emotions	that	[the	Asian	
	 American	woman]	had	I	give	props	to	[the	white	woman’s]	honesty	and	because	of	this	
	 I	understand	where	she	is	coming	from	now.	It’s	her	comment	that	made	this	learning	
	 community	stronger	in	meaning	and	understanding.		
	
Brice	also	returned	to	this	incident	when	writing	his	final	paper:	
	
One	of	the	most	poignant	moments	of	the	dialogue	came	[during	the	fishbowls],	
	 bordering	on	debate	about	white	privilege.	When	[a	white	student]	said	she	
	 recognized	and	understood	the	significance	of	the	privilege	that	she	had	possessed	in	
	 our	society	due	to	her	being	white,	and	I	thought	this	was	one	of	the	most	courageous	
	 and	honest	things	that	was	said	during	the	entire	course.	This	moment	sticks	out	to	me	
	 because	many	of	the	minority	students	seemed	quick	to	point	out	that	there	is	a	white	
	 privilege…Another	disagreement	among	viewpoints	that	was	a	defining	moment	for	
	 me	was	during	the	caucus	group...Initially	I	wanted	to	say	that	not	all	people	of	color	
	 have	some	sort	of	hatred	towards	white	people,	and	then	others	in	our	group	started	
	 agreeing	with	[that	statement].	I	perceived	that	amongst	our	group	that	there	was	a	
	 consensus	that	we	all	do	dislike	white	people	in	some	way	or	another.		
	
This	was	a	defining	moment	for	me	because	being	around	people	of	color	from	all	
	 different	types	of	ethnicities	I	have	heard	this	statement	before.	I	have	always	
	 understood	this	hatred	because	of	the	way	people	of	color	feel	they	have	been	
	 oppressed	by	white	people,	but	this	was	the	first	time	that	I	accepted	this.	While	I	may	
	 not	feel	this	way	a	lot	of	people	do	and	I	should	not	disregard	this	feeling	no	matter	
	 how	differently	I	feel	because	in	some	ways	this	feeling	is	warranted.		
	
Interestingly,	even	six	weeks	later	in	his	final	paper,	Brice	continues	to	connect	the	
comment	about	hating	white	people	to	the	exchange	about	white	guilt	during	fishbowls.	
Why	are	these	incidents	so	significant	for	these	students?	White	people	rarely	talk	in	
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intergroup	settings	about	race.	People	of	color	rarely	get	to	hear	white	people’s	
perspectives	on	race.	So	the	lacuna	in	the	collective	interpretive	framework	is	built	on	
silence:	students	do	not	know	how	members	of	other	social	groups	make	sense	of	race,	so	
how	can	they	understand	each	other?	For	the	first	time,	these	students	witnessed	a	woman	
of	color	and	a	white	woman	openly	describe	to	each	other	(and	to	the	class)	how	white	
racial	dominance	makes	them	feel.	Students’	silence	represents	an	active	critical	listening.	
The	silence	asks,	“what	does	this	mean?”	What	does	it	mean	for	a	white	woman	to	know	
she	has	privilege,	feel	badly	from	benefitting	from	an	oppressive	system,	and	yet,	at	the	
same	time,	speak	the	words	“it’s	not	my	fault,	I	didn’t	make	the	system.”	What	does	it	mean	
for	a	woman	of	color	to	say,	“save	it,	no	one	wants	your	sorry	here.”	This	paraphrasing	of	
the	silence	represents	a	watershed	moment	for	our	students.		
Engaging	in	this	critical	conversation	allowed	students	to	question	what	whiteness	
means	relative	to	one’s	social	location	and	position	and,	therefore,	what	does	it	mean	for	
them	as	individuals	(white	individuals	and	individual	students	of	color).	Perhaps	this	is	
why	Brice	cannot	separate	the	two	incidents.	Because	understanding	that	some	people	of	
color	feel	actual	hatred	towards	white	people	means	acknowledging	that	whiteness’	
pernicious	operations	of	power	very	much	impact	inter-personal	relationships.	As	much	as	
each	student	wants	to	embody	the	Cartesian	autonomous	self,	it	is	the	case	that	racial	
constructs	matter	in	our	perceptions	of	self	and	other.	These	difficult	interactions	forced	all	
students	to	acknowledge	that	even	within	the	deliberate	and	reflective	space	created	
within	the	intergroup	dialogue	classroom,	social	identity	impacts	their	judgments.	Could	
facilitators	have	assigned	readings	from	philosophy,	social	psychology	and	other	
disciplines	that	name	this?	Of	course.	However,	the	depth	of	learning	would	not	have	been	
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as	deep;	what	these	students	are	describing	is	a	way	to	generate	theory	through	an	analysis	
of	lived	interaction.	Because	of	their	embodied	perceptions	and	emotions	within	the	
dialogue,	students	were	able	to	make	meaning	of	specific	interactions	that	organically	build	
an	understanding	of	epistemic	practice.	
And	still	there	was	a	“third	space”	in	response	to	both	the	comment	about	hate	and	
the	subsequent	exchange	about	guilt.	Lee	reflected:	
To	reflect	upon	the	last	class	session,	there	are	numerous	things	that	came	to	my	
	 mind.	One	particular	was	the	heated	discussion	we	had	after	the	fish	bowl.	It	would	
	 seem	obvious	that	many	people	would	also	reflect	upon	that	event	because	it	was	so	
	 significant.	I	never	had	or	in	a	heated	discussion	with	white	people	before,	not	even	
	 once	had	I	ever	witness	a	group	of	white	people	talking	about	race.	This	experience	
	 is	shocking	to	me	even	though	I’ve	know	these	people	for	almost	two	month	now.	
	 For	instance,	one	of	my	classmates	would	make	jokes	about	how	she	might	someday	
	 just	wake	up	and	hate	white	people…I	still	think	I	understood	the	laughing	point	and	
	 laughed.	My	white	classmates	gave	a	complete	different	response,	which	I	actually	
	 felt	guilty	because	of	their	response.	My	white	classmates	found	that	joke	nowhere	
	 close	to	funny	and	see	no	other	white	people	laughing	as	well.	The	moment	I	heard	
	 about	their	reflection,	I	stopped	laughing	and	a	quick	message	come	through	my	
	 mind:	“Are	you	in	a	position	to	laugh?”	I	asked	myself	this	question	and	I	got	the	
	 answer	which	was	a	“No”.	My	mind	told	me	that	how	could	you	finds	it	fun	when	
	 you	know	nothing	about	the	reason	behind	their	laugher.	I	followed	this	thought	
	 and	come	up	with	the	fact	that	how	would	I	feel	if	someone	would	joke	about	them	
	 waking	up	and	hate	Asians.	
	
	 This	leads	to	my	finishing	thought	of	that	time,	which	I	also	voiced	out	during	class,	
	 is	that	we	must	consider	the	reason	other	say	and	do	thing	before	judging.	For	
	 instance,	the	reason	my	white	peers	were	not	laughing	is	because	they	couldn’t	find	
	 it	fun	because	of	their	skin	is	white.	The	reason	my	black	peers	were	laughing	is	
	 because	they	were	often	oppressed	because	of	their	skin	color.	I	should	realize	that	I	
	 belong	to	neither	one	of	them.	
	
Lee	observes	how	unusual	it	is	for	students	of	color	and	for	white	students	to	discuss	race	
and	ethnicity,	especially	to	openly	engage	in	tense	disagreement.	However,	he	also	
expresses	a	sense	of	puzzlement.	While	he	does	not	identify	as	Black,	he	was	able	to	
immediately	understand	the	sentiment	of	waking	up	and	hating	white	people.	However,	
when	white	students	voiced	not	understanding	the	sentiment	as	either	funny	or	as	an	
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obvious	response	to	oppression,	Lee	pauses	to	thinking	more	complexly	about	
perspectives.	He	realizes	that	because	he	neither	identifies	as	Black	nor	white,	he	in	some	
ways	inhabits	a	third	space.	Practicing	perspective	taking	and	a	shared	experience	of	racial	
subordination	allowed	Lee	to	access	the	sentiment	expressed	and	easily	accessed	by	
students	of	color;	however,	he	was	also	able	to	identify	that	white	students	were	struggling	
with	the	experience	of	being	defined	in	relation	to	their	whiteness.	All	of	the	white	students	
were	implicated	in	“being	hated”	by	being	white.	Lee	can	understand	that	the	white	
students	were	uncomfortable	with	this	in	part	because	of	his	experience	of	racialization	as	
other	otherness,	a	member	of	neither	group.		
	 Lee	is	like	an	archaeologist	excavating	the	layers	of	students’	racialization.	On	the	
thinnest	layer	is	social	etiquette:	students	of	color	and	white	students	rarely	take	up	race	
directly	and	when	they	do	students	tend	to	avoid	conflict.	Intergroup	dialogue	actively	
engages	conflict,	so	the	second	layer	is	an	acceptance	of	shared	in-group	experiences.	These	
are	important	but	can	also	prevent	working	towards	understanding	across	difference	if	
students	cannot	simultaneously	hold	their	sameness	and	difference.	Lee’s	position	as	a	
member	of	the	subordinate	racial	group	but	not	the	specifically	targeted	group	(Black	
students),	allowed	him	to	take	up	the	next	layer	of	perceiving	how	members	of	both	
subordinate	and	dominate	groups	perceive	their	experiences	relative	to	their	racialization.	
Lee	is	offering	an	example	of	how	a	student	can	work	to	hold	and	juggle	multiple	
perspectives	simultaneously.	
New	Knowing:	Whiteness	as	Social	Phenomena	
	 Across	semesters	and	social	identities,	students	articulated	powerfully	their	
evolving	understandings	of	whiteness.	
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	 Kristin,	a	white	woman,	reflected	again	on	the	caucus	groups	session	and	then	the	
subsequent	fishbowl	session	in	one	of	her	weekly	papers:	
	 Sharing	what	we	discussed	as	white	students	in	fishbowls	and	large	group	dialogue	
	 was	very	interesting.	Talking	to	my	peers	about	their	experiences	in	their	own	caucus	
	 groups,	I	realized	that	we	both	had	extremely	different	conversations.	In	my	caucus	
	 group,	we	did	not	really	know	how	to	answer	many	of	the	questions	we	were	asked.	
	 Most	of	the	time,	our	dialogue	with	each	other	and	facilitator	had	awkward	pauses	
	 and	needed	further	probing	before	a	discussion	truly	started.	I	think	that	this	
	 “awkwardness”	happened	because	many	of	those	in	my	caucus	group	are	still	
	 uncomfortable	with	the	issue	of	race	and	the	privilege	we	are	given	as	White	
	 people…The	students	in	the	other	caucus	group	did	not	have	this	“awkwardness”.	
	 Instead,	they	had	a	very	honest,	free-flowing	conversation	about	their	race,	feelings	
	 about	their	race	and	feelings	about	the	class.	After	discussing	with	them	the	
	 differences	between	our	caucus	groups,	they	told	me	we	also	bring	the	“awkwardness”	
	 we	brought	to	our	caucus	group	into	our	class	discussion.	
		
	 I	realized	that	they	are	completely	right.	While	I	love	the	discussion	we	have	in	class,	I	
	 realize	that	my	White	peers	and	myself	hold	back,	afraid	of	offending	the	students	of	
	 color.	However,	isn’t	thinking	that	way	a	little	bit	racist?…	By	holding	back,	we	are	
	 only	hurting	the	benefit	of	ourselves,	and	others	in	the	class.	Not	only	did	their	fishbowl	
	 conversation	make	me	feel	dishonest,	but	it	also	made	me	feel	like	a	coward….	By	not	
	 asking	them	questions	and	giving	my	opinion,	I	am	simply	being	timid	and	not	
	 benefitting	the	group	and	myself.	…After	the	fishbowl	activity,	I	realized	that	simply	
	 being	White	makes	me	a	little	bit	racist.	I’m	not	negative	towards	other	races	and	
	 ethnicities,	but	I	still	feel	uncomfortable	talking	about	the	oppressed	pasts	of	different	
	 races	and	ethnicities	that	my	race	or	ethnicity	may	have	had	a	part	in.	I	feel	like	if	I	
	 was	100%	not-racist,	I	would	not	feel	guilty	when	discussing	oppression.	I	also	learned	
	 that	in	a	class	like	SOC300,	students	of	color	want	White	students	to	be	honest	about	
	 race	and	ethnicity	issues.	Honest	opinions	are	valued,	because	this	is	one	of	the	only	
	 places	that	conversations	like	this	can	be	talked	about	so	freely.		
	
	 Sarah,	a	white	woman,	reflected	in	one	of	her	weekly	papers:		
	 I	believe	that	White	people	cannot	truly	understand	oppression,	racism	and	racist	
	 tendencies	as	well	as	those	who	have	a	history	of	being	targeted	with	racism,	simply	
	 because	being	White	gives	them	privilege	and	power.	Because	of	this	lack	of	
	 experience,	any	racial	tendencies	seem	grandiose	to	White	people.		
	
Returning	to	whiteness	in	her	final	paper,	Sarah	wrote:	
	
Regardless	of	how	little	I	know	about	my	background	and	ethnicity,	the	color	of	my	
	 skin	grants	me	privilege,	power	and	advantages.	No	matter	what	my	potential	
	 background	may	be,	I	look	like	I	am	white.	I	look	like	I	am	an	all	American	girl	with	my	
	 White	complexion,	blonde	hair	and	blue	eyes.	Because	of	my	appearance,	and	history,	I	
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	 have	a	far	more	privileged	life	than	someone	of	color.	Before	SOC300,	I	never	realized	
	 how	privileged	I	really	was,	after	this	class,	I	realized	that	my	life	is	filled	with	
	 advantages	that	myself	and	other	people	with	White	skin	share.		It	is	a	strange	feeling	
	 to	have,	but	often	times	I	would	feel	guilty	in	Intergroup	Dialogue	class.	I	would	feel	
	 guilty	for	a	few	reasons.	I	would	feel	guilty	because	I	had	privilege	when	my	peers	did	
	 not,	and	I	felt	guilty	when	talking	about	personally	being	affected	by	racism,	because	I	
	 never	had.	When	I	felt	this	guilt,	I	would	remember	Beverly	Daniel	Tatum’s	article	
	 when	he	[sic]	stated	“For	White	students,	advantaged	by	racism,	a	heightened	
	 awareness	of	it	often	generates	painful	feelings	of	guilt.”	(1992,	7).	So	while	this	
	 meant	I	was	learning,	I	also	wished	the	feelings	would	go	away.	I	also	learned	that	
	 people	of	color	have	always	known	about	this	privilege	that	they	do	not	have,	and	they	
	 barely		question	it	anymore.	The	privilege	that	White	people	have	is	the	norm	because	
	 of	history	and	the	power	that	White	people	have	granted	themselves.	It	is	not	fair,	but	
	 it	is	a	hard	thing	to	change	after	so	many	years	of	the	same	ways	society	works.	I	
	 personally	do	not	feel	like	this	White	privilege	is	fair.	The	color	of	peoples	skin	should	
	 not	determine	how	many	advantages	they	have	and	how	society	treats	them.	I	feel	like	
	 the	only	way	to	change	the	way	White	people	and	people	of	color	are	viewed	and	
	 treated	is	through	education.	Because	of	this	class,	I	know	now	how	much	privilege	I	
	 have	and	how	unfair	it	is.	If	other	people	were	educated	like	I	have	been,	they	might	
	 want	change	as	well.	
	
	 Alex	chose	to	reflect	on	whiteness	and	being	white	over	and	over	again	in	his	final		
	
paper:	
	
Perhaps	the	most	educational	thing	we	did	this	semester	was	acknowledge	our	
	 identities.	I	think	[another	student]	said	it	best	when	she	said	that	she	never	thought	
	 about	being	white	before	this	class.	She	was	just	white.	I	definitely	understand	what	
	 she	was	saying.	Obviously	I	knew	I	was	white	and	I	understood	the	advantages	that	
	 came	with	it.	However,	I	never	really	thought	about	it	enough	for	it	to	have	an	impact	
	 on	me.…Yet,	still	this	is	a	tough	one	for	me.	Perhaps	it	boils	down	to	the	fact	that	I	am	
	 not	proud	to	be	white.	It’s	not	that	I	am	ashamed	of	being	white.	I	am	not	rejecting	it.	
	 I	just	do	not	identify	with	whiteness	as	something	to	be	proud	of.	It	is	just	my	race.	
	 That	is	how	I	feel	and	I	will	take	ownership	of	that…[During	the	web	of	oppression	
	 activity23]	I	was	not	conscience	of	my	whiteness.	I	was	bored	because	I	did	not	want	to	
	 keep	hearing	these	statistics.	I	was	over	it…I	hesitate	to	criticize	myself	here.	I	did	not	
	 know	what	I	was	doing.	However	this	type	of	thinking	is	dangerous	in	improving	racial	
	 problems.	Just	because	I	did	not	know	what	I	was	doing	does	not	excuse	it.…The	
	 aftermath	of	the	web		of	oppression	was	also	very	educational.	When	no	one	else	
	 matched	my	honesty,	I	felt	like	I	was	left	out	in	the	dust.	I	felt	that	because	I	owned	up	
	 to	feeling	bored	during	the	activity	because	I	was	white	and	no	one	else	did,	that	I	was	
	 going	to	be	vilified.	Moreover	I	was	so	angry	at	my	white	classmates	for	being	
	 dishonest!	In	the	end,	I	am	so	glad	this	happened.	When	you	speak	out	it	is	going	to	be	
	 uncomfortable.	Race	is	uncomfortable.	The	more	I	deal	with	situations	like	this,	the	
	 better	I	will	become	at	dealing	with	them…It	also	relates	to	[the	exchange]	about	how	
	 sometimes	[people	of	color]	wake	up	and	hate	white	people.	Perhaps	I	am	
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	 uncomfortable	with	this	because	I	do	not	like	being	hated!	I	am	trying	to	distance	
	 myself	from	the	problem.	However,	this	is	taking	the	easy	way	out.	In	order	to	make	
	 advances,	we	may	need	to	take	responsibility	as	an	identity,	even	if	it	is	uncomfortable	
	 doing	so.	While	I	may	not	be	acutely	apart	of	these	events,	I	am	a	part	of	the	system	
	 they	have	created,	thus	I	must	hold	some	responsibility	if	we	are	to	change	it.		
	 	
	 Carrie	too	focused	on	whiteness	in	her	final	paper:	
	
I	remember	in	the	beginning	of	the	semester	we	were	asked	to	make	identity	wheels	
	 and	cultural	chests.	I	remember	that	this	task	was	a	very	difficult	one	for	me.	I	came	
	 into	this	class	not	knowing	my	own	identity.	I	did	not	know	how	to	describe	myself	to	
	 other	people	especially	when	it	came	to	discussing	my	race	and	ethnicity.	I	remember	
	 thinking	to	myself	that	I	am	just	a	white	and	Jewish	girl.	I	could	not	figure	out	
	 anything	else	to	add.	My	identity	had	not	been	a	big	part	of	my	life	at	that	point	and	I	
	 just	could	not	figure	anything	out.	I	was	nervous	especially	because	I	knew	that	our	
	 testimonial	assignment	would	be	coming	up	soon.	I	don’t	think	it	was	until	I	heard	the	
	 other	white	Jewish	girls’	testimonials	and	until	we	discussed	white	privilege	that	I	truly	
	 understood	my	own	identity.		
	
Tatum’s	article,	The	Complexity	of	Identity:	Who	Am	I	discusses	how	complex	and	it	is	
	 to	identify	yourself.	Tatum	explains	that	it	is	a	psychological	process	in	order	to	
	 achieve	self-acceptance.	It	took	me	a	very	long	time	to	grasp	the	concept	of	identifying	
	 and	I	definitely	have	come	a	very	long	way.		It	was	a	frustrating	and	draining	process	
	 for	me.	Now	that	I	have	grown	I	am	able	to	explain	my	identity.	I	am	white,	female,	
	 Jewish,	privileged,	and	do	not	suffer	from	oppression.	I	am	from	the	upper-middle	class	
	 and	have	had	a	pretty	decent	life.	I	do	not	have	to	worry	about	disadvantages	that	
	 come	a	long	with	whiteness.	I	now	know	that	people	who	identify	as	a	color	struggle	
	 on	a	daily	basis	with	racism.	I	know	about	my	classmate’s	stories	and	their	lives.	I	have	
	 understanding	of	what	it	feels	like	to	be	a	person	of	color	and	am	educated	about	
	 many	disadvantages.	I	never	knew	any	of	this	until	I	sat	through	our	class	for	3	hours	
	 each	week.	I	would	have	never	had	any	clue	about	other	identities	and	I	would	not	
	 have	been	motivated	to	make	change.	I	am	now	confident	in	my	knowledge	and	
	 hopefully	will	be	able	to	help	other	people	figure	out	his	or	her-own	identities.		
	
Randy,	a	white	man,	wrote	extensively	about	whiteness	in	his	final	paper:	
	
As	was	said	before,	I	was	definitely	nervous	about	taking	an	intergroup	dialogue	class	
	 on	race	and	ethnicity.	Considering	it	is	a	dialogue	based	course	and	the	class	size	
	 would	most	likely	be	small,	I	knew	I	would	have	to	speak	a	lot	and	that	scared	me.	It	
	 scared	me	because	I	did	not	want	to	hurt	anybodies	feelings	and	I	did	not	know	how	to	
	 phrase	some	things	without	being	offensive.	The	last	thing	I	wanted	to	do	was	make	
	 the	class	awkward,	so	I	was	just	a	little	fearful	that	I	would	slip	up	and	alienate	myself	
	 from	the	group…I	knew	I	would	not	truly	learn	anything	unless	I	participated,	so	my	
	 mission	was	not	to	do	that…Part	of	the	process	of	getting	to	know	everyone	so	that	we	
	 could	get	comfortable	with	each	other,	was	actually	getting	to	know	ourselves.	Coming	
	 in	to	this	class,	I	had	very	little	knowledge	or	desire	to	learn	about	my	own	
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	 racial/ethnic	identity.	Growing	up,	my	family’s	ethnicity	was	never	a	talked	about	
	 topic	in	our	home,	unlike	in	many	other	households.	The	extent	of	what	I	knew	about	
	 my	own	ethnicity	was	that	I	had	Italian,	German	and	Irish	blood	in	me,	but	that	was	
	 about	it.	I	had	asked	my	parents	before	for	more	information,	but	they	revealed	to	me	
	 that	they	did	not	know	much	about	their	own	ethnicity	either…Having	white	skin	just	
	 happened	to	be	a	fact	of	life,	and	I	never	paid	much	particular	attention	to	it.	Being	
	 white	never	created	a	problem	or	was	a	disservice	to	me,	so	there	was	never	really	a	
	 reason	to	question	it…As	I	got	further	into	the	class,	the	fact	that	white	people	were	
	 relatively	unaffected	negatively	by	race	quickly	became	a	common	trend….	Another	
	 example	of	people	of	color	being	put	at	a	disadvantage	due	to	their	social	group	was	in	
	 1932	with	the	enactment	of	the	New	Deal.	Franklin	Delano	Roosevelt	created	the	New	
	 Deal	to	help	those	struggling	after	the	Great	Depression	to	get	back	on	their	feet	
	 financially.	However,	the	catch	was	that	only	white	people,	not	people	of	color,	could	
	 reap	its	benefits.	In	effect,	white	people	were	given	the	aid	needed	to	financially	
	 become	a	part	of	middle	class,	while	people	of	color	were	left	to	struggle	on	their	own.	
	 Arguably,	this	can	be	seen	as	a	primary	factor	in	the	reason	why	ghettos	in	cities	are	
	 filled	with	poor	people	of	color	and	the	middle	class	suburbs	outside	of	cities	are	
	 almost	entirely	filled	with	whites.	It	does	not	stop	in	the	past	though,	as	there	are	
	 plenty	of	examples	in	current	times	of	white	privilege	happening.			
	
It	is	not	accidental	that	these	five	examples	of	students	tackling	their	understanding	
of	whiteness	come	from	white	students.	As	one	reads	these	excerpts,	it	is	clear	that	each	
student	is	at	a	different	stage	in	their	identity	development	(Tatum,	1992),	but	more	
importantly,	that	whether	the	students	are	talking	about	whiteness	during	a	weekly	paper	
or	their	final	paper,	they	are	in	process.	They	are	working	through	their	understanding	of	
whiteness,	each	of	them	drawing	from	the	content	or	interactions	they	found	most	
compelling.	Randy,	for	example,	took	an	individualist	standpoint	throughout	phase	one,	
arguing	that	race	might	influence	how	people	think	or	what	they	value,	but	not	how	they	
experience	the	world.	After	reading	the	course	content	in	phase	two,	however,	Randy	
began	a	critical	engagement	with	historical	fact.	Only	through	understanding	the	historical	
and	institutional	practices	of	racial	inequality	did	Randy	began	to	see	whiteness	as	
something	other	than	a	physical	characteristic.	We	see	this	in	his	extensive	focus	on	
historical	constructions	of	racial	inequality	in	his	final	reflection.		
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Kristin	is	expressing	an	understanding	that	racism	is	not	something	that	is	simply	
“out	there,”	but	that	she	too	is	racist	and	practices	racist	behaviors,	like	failing	to	engage	
authentically	with	her	peers	who	identify	as	students	of	color,	to	protect	her	own	
vulnerability	as	a	white	person.	Kristin	also	shares	that	she	feels	guilt	when	actively	
thinking	about	and	having	to	discuss	her	whiteness.	Importantly,	Kristin’s	ability	to	
struggle	with	her	own	whiteness	and	share	that	she	is	struggling	to	own	her	whiteness	is	a	
step	forward	from	not	knowing	how	or	why	she	needs	to	talk	about	her	whiteness.	For	
white	students,	thinking	about	racism	often	begins	with	accepting	that	they	have	a	race	and	
having	a	race	matters.	Kristin	is	talking	about	recognizing	she	is	white,	that	knowing	she	is	
white	in	a	society	that	privileges	whiteness	makes	her	feel	guilty	and	conflicted	and	that	
guilt	makes	her	feel	awkward,	vulnerable.	Further,	she	realizes	safeguarding	her	
vulnerability	by	avoiding	talking	about	race	honestly	or	in	a	way	that	opens	her	up	to	
conflict	with	students	of	color	is	in	and	of	itself	an	act	of	racism;	as	she	admits	to	herself	in	
the	course	of	her	reflection,	she	is	a	racist	white	woman.			
Similarly,	Carrie	is	just	coming	to	understand	and	see	that	people’s	experiences	of	
social	structures	and	systems	differ	dependent	on	social	identity.	She,	further,	is	able	to	
infer	that	these	systemic	practices	mean	something	for	her	personally.	Carrie	begins	to	
perceive	that	she	benefits	from	racial	advantages	specifically	because	others,	her	new	
friends	in	the	class,	experience	disadvantage	because	of	their	racial	identity.	Carrie	is	
starting	to	develop	an	analysis	of	these	emotions	relative	to	systems	of	power	and	her	
participation	in	privilege.		
Alex	and	Sarah	name	the	emotions	that	come	with	an	understanding	of	the	
normative	role	of	whiteness	and	their	participation	in	it.	Additionally,	these	students	also	
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show	an	understanding	of	students	of	color’s	awareness	of	whiteness	all	along.	Both	of	
these	students	perceive	that	what	is	radically	new	knowledge	for	them	was	always	known	
to	students	of	color.	Additionally,	these	students	are	developing	an	analysis	of	their	own	
responsibility	and	need	to	change	behaviors	moving	forward.	
White	students	talked	about	whiteness	as	an	independent	phenomenon,	separated	
from	specific	interactions	or	behaviors.	While	students	of	color	infused	an	understanding	of	
whiteness	in	analysis	of	each	class	dialogue	or	set	of	course	readings,	white	students,	who	
are	coming	to	understand	their	racial	identity	for	the	first	time,	need	to	analyze	whiteness	
qua	whiteness.	For	some	white	students,	participating	in	the	dialogue	course	presented	the	
first	time	they	would	identify	as	a	white	person,	as	someone	who	participates	in	whiteness,	
as	someone	for	whom	race	matters	in	their	daily	perceptions	and	interactions.	Becoming	
aware	of	their	white	epistemic	ignorance	means	taking	the	time	to	understand	whiteness	
so	they	can	unlearn	their	racialized	unknowing	and	misunderstanding.		
New	Behaviors:	From	Dialogue	to	Social	Action	
	 Students	were	asked	to	reflect	in	their	final	papers	about	next	steps	and	what	to	do	
with	the	information	and	practices	they	learned	in	dialogue	moving	forward.	
Carrie	reflected	in	her	final	paper:	
	
I	hope	that	other	people	will	see	the	movie	that	we	made.	I	want	to	share	it	with	the	
	 entire	Central	Campus.	It	is	important	to	educate	the	students	on	segregation	issues	so	
	 they	can	understand	the	impact	of	racism	in	society.	In	the	future	I	hope	that	I	can	
	 encourage	as	many	people	as	possible	to	sign	of	for	the	intergroup	dialogue	class	on	
	 race	and	ethnicity.	I	have	already	begun	to	tell	my	friends	and	family	that	they	are	
	 wrong	for	making	racist	comments	on	many	occasions.	I	have	explained	to	them	that	
	 they	are	oblivious	to	racism.		I	have	even	forwarded	on	many	of	the	articles	that	we	
	 read	for	our	class	to	my	parents	and	friends.	I	want	to	teach	my	children	about	race	
	 and	ethnicity	at	a	very	young	age.	All	I	can	do	is	try.	I	am	motivated	and	I	know	that	I	
	 want	to	see	change.	One	day	I	hope	I	can	express	racism	through	a	powerful	
	 documentary.	Film	is	my	passion	and	is	something	I	have	studied	at	school	for	four	
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	 years.	I	hope	I	can	take	my	skills	and	successfully	send	a	message	to	the	entire	world	
	 and	I	hope	that	I	encourage	change.		
	
Hannah,	a	Black	woman,	reflected	in	her	final	paper:	
	
When	I	signed	up	for	the	class	I	thought	I	knew	all	there	was	to	me.	I	was	a	black	
	 woman.	Sure,	there	were	more	identities	if	I	really	thought	about	it,	but	I	didn’t.	Of	all	
	 the	identities	I	have,	black	and	female	are	the	only	ones	that	put	me	at	a	disadvantages	
	 from	others.	Why	I	focus	on	these	disadvantages	may	be	because	of	the	many	
	 American	history	lessons	I’ve	learned,	I	have	taken	note	that	I	identify	with	the	Blacks	
	 and	women.	But	focusing	on	these	disadvantages	aren’t	so	bad	in	the	sense	that	I	must	
	 be	aware	of	them	first	to	know	how	to	not	let	them	get	in	the	way	of	my	being	a	
	 success.	However,	focusing	on	my	disadvantages	does	take	away	from	my	realizing	
	 that	I	still	am	advantaged	in	terms	of	my	sexuality,	socio-economic	class,	and	ability.	In	
	 looking	at	Fletcher’s	(1999)	examples	of	privileged	and	oppressed	groups	(chart	on	
	 page	97)	I	noticed	that	I	fit	into	far	more	dominant	groups	than	I	do	oppressed.	As	
	 Tatum	(1992)	said	in	her	article,	everyone	has	and	how	in	some	way	everyone	is	
	 dominant.	Especially	with	ability,	I	am	a	part	of	the	vast	majority	of	people	who	do	not	
	 have	a	mental	or	physical	disability	and	forget	that	that	is	actually	a	great	benefit	to	
	 myself.	I	do	wonder	if	those	that	have	the	disadvantages	that	I	do	not	focus	on	theirs	
	 and	also	forget	of	their	advantages.	I	would	imagine	that	we	are	all	guilty	of	it	at	least	
	 a	small	bit.	Now	that	the	class	has	ended	I	still	see	myself	as	a	Black	woman,	but	
	 certainly	do	try	to	remember	that	though	I	have	many	more	identities.	Some	that	put	
	 me	in	a	superior	position	to	others	and	some	that	many	others	share.		
	
Jennifer,	a	Black	woman,	reflected	in	her	final	paper:	
	
	 Moving	forward	after	this	class	I	think	of	Ayvazian	and	“interrupting	this	cycle	of	
	 oppression”.	I	feel	like	I	have	interrupted	my	own	cycle	of	oppression	by	coming	to	
	 terms	of	my	race,	understanding	it	and	embracing	it.	Now	I	want	to	inspire	others	to	
	 do	the	same.	
	
Sarah	reflected	in	her	final	paper:	
	
Now	that	this	class	has	concluded,	I	have	realized	that	I	am	truly	a	tool	that	can	make	
	 change	in	my	community.	Especially	after	working	in	my	ICP	group,	I	realized	that	I	
	 have	good	ideas,	and	that	from	Intergroup	Dialogue,	I	have	not	only	taken	away	
	 dialogue	skills,	but	also	implementation	skills.	The	ICP	project	in	particular	taught	me	
	 a	lot	about	how	I	can	make	a	difference.	It	is	amazing	how	every	person	in	my	
	 Intergroup	Dialogue	class	was	so	inspiring,	and	if	we	all	took	that	inspiration	we	gave	
	 to	ourselves	and	to	others,	we	could	really	make	a	difference	on	the	Central	campus.	
	 By	just	collaborating	in	small	groups,	we	all	came	up	with	achievable	ideas	that	would	
	 educate	others	and	inspire	them	to	think	differently	about	race	and	ethnicity	in	
	 society…Therefore,	if	interventions	are	not	made	in	the	problems	of	society,	they	will	
	 continue.	Just	intervening	can	contribute	to	the	end	of	problem	concerning	race	and	
	 ethnicity.	The	changes	you	make	may	have	an	impact	on	others,	and	at	large,	society	
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	 and	the	community.	I	honestly	feel	that	without	Intergroup	Dialogue,	I	would	not	have	
	 reached	the	point	I	am	at	today	in	learning	about	how	to	be	a	voice	for	social	justice.	I	
	 also	do	not	believe	I	would	be	as	educated	about	issues	involving	race	and	ethnicity.	I	
	 am	not	at	my	full	potential	as	far	as	knowledge	goes	though.	I	can	still	learn	more	
	 about	how	to	be	a	voice	for	social	justice,	and	I	can	still	learn	more	about	issues	in	
	 society.	Through	this	learning,	I	can	learn	how	to	stand	up	for	the	issues	I	care	about	
	 and	ultimately	make	my	community	and	society	a	better	place.	While	the	work	may	
	 never	be	done,	change	can	always	be	made	and	the	changes	that	are	made	can	be	very	
	 rewarding.	
	
Brice	reflected	in	his	final	paper:	
	
	 Informing	others	on	how	to	talk	about	race	is	one	of	the	most	important	things	I	will	
	 be	able	to	take	from	this	class.	As	we	heard	in	the	video	on	the	last	day,	racism	is	not	a	
	 scientific	or	quantitative	entity,	it	something	socially	constructed	and	yet	it	has	had	
	 long	lasting	and	damaging	affects	on	our	society.	I	have	finally	answered	my	question	
	 of	‘What	do	we	do	now?’	And	the	answer	for	me	is	try	to	teach	people	how	to	talk	
	 about	race	in	a	constructive	manner	that	moves	beyond	white	guilt	and	that	seeks	to	
	 bridge	the	racial	divide,	no	matter	how	few	people	we	reach.	
	
	 In	reflecting	on	what	they	want	to	do	with	their	new	knowledge,	each	student,	again,	
describes	a	different	place	both	in	process	and	in	social	location,	but	each	one	expresses	
that	their	new	knowledge	has	impacted	and	changed	their	experience	of	the	world.	Carrie	
talks	about	the	importance	of	what	she	learned	about	campus	segregation	from	working	
with	her	ICP	group.	This	leads	to	a	desire	to	teach	others	and	an	understanding	of	the	
impact	of	social	identity	on	other’s	experiences	of	campus	(society)	and	her	own.	Hannah	
developed	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	her	own	identity.	This	self-understanding	led	
her	to	a	greater	openness	to	others.	Sarah	developed	a	sense	of	empowerment,	a	voice	as	a	
social	justice	change	agent.	Brice	acquired	the	language	with	which	to	describe	his	
experiences	and	his	understanding	of	social	practices.	While	each	student’s	learning	is	
different,	they	all	shared	a	reorientation	of	their	former	worldview.		
Implications	for	Epistemically	Just	Pedagogy		
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	 In	developing	an	analysis	of	student	papers	from	an	understanding	of	Mills	(1997)	
account	of	epistemic	ignorance	and	philosophers’	account	of	epistemic	justice,	this	chapter	
discerns	features	of	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	that	contribute	to	new	knowledge	
practices	among	students	with	subordinate	and	dominant	racial	social	identities.	Firstly,	
through	an	emphasis	on	perspective	taking	and	empathic	communication	coupled	with	an	
engagement	of	interdisciplinary	content,	students	participating	in	intergroup	dialogue	
courses	are	able	to	develop	an	awareness	(or	to	deepen	an	existing	awareness)	of	their	
racial	identity.	This	awareness	in	combination	with	a	structural	analysis	of	inequality	
allows	students,	particularly	white	students,	to	perceive	the	intentional	and	malicious	work	
of	whiteness	in	maintaining	systems	of	disadvantage.	At	the	same	time,	students	with	non-
dominant	identities	are	able	to	center	their	own	epistemic	frameworks	in	a	college	
classroom	at	a	predominantly	white	university;	this	de-centering	of	dominant	frameworks	
challenges	normative	white	epistemic	practices	in	these	classrooms,	on	this	campus,	and	in	
the	larger	interactions	these	students	have	in	the	communities	and	environments	they	
interact	with.		
	 Additionally,	students	across	race	are	able	to	focus	on	their	racial/ethnic	identities	
as	salient	for	the	purposes	of	this	course	while	also	using	an	intersectional	lens	(Hill-
Collins,	2000)	to	analyze	their	identities	and	their	experiences.	Carrie	describes	her	racial	
identity	as	white	but	her	ethnic	identity	as	Jewish.	Hannah	describes	her	race	as	
intersecting	with	her	sexuality,	socio-economic	status	and	her	identity	as	able-bodied.	Both	
students	describe	how	some	of	their	identities	can	be	socially	beneficial	while	others	are	
often	accompanied	by	marginalization.	Importantly,	these	intergroup	dialogue	students	are	
able	to	describe	how	their	multiple	identities	complicate	their	interactions	with	the	world.		
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	 As	described	above,	white	students	are	encouraged	to	develop	a	structural	
awareness	through	contact	with	the	experiences	of	students	of	color	that	are	manifested	in	
classroom	interactions.	It	is	not	“reading	about”	what	happens	to	abstract	‘others’	that	
spurs	white	students	to	pause	and	analyze	their	own	role	in	benefiting	from	and	
reproducing	white	epistemic	practices.	Rather,	it	is	the	interplay,	the	exchange	between	
white	students	and	students	of	color	that	disrupt	previously	unseen	knowledge	practices.	It	
is	because	white	students	dialogued	with	students	of	color	who	directly	questioned	white	
geospatial	privilege	(Alyssa’s	comment	about	white	students	leaving	the	room),	white	
dominance	(the	exchange	about	hating	white	people),	and	white	affective	distancing	
strategies	(the	critique	of	white	guilt)	that	white	students	were	forced	to	consider	their	
own	ways	of	knowing/unknowing.	Handing	undergraduate	students	a	copy	of	the	Racial	
Contract	may	give	them	the	words	“white	epistemic	ignorance,”	but	participation	in	
intergroup	dialogue	facilitates	their	first	person	awareness	of	their	own	location	within	a	
larger	system	they	cannot	help	but	be	part	of.	The	extensive	excerpts	from	student	essays	
in	this	paper	demonstrate	students’	ability	to	describe	knowledge	practices	and	to	unveil	
whiteness	as	a	result	of	dialogue.				
	 Students	like	Carrie,	Sarah	and	Randy	repeatedly	reflect	on	learning	new	content	
(e.g.	institutional	practices	benefit	white	people)	that	leads	to	an	uncovering	or	unlearning	
of	former	assumptions.	Both	Carrie	and	Randy	admitted	to	having	no	idea	that	people	of	
color	experience	institutionalized	discrimination	on	a	daily	basis.	However,	this	new	
knowledge	did	not	just	lead	to	an	understanding,	which	is	powerful	in	and	of	itself,	but,	
more	importantly,	a	gestalt	shift,	a	re-seeing	of	the	world.	Each	white	student	reflected	that	
they	would	no	longer	make	assumptions	about	others’	experiences	or	perspectives	because	
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of	their	experience	in	dialogue.	These	are	the	habits	that	help	individuals	develop	the	
epistemic	tendencies	that	lead	to	testimonial	justice	(Fricker,	2007;	Medina,	2013).	Our	
white	students	are	describing	an	increased	critical	reflective	awareness	that	unsettles	
prejudicial	identity	judgments	in	the	testimonial	exchange.	And,	they’ve	all	expressed	an	
interest	in	sharing	this	knowledge	with	others.	
	 At	that	same	time,	students	of	color	report	a	sense	of	empowerment	as	a	result	of	
dialogue	providing	a	space	within	which	they	could	use	their	voices	to	disrupt	normative	
knowledge	practices.	As	Alyssa’s	epigraphical	quote	(pg.	134)	describes,	white	people	need	
to	change	their	knowledge	habits	in	order	to	change	their	communities.	This	course	
provides	students	of	color	with	the	opportunity	to	speak	back	to	racialized	knowledge	
scripts.	Students	of	color	can	develop	both	counter	narratives,	the	skills	to	express	their	
stories	across	racially	diverse	contexts,	and	the	practice	of	meta-reflection	(i.e.	considering	
what	their	stories	mean,	how	their	stories	related	to	other	students	through	an	
intersectional	lens).	Interestingly,	none	of	our	students	of	color	reported	feeling	forced	into	
the	“teacher”	role.	Students	of	color	decided	when	and	if	to	share	personal	stories	or	
reflections	throughout	the	course	of	the	semester,	and,	owing	to	the	nature	of	dialogic	
engagement,	all	students	used	the	interdisciplinary	readings	as	a	way	of	providing	evidence	
for	their	interpretation	of	society’s	inequalities.		
	 Further,	students	like	Brice	and	Hannah	described	developing	a	deeper	
understanding	of	their	own	identity	through	dialogue	with	their	peers	of	color.	Students	
like	Alyssa	and	Jennifer	demonstrate	a	greater	structural	understanding	and	sense	of	
empowerment	in	terms	of	creating	change	as	a	result	of	their	participation	in	dialogue.	In	
these	ways,	our	students	of	color	are	emboldened	as	resisting	epistemic	agents.	Since	
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dialogue	positions	all	students	as	co-inquirers,	members	of	subjugated	knowledge	
communities	are	able	to	center	their	epistemic	contributions	in	Intergroup	Dialogue	
courses;	it	is	perhaps	this	empowered	position	as	co-inquirer	that	leads	students	of	color	in	
intergroup	dialogue	courses	to	feel	more	like	experts	and	less	like	they	are	burdened	by	the	
assumption	that	it	is	for	them	to	teach	white	students	about	race.	Although,	to	be	sure,	
students	of	color	did	express	frustration	(as	Hannah	did	above)	at	having	to	explain	their	
feelings	for/to	white	students.	These	examples	of	students	of	color	learning	through	
intergroup	dialogue	are	consistent	with	findings	reported	in	the	quantitative	studies	
summarized	earlier	(e.g.,	Gurin	et	al.,	2013).	
	 Finally,	because	Intergroup	Dialogue	courses	are	offered	in	higher	education	
settings,	they	represent	an	institutional	step	towards	epistemic	justice.	Colleges	and	
universities	that	offer	dialogue	courses	are	making	spaces	for	students	to	develop	the	
habits	necessary	for	epistemic	justice	and	to	expand	their	understanding	or	critique	of	the	
shared	dominant	hermeneutic	resources.	While	this	paper	in	no	way	argues	that	providing	
intergroup	dialogue	courses	is	a	means	for	institutions	of	higher	education	to	fully	respond	
to	educational,	economic	and	other	structural	inequalities,	we	can	see	how	pedagogical	
practices	can	be	part	of	an	institutional	response	to	transform	epistemic	injustices	into	
democratic	epistemic	practice.		
Conclusion	
	 As	Rozas	describes:	
	 Intergroup	dialogue	is	both	a	method	and	a	philosophy.	It	reflects	a	larger	dialogic	
	 philosophy	of	education	which	emphasizes	that	reciprocity	and	equal	
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	 representation	are	not	ends	in	themselves,	but	rather,	the	means	of	achieving	
	 mutuality	and/or	a	more	complex	understand	of	self	and	‘other’	(2004,	p.	240).			
It	is	a	pedagogy	that	fosters	empathic	communication,	understanding	and	mutual	
understanding	through	shared	inquiry	(Nagda	&	Gurin,	2007).	It	is	an	open-ended	process	
in	which	participants	develop	meaning	and	ways	of	thinking	through	collaboration	with	
others.	Intergroup	dialogue	is	a	pedagogy	that	can	open	up	a	space	for	transforming	
oppressive	epistemic	practices.		
An	intergroup	dialogue	classroom	is	marked	by	a	curriculum	that	intentionally	
“blends	theory	with	practice	via	structured	interactions	and	activities,	ground	rules	for	
discussion,	small	classroom	sizes,	diverse	groups	of	students,	and	collaborative	projects	for	
students	to	practice	and	implement	new	skills”	(Hopkins	&	Domingue,	2015,	p.	400).	
Consistently	across	studies	students	who	participated	in	Intergroup	dialogue	courses	are	
shown	to	develop	an	increased	development	in	communication	and	cognitive	skills	that	
include:	suspending	judgments,	perspective	taking,	voicing,	working	constructively	with	
conflict,	and	recognizing	social	identities	and	social	oppression	(Hopkins	&	Domingue,	
2015;	Dessel	&	Rogge,	2008).	Through	a	combination	of	exposing	students	to	rich	social	
science	content	and	the	personal	storytelling	of	their	peers,	students	develop	insights	
related	to:	students’	own	unawareness,	systemic	oppression,	and	taking	action	for	social	
change	(Keehn,	2015).	Importantly,	these	intellectual,	social,	and	communicative	
developments	are	shown	by	students	who	are	members	of	both	dominant	and	subordinate	
racial	identy(ies)	groups	(Keehn,	2015).		
This	chapter	contributes	to	the	already	robust	body	of	research	that	explores	the	
impacts	of	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	by	describing	the	new	knowings	students	develop	
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while	navigating	shared	critical	moments	and	while	learning	about	whiteness	as	a	
phenomenon	that	lead	them	to	new	behaviors	that	put	dialogue	into	action.	Students	of	
color	and	white	students	described	feeling	both	empowered	and	disempowered	by	the	
saliency	of	their	racial	identities.	Students	of	color	were	able	to	describe	how	racial	
identities	gave	them	insight	into	shared	social	experiences	with	other	students	of	color,	
while	white	students	described	how	their	white	racial	identity	limited	their	ability	to	
discuss	race	as	more	than	individual	and	instead	as	social	and	structural.	Students	also	
described	the	emotional	awareness	that	they	began	to	share	with	each	other,	tackling	
concerns	like	the	ways	in	which	white	guilt	limits	meaningful	engagement	across	racial	
difference.	White	students	described	how	they	were	coming	to	see	whiteness	as	not	just	an	
individual	“having”	or	“being”	white,	but	rather	as	a	function	of	historical,	social,	and	
structural	engineering	and	practice.	Students	of	color	and	white	students	alike	also	talked	
about	being	agents	of	social	change	and	wanting	to	put	their	new	knowings	into	practice	
moving	forward.		
This	chapter	also	bridged	research	about	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	and	
theorizing	about	epistemic	injustice,	a	notable	contribution	to	both	bodies	of	research.	As	
previously	described	in	great	detail,	Fricker	(2007)	describes	testimonial	justice	as	a	
privileged	hearer	“reliably	succeed(ing)	in	correcting	for	the	influence	of	prejudice	in	her	
credibility	judgments”	(Fricker,	2007,	p.	5).	To	act	against	the	negative	impacts	of	prejudice	
on	a	hearer’s	credibility	judgments,	Fricker	recommends	compensating	degrees	of	
credibility	upwards	during	exchanges	with	interlocutors	who	are	impacted	by	identity	
prejudice.	This	requires	the	hearer	to	practice	corrective	judgments	that	take	into	account	
both	experience	and	critical	reflection.	More	recently	philosophers	have	expanded	on	
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Fricker’s	(2007)	theory	of	epistemic	injustice.	Summarily,	Dotson	(2012)	expands	this	
theory	of	epistemic	justice	and	argues	that	for	privileged	knowers	to	develop	the	habits	of	
knowledge	justice,	they	cannot	only	correct	for	credibility	deficits	that	originate	from	
lacunas	in	the	shared	dominant	hermeneutic	framework,	but	that	they	must	also	seek	out	
marginally	situated	hermeneutic	resources.	Medina	(2013)	contributes	to	theories	of	
epistemic	injustice	and	expands	our	understanding	of	what	is	required	for	justice	further.	
Medina	(2013)	argues	that	epistemic	justice	requires	the	“restructuring	of	habits	and	
affective	structures…it	also	involves	political	action	and	deep	cultural	transformation”	
(Medina,	2013,	p.	76).	Privileged	knowers	must	remain	open	to	engaging	the	perspectives	
of	others	(like	Fricker	(2007)	suggests)	but	they	must	additionally	develop	the	ability	to	
look	at	the	world	through	multiple	differing	perspectives.		
Collectively,	Fricker	(2007),	Dotson	(2012)	and	Medina	(2013)	argue	that	knowers	
who	are	dominantly	situated	must	develop	the	cognitive	and	affective	habits	necessary	to	
correct	for	epistemic	injustice;	specifically,	for	testimonial	injustice	with	the	understanding	
that	testimonial	injustice,	rooted	in	hermeneutical	injustice,	must	necessarily	always	be	
held	in	relation	to,	and	not	wholly	separated	from,	hermeneutic	injustice.	To	this	end,	
collectively,	they	recommend	dominantly	situated	knowers	(1)	correct	for	mistakes	in	their	
credibility	judgments	through	critical	reflection,	(2)	seek	out	new	knowledge	from	
marginally	situated	interpretive	resources,	(3)	restructure	intellectual	habits	and	affective	
structures	while	working	towards	political	action	and	transformation,	and	(4)	develop	the	
ability	to	engage	multiple	perspectives.	As	education	researchers	and	theorists,	we	must	
take	up	philosophers’	analysis	of	epistemic	justice	and	ask	what	this	means	for	teaching	
and	learning.		
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	 When	students	are	challenged	to	critically	engage	issues	of	race	and	ethnicity	across	
race,	students	from	dominant	and	subordinate	social	identy(ies)	groups	develop	a	deeper	
awareness	of	and	understanding	of	the	impacts	of	both	privilege	and	oppression	(Keehn,	
2015;	Linder,	Harris,	Allen,	&	Hurbain,	2015).	This	chapter,	in	theorizing	about	epistemic	
justice	and	research	about	students’	learning	in	the	intergroup	dialogue	classroom,	
demonstrated	that	intergroup	dialogue	students	describe	the	process	of	developing	the	
four	habits	outlined	in	the	paragraph	above.	Dominantly	situated	knowers	who	
participated	in	intergroup	dialogue	courses	on	race	and	ethnicity	described	correcting	for	
mistakes	in	their	judgments	and	thinking	that	were	based	in	dominant	misconceptions	and	
errors.	Students	participating	in	intergroup	dialogues	demonstrate	increased	perspective	
taking	and	empathetic	listening,	learning	from	the	experiences	and	perspectives	of	
students	across	identity	and	power	differences	(Dessel	&	Rogge,	2008).	In	learning	to	learn	
from	and	with	others,	students	in	intergroup	dialogue	courses	have	also	demonstrated	
increased	action	taking	for	social	change	while	learning	the	historical	significance	of	
working	in	collaboration	across	difference	with	the	aim	of	transformation	for	greater	
structural	equity	(Dessel	&	Rogge,	2008).	Finally,	multiple	perspective	taking	is	a	crucial	
discipline	that	intergroup	dialogue	practitioners	try	to	both	teach	and	practice.	Students	
are	encouraged	to	share	their	perspectives	from	across	their	multiple	identities	(e.g.	as	a	
lesbian,	working	class,	white	woman)	and	to	understand	other’s	lived	experiences	in	
relation	to	their	multiple	interlocking	identities.			
	 Owing	to	the	goals	and	demonstrated	outcomes	of	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy,	a	
key	contribution	of	this	chapter	is	demonstrating	that	intergroup	dialogue	provides	a	
model	for	how	curriculum	and	pedagogy	can	be	catalysts	for	individual	students	to	correct	
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for	testimonial	injustice	and	a	motivation	for	students	to	be	catalysts	for	the	structural	
change	necessary	to	address	hermeneutic	injustice.	Students	are	learning	about	their	
unawareness,	developing	understanding,	and	challenging	white	hegemony	and	epistemic	
norms	through	participation	in	intergroup	dialogue	courses.	These	students	are	working	
towards	increased	epistemic	justice.	 	
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Chapter	5	
Discussion	
	
“Education	research	suffers	from	neutrality	sickness”		
--Sonia	Nieto	(2012,	p.1).		
	
“Momma,	you	were	mistaken.	Columbus	wasn’t	a	bad	guy.	He	discovered	the	world	
isn’t	flat.”	My	four-year	old,	Ethan,	recently	came	home	from	school,	and,	with	great	energy,	
told	me	that	I	was	wrong	about	Columbus.	That	day,	he	went	to	music	class	and	his	music	
teacher	(a	white	woman)	taught	them	songs	about	Columbus’	1492	voyage.	When	she	told	
the	class	they	would	be	singing	about	Columbus,	my	four-year	old	raised	his	hand	and	said,	
“But	Columbus	is	a	bad	guy.	We	shouldn’t	sing	about	him.”	The	music	teacher	responded	
that	she	had	never	heard	anyone	call	Columbus	a	bad	guy,	and	that	Columbus	discovered	
the	world	is	round	through	his	voyage.	She	then	proceeded	to	teach	the	class	a	song	about	
Columbus’	ships.	My	spouse	and	I	helped	Ethan	process	his	confusion	at	being	told	he	was	
wrong	when	he	was	not,	and	we	also,	for	the	first	time	as	parents,	had	to	face	his	pain	at	
being	overwhelmed	by	conflicting	information	from	two	sets	of	adults	he	trusts.	If	parents	
don’t	lie	and	teachers	don’t	lie,	what	is	he	supposed	to	think?	How	is	he	supposed	to	know	
what	is	true?	And	if	his	parents	are	right	in	telling	him	that	Columbus	caused	great	harm	to	
innocent	people,	then	why	would	his	teacher	sing	him	a	song	of	celebration?	
Upset,	my	spouse	and	I	e-mailed	the	music	teacher	asking	for	why	Ethan	was	taught	
both	factually	inaccurate	and	culturally	irresponsive	material.	Her	response	was	incredibly	
disappointing	to	us:	
Dear	Ethan’s	mom,	
		
Thank	you	for	your	email.	I	had	never	heard	anyone	describe	Christopher	Columbus	as	
a	“bad	man.”	When	Ethan	expressed	that	point	of	view,	I	replied	that	I	had	never	heard	
that	before	and	that	Columbus	was	celebrated	with	a	holiday	in	his	honor.		I	also	said	
that	he	was	credited	with	discovering	that	the	world	was	round.	I	realize	that	many	
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discoveries	credited	to	Columbus	have	been	proven	false	in	recent	years,	but	this	was	
not	a	history	lesson.	This	discussion	comprised	less	than	one	minute	of	class	time	and	
was	simply	offered	as	background	information	for	the	game	and	song.	
		
We	were	learning	a	song	about	Christopher	Columbus	and	playing	a	game,	that	the	
children	really	love	to	play.	The	song	was	chosen	according	to	musical	standards	for	
his	age	level	and	the	concept	we	are	studying	now	(melody).	We	added	a	game	with	
toy	ships	(Nina,	Pinta,	and	Santa	Maria)	to	make	learning	more	engaging	and	fun.	The	
musical	concepts	in	the	song	reinforce	pitch	matching,	call	and	response,	learning	Sol	
and	Mi	in	the	scale,	and	understanding	that	music	relates	to	our	world	by	expressing	
celebrations	and	historical	events.	
		
I	hope	this	clarifies	the	lesson	today	and	its	intent.		I	have	enjoyed	Ethan	and	hope	that	
he	continues	to	have	fun	learning	music.	
	
We	were	struck,	as	parents	and	as	members	of	our	society,	that	a	veteran	teacher	could	
exist	during	this	day	and	time	and	have	no	idea	that	Columbus	is	responsible	for	genocide	
and	severe	colonial	violence	(Lowen,	2008).	Was	our	four-year	old	really	the	first	person	to	
bring	this	to	her	attention?	How	could	she	care	so	little	when	we	presented	her	with	
information	and	resources	about	Columbus	and	the	harm	of	teaching	cultural	irresponsive	
material	to	simply	respond	by	stating	her	lesson	met	the	“standards”?	I	processed	this	
interaction	with	my	friend	Leslie,	a	Black	mom,	who	is	choosing	to	homeschool	her	sons	
precisely	to	protect	them	from	daily	epistemic	violence	at	school.	Her	response	was	
straight	forward	and	to	the	point:	“Isn’t	this	the	point	of	your	dissertation.	You	need	to	hop	
to	and	finish;	take	the	oxygen	away	from	her	fire.”		
	 I	share	this	story	not	to	claim	we	(my	child	or	me)	experienced	epistemic	injustice.	
To	be	clear,	we	are	upper	middle	class	white	people;	we	did	not	experience	epistemic	harm	
and,	in	fact,	if	anything,	this	story	highlights	our	privilege:	I	do	not	regularly	face	my	child	
being	invalidated,	marginalized,	and	silenced	at	school.	Instead	of	being	an	everyday	
occurrence,	this	was	an	“event,”	that	was	immediately	redressed	by	my	child’s	homeroom	
teacher	and	principal.	This	experience	did	highlight	for	me,	however,	the	everyday	nature	
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in	which	students	of	color	in	classrooms	across	the	country	experience	direct	assaults	on	
their	identities	and	histories.	As	a	parent,	I	could	not	help	but	think	of	Ethan’s	friends	who	
identify	as	Caribbean,	Afro-Caribbean	and	Latina	in	his	class.	Did	they	go	home	singing	
about	the	“Nina,	Pinta	and	Santa	Maria”	too?	Did	they	go	home	talking	to	their	parents	and	
family	members	about	the	“good	guy”	and	celebrated	historical	figure	who	brought	
violence,	plague,	and	genocide	to	some	of	the	very	islands	their	families	identify	as	being	
part	of	their	heritages	and	histories?	How	many	times	a	week	does	this	happen?	How	many	
times	a	week	does	a	teacher—very	likely	a	white,	woman	teacher—laugh	at	a	counter	point	
they	raise	in	class	and	off-handedly	tell	them	they	must	be	mistaken	even	though	they	are	
correct?	How	often	do	their	parents	have	to	face	the	pain	of	a	child	being	given	information	
at	school	that	conflicts	with	what	is	taught	at	home,	valued	in	the	home?	These	questions	
drive	my	desire	to	follow	Leslie’s	advice	and	take	the	oxygen	away	from	education	
practitioners,	researchers	and	theorists	who	fail	to	recognize	the	centrality	of	epistemic	
justice	to	our	roles	as	participants	in	education	institutions;	Leslie’s	advice	is	a	helpful	
description	of	the	goal	of	this	dissertation	and,	in	particular,	this	chapter.	This	chapter	
seeks	to	discuss	the	conclusions	and	highlight	the	contributions	and	applications	of	this	
dissertation	project.	
Discussion	
	
Epistemic	injustice	is	omnipresent	in	the	history,	structures	and	practices	of	education	
in	our	nation.	Marginally	situated	knowers	experience	harm	throughout	their	participation	
in	education	institutions	(pre-K	through	university)	based	on	their	social	identities.	Social	
justice	pedagogies	like	Youth	Participatory	Action	Research	(YPAR)	and	Intergroup	
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Dialogue	(IGD)	pedagogy	offer	specific	strategies	for	creating	pedagogies	and	curricula	
(contents)	that	work	towards	epistemic	justice.	
Epistemic	injustice	can	include	or	be	marked	by	the	following	(described	in	greater	
detail	in	chapter	two):		
• when	a	marginally	situated	person	experiences	a	downgrade	in	her	credibility	due	
to	a	prejudiced	credibility	judgment	on	the	part	of	an	interlocutor;	
• when	a	subject	cannot	make	sense	of	her	experience	due	to	a	lacuna	in	the	shared	
hermeneutical	frame;	
• when	a	subject	understands	her	experience	and	can	communicate	it	in-group	but	
due	to	a	lacuna	in	the	shared	hermeneutical	resource	cannot	share	it	with	the	wider	
community	or	agency;	
• when	dominantly	situated	knowers	refuse	to	acknowledge	the	epistemic	tools	
developed	by	marginally	situated	knowers;	
• is	agential	and	structural	as	socio-political	agencies	(like	juries)	use	deficient	
dominant	hermeneutic	resources	and	fail	to	engage	alternative	epistemic	resources	
at	the	expense	of	marginally	situated	knowers;	
• the	loss	of	knowledge	in	both	dominantly	and	marginally	situated	knowers;	and		
when	excess	credibility	is	bestowed	on	dominantly	situated	knowers.		
Educational	institutions,	structures,	and	actors	contribute	to	and	maintain	epistemic	
injustice.	As	described	in	chapter	three,	marginally	situated	knowers	are	often	unable	to	
fully	benefit	from	education	systems,	leaving	out	their	perspectives	from	the	dominant	
hermeneutical	frame	and	denying	them	the	ability	to	have	greater	ability	and	access	to	
creating	knowledge	with	others	and	in	the	public	sphere	(if	one	is	unable	to	get	a	job	after	
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graduating,	they	have	less	access	to	the	socio-political	and	economic	exchanges	that	are	
necessary	to	participation	in	capitalism-based	democracy).	Marginally	situated	knowers	
are	sometimes,	although	rarely,	encouraged	to	give	voice	to	their	educational	experiences	
(within	the	dominant	framework)	through	pedagogies	like	Youth	Participatory	Action	
Research	(YPAR).	While	YPAR	allows	students	to	generate	public	knowledge	from	their	
perspectives	about	their	educational	experiences,	this	knowledge	is	too	infrequently	taken	
up	by	powerful	education	stakeholders.		
Students	who	experience	the	most	marginalization	and	the	least	benefit	in	education	
systems,	are	often	either	blamed	or	pathologized;	even	though,	some	have	produced	new	
knowledge	about	the	opportunity	gap	structurally	created	in	society	(Torre	&	Fine,	2011).	
These	features	of	students’	education	experiences	meet	the	criteria	described	above	for	
epistemic	injustice.	Students	who	experience	structural	inequality	in	education	may	not	be	
able	to	make	sense	of	or	make	intelligible	the	ways	that	they	are	marginalized	and	made	
unable	to	thrive	in	educational	settings;	the	marginally	situated	students	who	are	able	to	
make	sense	of	their	educational	experience	are	rarely	able	to	articulate	it	to	the	wider	
public	and	to	educational	agents.	Dominantly	situated	students	are	harmed	too.	Few	will	
learn	about	the	mechanisms	they	personally	use	and	that	are	reproduced	socially	to	protect	
them	from	their	privileges;	many	will	experience	inflated	credibility	judgments	that	will	
prevent	them	from	authentically	participating	in	knowledge	production,	and	few	will	learn	
how	to	develop	a	kaleidoscopic	consciousness	(Medina,	2013).	
Chapter	three	of	this	dissertation	described	both	YPAR	and	a	YPAR/IGD	fusion	and	
chapter	four	of	this	dissertation	offered	a	description	of	intergroup	dialogue	(IGD)	as	
particular	types	of	social	justice	pedagogy	that	can	address	epistemic	injustice	within	the	
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contexts	of	student	participants	and	through	the	structure	of	institutional	course	offerings.	
Specifically,	participating	in	intergroup	dialogue	courses	helps	students	to	develop	
increased	perspective	taking	and	a	more	pluralistic	worldview,	increased	critical	
consciousness	and	analytical	skills,	increased	ability	to	practice	empathy	and	to	engage	
conflict	meaningfully	and	a	greater	desire	to	participate	in	action	for	social	change.	These	
skills	are	necessary	for	students	to	engage	perspectives	other	than	their	own,	expand	their	
hermeneutic	framework	and	to	take	a	kaleidoscopic	worldview.	In	other	words,	intergroup	
dialogue	puts	into	place	the	practices	philosophers	recommend	for	developing	
epistemically	just	knowledge	practices.		
Moving	forward,	exciting	research	and	theoretical	opportunities	exist	for	exploring		the	
relationship	between	intergroup	dialogue	and	epistemic	justice.	In	particular,	it	would	be	
productive	to	further	explore	the	role	and	impact	of	writing	in	intergroup	dialogue	courses:	
specifically,	what	is	the	role	and	impact	of	critical,	reflective	writing	in	the	outcomes	
studied	to	date.	Additionally,	an	epistemic	justice	lens	can	be	used	to	explore	and	shine	a	
light	on	action	and	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy.	Each	semester,	students	participating	in	
intergroup	dialogue	courses	work	together	across	difference	to	develop	and	implement	an	
action	project.	What	do	these	collaborations—their	goals,	approach,	execution,	and	
outcomes—reveal	about	action	taking	as	part	of	intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	and	
epistemic	justice?	Further,	do	students	remain	engaged	in	action	taking	and	how	so?	There	
is	work	addressing	student	action	taking	as	a	result	of	participating	in	intergroup	dialogue	
(Ford,	2017),	but	more	investigation	would	be	beneficial,	particularly	research	focused	on	
continued	student	action	and	work	towards	greater	epistemic	justice.		
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Contributions:	We	Know,	Now	What?	
	
	 Intergroup	dialogue	practice	and	research	are	robustly	interdisciplinary.	Both	
seriously	take	up	the	epistemic	development	and	shifts	of	participating	students.	This	
dissertation	specifically	connects	research	in	the	field	of	intergroup	dialogue	to	theorizing	
in	the	philosophical	field	of	epistemic	injustice.	Philosophers	have	earnestly	taken	up	the	
work	of	epistemic	injustice	over	the	last	decade;	however,	there	is	still	much	work	to	be	
done	in	centering	this	theorizing	in	the	field	of	education	both	in	terms	of	theory	and	
practice.	This	section	offers	a	brief	review	of	how	philosophers	have	applied	theories	of	
epistemic	injustice	to	education,	and	it	then	describes	how	this	dissertation	encourages	
education	stake	holders	to	take	up	the	call	to	work	towards	epistemic	justice	in	education.		
	 Robertson	(2013)	engages	Fricker’s	(2007)	account	of	epistemic	injustice	when	
arguing	for	the	epistemic	value	of	diversity.	Robertson	(2013)	observes	that	diversity	is	
important	among	education	researchers	because,	“Members	of	marginalized	groups	may	
discover	that	the	problems	that	concern	them	about	the	phenomenon	in	question	are	not	
represented	in	the	research”	which	can	result	in	hermeneutic	injustice	(p.	302).	
Additionally,	if	knowledge,	in	this	case	is	generated	predominantly	by	people	who	are	
members	of	the	dominantly	situated	group,	it	may	be	“biased	in	the	sense	of	giving	an	
incomplete	picture	of	the	domain	of	study,	one	biased	toward	the	interests	and	experiences	
of	the	dominant	group”	(Robertson,	2013,	p.	302).	Again,	the	incomplete	picture	that	
results	from	biased	knowledge	making	can	result	in	hermeneutic	injustice	in	education.		
	 Frank	(2013)	argues	that	it	is	important	to	move	from	the	language	of	epistemic	
diversity	to	the	language	of	epistemic	injustice	in	education	research	and	analysis.	Frank	
begins	with	Fricker’s	(2007)	observations	that	marginalized	groups	usually	have	different	
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perspective	systems	than	those	who	are	in	positions	of	power	in	those	systems	and	that	
those	very	marginally	situated	perspectives	may	likely	be	invisible	to	those	with	power	
(Frank,	2013).	Frank	realizes	the	role	of	power	in	knowledge	making	can	be	dangerous	
concluding,	“We	silence	large	segments	of	the	community	of	knowers	of	which	we	are	all	a	
part	of	at	our	own	peril.	The	truth	of	our	social	world	will	elude	us	until	we	learn	what	is	
means	to	hear	across	the	social	spectrum”	(Frank,	2013,	p.	365).	The	way	Frank	(2013)	
takes	up	Fricker’s	(2007)	account	of	epistemic	injustice	is	important	because	it	places	“the	
problem”	not	on	subordinately	situated	knowers	but	on	dominantly	situated	knowers.	
Frank	argues	that	dominantly	situated	educational	researchers	must	discuss	testimonial	
injustice	and	be	aware	of	their	own	subjectivity,	the	difficulties	of	listening	and	the	need	to	
listen	across	difference.	Interestingly,	he	argues	that	graduate	researchers	in	education	
need	to	apply	the	lens	of	epistemic	injustice	to	existing	bodies	of	education	research,	
questioning	whose	perspectives	are	privileged	in	existing	research	and	why.	Significantly,	
Frank	(2013)	asks:	
	 Can	the	process	of	learning	to	become	an	educational	researcher	include	more	
	 opportunities	to	support	the	development	of	resources	within	the	communities	
	 outside	of	the	academy;	can	it	teach	future	researchers	to	trust	the	individuals	
	 developing	these	resources,	even	if	they	work	outside	of	the	academy;	can	it	teach	
	 future	researchers	to	take	a	serious	interest	in	learning	what	is	means	to	use	those	
	 resources?	If	we	see	epistemic	injustice	as	a	threat	that	can	keep	us	from	ever	
	 achieving	a	true	picture	of	our	social	world,	then	we	might	be	able	to	seriously	
	 engage	these	types	of	questions	and,	in	the	process,	rethink	how	educational	
	 researchers	are	educated	(p.	369).	
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While	Frank’s	(2013)	primary	concern	is	truth	and	understanding	our	social	world	and	
mine	is	justice	and	accountability	for	the	harm	epistemic	injustice	in	education	does	to	
marginally	situated	knowers,	Frank’s	concluding	call	to	take	up	epistemic	injustice	in	
education	is	incredibly	important	for	this	dissertation.	In	chapter	three,	I	offered	examples	
of	youth	participatory	action	projects	that	developed	knowledge	from	marginally	situated	
perspectives	outside	of	the	academic	but	in	collaboration	with	invested	academics.	Using	
examples	from	across	the	country	and	from	my	own	collaborative	work	in	the	Northeast,	I	
provided	an	account	in	this	dissertation	of	the	type	of	graduate	education	training	and	the	
type	of	academic	practices	that	seriously	take	up	learning	from	and	centering	non-
dominant	perspectives.	Similarly,	in	chapter	four,	I	provided	an	example	of	intergroup	
dialogue	in	the	college	setting	that	seriously	engages	the	perspectives	of	non-dominant	
students	while	providing	an	account	of	how	dominantly	situated	knowers	can	learn	how	to	
identify	their	privileged	ways	of	knowing;	in	this	chapter,	students	described	developing	
the	practices	for	coming	to	know	how	to	listen	and	engage	with	other	knowers	across	
differences	of	power	and	social	experiences.		
	 Kotzee	(2013)	also	focuses	on	the	epistemic	implications	of	epistemic	injustice	
(more	so	than	the	justice	implications).	Kotzee	(2013)	summarizes	that	justice	in	
knowledge	making	is	not	for	everyone	to	have	equal	knowledge	or	to	have	a	given	right	to	
express	their	view	and	have	it	taken	seriously;	instead,	he	argues	that	justice	is	to	have	
one’s	testimony	“measured	by	epistemic	or	logical	standards	of	credibility”	(p.	344).	He	
then	observes	that	hermeneutic	injustice	is	when	a	group	experiences	disadvantage	in	
terms	of	communicating	the	disadvantages	they	suffer.	Kotzee	(2013)	then	states	that	in	
education	we	can	apply	our	understanding	of	testimonial	injustice	by	acknowledging	what	
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the	“powerless”	(Kotzee’s	use	of	powerless	instead	of	non-dominantly	situated	seems	to	
take	up	a	deficit	perspective	of	knowers	and	traps	them	in	a	position	that	is	defined	by	the	
absence	of	power	instead	of	in	the	presence	of	structural	inequality)	know.	For	education	
to	address	this	and	to	take	up	the	issue	of	non-dominantly	situated	knowers	knowing	and	
knowledge	making,	Kotzee	(2013)	recommends	a	minimum	level	of	education	that	“must	
place	one	in	a	position	to	function	as	a	useful	contributor	to	knowledge	sharing	in	society”	
(p.	348).			
	 Growing	from	and	contributing	to	this	body	of	literature	theorizing	about	education	
and	epistemic	injustice,	this	dissertation	argues	that	(1)	epistemic	injustice	cannot	be	
delinked	from	issues	concerning	how	power	operates	in	education	settings	(as	a	proxy	for	
how	power	operates	at	large	in	our	society),	and	(2)	education	stakeholders	must	consider	
responsibility	for	epistemic	justice	to	be	inherent	in	their	role.	Firstly,	we	cannot	ever	
forget	about	what	Ladson-Billings	(2006)	calls	the	education	debt.	We	cannot	fully	discuss	
educations’	role	and	responsibility	in	terms	of	thinking	about	epistemic	in/justice	without	
considering	the	ways	in	which	education	has	reproduced	and	maintained	inequality	
broadly	and	specific	to	knowledge	making.	At	no	time	in	this	nation’s	history	have	schools	
been	inclusive	sites	of	knowledge	making	and	sharing.	Schools	have	always	excluded	and	
marginalized	students	and	the	epistemic	contributions	of	marginally	situated	knowers	
(Outlaw,	2007).	This	matters—especially	when	we	fully	consider	the	structural	and	system	
nature	of	hermeneutic	injustice.		
Kotzee	(2017)	focuses	on	if	or	how	we	know	epistemic	injustice	exists	in	education.	
Problematically,	he	is	the	only	philosopher	of	education	in	the	recently	published	Routledge	
Handbook	of	Epistemic	Injustice	(2017),	and	he	wrote	the	only	chapter	on	education	and	
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epistemic	injustice.	In	so	far	as	a	major	publication	represents	the	“state	of	the	discipline,”	
we	must	shift	the	focus	to	what	education	stakeholders	and	institutions	must	do	to	work	
towards	epistemic	justice.	Kotzee’s	(2017)	case	study	of	epistemic	injustice	and	education	
illustrates	the	need	for	philosophers	of	education,	specifically,	to	engage	more	deeply	with	
theorizing	about	epistemic	justice.	For	example,	when	arguing	we	must	differentiate	
between	“uneducatedness”	and	hermeneutic	injustice,	Kotzee	(2017)	relies	on	a	dangerous	
false	equivalence	while	disregarding	the	theorizing	of	philosophers	of	color	working	in	the	
field	of	epistemic	injustice	(see	for	example	Dotson,	2012	and	Medina,	2013	more	fully	
described	in	chapter	two).	Kotzee	(2017)	asks	whether	“all	learners’	experiences	deserve	
the	possibility	of	articulation…Would	we	demand	of	the	teacher	of	the	white	male	skinhead	
who	despises	immigrants	that	she	makes	available	to	him	the	conceptual	resources	or	
argumentative	space	to	articulate	his	views	better?”	(p.	332).	This	question	and	example	
are	very	problematic	applications	of	epistemic	injustice	to	education.	Neither	Fricker	
(2007)	or	other	philosophers	focused	on	epistemic	injustice	(Pohlhaus,	2012;	Mason,	2011;	
Medina,	2013;	Alcoff,	2010)	have	argued	that	all	learners’	experiences	should	be	
articulated	in	the	classroom	or	otherwise.	Indeed,	philosophers	of	education	have	long	
discussed	the	politics	and	ethics	of	permitting	or	silencing	hateful	speech	in	the	classroom	
(see	for	example	Applebaum,	2014;	Sensoy	&	DiAngelo,	2014).	Rather,	those	focused	on	
epistemic	injustice	are	concerned	with	the	experiences	of	those	who	are	structurally	
subordinated	based	on	their	social	identities.	So,	when	Kotzee	(2017)	says	we	need	some	
criteria	for	discerning	if	someone	is	experiencing	a	hermeneutical	injustice	or	simply	a	lack	
of	education,	it	seems	like	he	is	not	fulling	engaging	power;	the	criteria	for	understanding	
whether	or	not	someone	or	some	group	is	experiencing	a	hermeneutical	injustice	is	to	ask	
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if	there	is	a	structural	dynamic	involved	in	the	naming—or	inability	to	name—what	they	
are	trying	to	say,	express	or	do.		
A	white	skinhead	does	not	have	his	views,	experiences	or	perspectives	structurally	
subordinated.	A	skinhead	does	not	lose	knowledge	when	he	is	not	permitted	to	share	his	
perspective.	A	Latina	student	(like	the	one	described	in	the	vignette	in	chapter	four)	who	
must	write	an	article	about	a	Latino	thief	even	after	raising	concerns	about	pernicious	
racial	profiling	is	silenced,	is	stopped	from	sharing	a	perspective	on	crime,	racism	in	the	
media,	and	her	academic	experience.	What	is	more,	the	skinhead	does	not	simply	present	
the	possibility	of	epistemic	violence	as	does	speech	that	supports	and	is	rooted	in	white	
supremacy;	the	skinhead	represents	the	call	for	physical	violence,	physical	violence	that	is	
to	be	endorsed	and	carried	about	by	the	state	(Heim,	2017).	When	skinheads	call	for	the	
death	of	Black	people,	for	Jews	to	“not	replace	us,”	and	for	“blood	and	soil”	(an	appeal	to	
Nazism),	that	skinhead	is	actively	threatening	the	lives,	calling	for	the	death,	of	particular	
groups	of	people	and	calling	on	the	state	to	be	the	agent	of	said	violence.	One	cannot	walk	
on	a	plane	and	call	for	the	death	of	Black	people	or	Jewish	people	without	being	forcibly	
removed	and	arrested,	why	should	one	be	able	to	do	so	in	a	classroom?	He	should	not	as	
there	is	a	clear	difference	between	the	threat	of	physical	violence	and	the	threat	of	
epistemic	violence.		
To	be	clear,	I	do	not	make	this	case	to	minimize	the	harm	of	epistemic	violence;	I	
understand	and	honor	the	harm	that	can	be	done	in	both	a	classroom	and	to	individual	
students	when	a	dominantly	situated	knower	shares	hateful	perspectives	in	the	classroom.	
However,	as	a	social	justice	educator,	I	understand	that	it	is	possible	to	engage	perspectives	
like,	“General	Lee	was	a	hero”	or	“immigration	is	a	safety	concern	of	mine”	in	the	classroom	
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in	ways	that	are	critical,	reveal	misconceptions,	and	speak	truth	to	power.	Engaging	hateful	
perspectives	can	be	informative	if	not	transformative	in	the	classroom.	But,	again,	in	doing	
so	educators	must	take	up	issues	of	power,	center	fact	over	misconception	and	bridge	
misconception/bias	and	understanding.		
Additionally,	we	must	be	wary	of	latent	paternalistic	assumptions	in	regard	to	
correcting	for	hermeneutic	injustice.	Kotzee	(2017)	asserts	that	those	genuinely	
experiencing	hermeneutic	injustice	need	“to	be	helped	to	express	their	point	of	view”	(p.	
332).	While	indeed	facilitators	and	teachers	do	and	must	help	students	express	their	points	
of	view,	we	should	take	great	care	to	not	assume	that	students	are	not	aware	of	and	cannot	
express	their	point	of	views.	Rather,	it	is	imperative	that	we	be	attentive,	again,	to	power:	
Are	students	welcomed	to	share	their	perspectives?		Do	students	experience	validation	
when	they	share	their	perspectives?	Are	students’	perspectives	seriously	engaged	by	
teachers,	administrators	and	dominantly	situated	students?	For	example,	the	students	
participating	in	Spotlighting	Justice	were	incredibly	specific	(yes,	within	the	scope	of	being	
introduced	to	interdisciplinary	texts	focused	on	identity	and	structural	inequality)	about	
the	types	of	dynamics	existing	in	their	school	that	were	harming	them.	They	could	name	
that	not	learning	about	Black	history	and	contributions	in	our	society	was	disaffirming	and	
lessening	the	quality	and	value	of	their	education.	Facilitators	engaged	students	in	critical	
inquiry	and	in	navigating	relationships	with	administrators,	but	students	generated	the	
ideas	based	on	their	shared	experiences	of	marginalization	within	their	school.	Pedagogies	
like	intergroup	dialogue	and	YPAR	are	so	important	precisely	because	they	engage	
students	in	content	and	processes	that	allow	students	to	find	the	spaces	and	the	intellectual	
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products	that	allow	them	to	reach	multiple	audiences,	especially	those	outside	of	their	
salient	identity	groups.		
Kotzee	(2013),	also	questions	how	those	concerned	with	epistemic	injustice	and	
education	can	change	the	epistemic	social	imaginary	“without	dishonesty”	(p.	332).	Is	
dishonesty	an	issue	when	considering	all	the	ways	the	education	system	routinely	benefits	
white	students	and	high-income	students	while	students	of	color	and	low-income	students	
do	not	benefit?	Is	using	data	to	show	disparity	in	treatment—take	for	example,	the	medical	
field,	where	people	of	color	are	provided	less	pain	medication	than	their	white	
counterparts	due	to	practitioners	being	less	receptive	to	people	of	color’s	expressions	of	
pain	(Chapman,	Kaatz,	Carnes,	2013)—not	important	in	the	school	of	medicine?	Perhaps	
Kotzee	is	not	thinking	about	information	for	which	there	is	connecting	social	science	data	
(although	it	is	hard	for	me	to	think	of	an	example)	when	he	asks,	“Is	treating	the	views	of	
members	of	the	non-dominant	culture	with	kid	gloves	(i.e.	too	generously)	not	itself	
unjust?”	(2013,	p.	332).	At	face	value,	his	question	is	not	totally	problematic.	Of	course	
failing	to	engage	a	student	of	color	as	intelligent	and	capable	interlocutor	is	a	problem	and	
a	fine	example	of	precisely	the	type	of	poor	teaching	that	marginalizes	non-dominantly	
situated	people	as	knowers.	Philosophers	like	Medina	(2013)	and	intergroup	dialogue	and	
YPAR	practitioners	are	not	calling	on	any	teachers	to	offer	students	of	color	disingenuous	
praise.		
Rather,	what	is	called	for	is	not	structurally	concealing	the	experiences	of	non-
dominant	people.	Again,	let	us	take	the	medical	classroom	as	an	example.	No	one	is	arguing	
that	medical	students—or	students	of	history	in	general—should	not	be	taught	that	J.	
Marion	Sims	invented	gynecological	surgery;	instead,	people	of	color	argue	teaching	about	
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Sims,	glorifying	his	achievements,	without	simultaneously	critically	engaging	his	inhumane	
and	unethical	experimentation	on	slaves	is	unjust	and	does	an	epistemic	harm	(Wall,	
2006).	When	the	brutal	experiences	of	Black	women,	slaves,	are	“left	out”	of	conversations	
about	the	birth	of	gynecological	surgery,	the	shared	experiences	of	Black	women	are	
perniciously	obscured	in	the	shared	social	imaginary.	The	legacy	of	Black	people,	especially	
Black	women	who	to	this	day	experience	the	highest	mortality	rates	during	child	birth	in	
our	country	(Martin	&	Montagne,	2017),	being	harmed	or	experimented	on	in	medicine	is	
important;	it	has	value	when	we	try	to	understand	current	public	health	crises	like	the	high	
rate	of	infant	mortality	inflicting	the	Black	community	(Carpenter,	2017).	Black	women	
were	brutally	used	and	injured	in	the	research	that	made	possible	current	day	
gynecological	surgery	and	best	practices;	Black	women	die	more	often	as	a	result	of	child	
birth	than	any	other	group	of	women	in	the	nation;	Black	babies	are	more	likely	to	die	
during	the	first	year	of	life	than	any	other	group	of	newborns	in	the	nation.	These	facts	are	
not	unlinked;	rather,	they	show	a	history	of	Black	women	being	marginalized	in	medical	
practice	and,	so	importantly,	in	education--	medical	education	and	every	stage	of	education	
that	preceds	it.	When	we	leave	information—historical,	medical—out	of	the	dominant	
shared	social	hermeneutical	resource,	health	practitioners,	public	health	experts	and	policy	
makers	cannot	make	connections	based	on	racialized	experiences.	Epistemic	injustice	is	
not	a	question	of	honesty;	it	is	a	question	of	whose	histories,	whose	knowledges,	whose	
experiences,	whose	perspectives,	are	intentionally	marginalized	or	totally	silenced	in	the	
dominant	interpretive	framework	in	order	to	support	the	established	normative	role	of	
whiteness	(Mills,	1997).		
	 	
	 	
197 
This	dissertation	contributes	to	the	conversation	about	epistemic	injustice	and	
education	by	providing	specific	examples	from	recent	education	research	on	the	ways	in	
which	students	experience	epistemic	injustice	in	education	settings.	Chapter	three	looks	at	
ways	schools	from	pre-kindergarten	through	university	do	not	successfully	educate	
students	of	color	and	low-income	students	as	well	as	they	do	white	students	and	upper-
income	students.	Chapter	three	then	offered	marginally	situated	students’	own	
interpretations,	descriptions	and	suggestions	describing	their	educational	and	hoped	for	
education	experiences.	Chapters	three	and	four	highlighted	the	contributions	of	YPAR	and	
IGD	for	mobilizing	students’	identities	in	the	classrooms	that	lead	to	demonstrated	student	
learning	about	race,	structural	inequality	and	action	towards	social	change;	these	praxes	
can	help	contribute	to	epistemic	justice	in	education	settings	by	affirming	marginally	
situated	students	as	knowers,	promoting	understanding	across	dominantly	and	
subordinately	situated	students,	helping	students	to	develop	an	understanding	of	
whiteness	and	structurally	inequality,	and	providing	students	with	examples	and	
experiences	of	working	across	difference	towards	social	change.		
Applications	
	
Over	the	last	quarter	century,	scholars	in	education	have	largely	described	pedagogical	
praxis	and	content	development	that	leads	to	epistemic	inclusion	by	developing	best	
practices	for	creating	and	putting	culturally	relevant	curriculum	and	pedagogy	into	
practice	(see	for	example	Ladson-Billings,	2006;	Noguera,	2009).	Philosophers	of	race	and	
of	epistemology	have	described	the	ways	in	which	identity	matters	in	knowledge	making	
and	the	ways	in	which	the	epistemic	is	indeed	ethical.	Social	scientists	have	described	how	
intergroup	dialogue	pedagogy	impacts	students’	learning	as	related	to	prejudice	and	bias	
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reduction,	the	practices	of	empathy	and	perspective	taking	and	increased	structural	
thinking.	This	dissertation	stands	on	their	shoulders	and	seeks	to	honor	their	work	by	
bringing	these	disciplines	together.	In	addition	to	arguing	there	is	an	ethical	responsibility	
for	educational	researchers	and	practitioners	to	work	towards	epistemic	justice	through	
practice,	policy	and	pedagogy,	this	dissertation	described	ways	that	two	specific	social	
justice	praxes,	intergroup	dialogue	and	youth	participatory	action	research,	lead	to	
epistemic	justice;	strategies	used	in	these	practices	should	be	incorporated	into	
teacher/professor	training	and	curriculum	development	(from	pre-K	through	university).	
Still,	much	more	can	and	must	be	done	requiring	institutional	and	individual	change	
including	interventions	to	increase	contact	(e.g.	the	hiring	of	faculty,	staff	and	
administrators	from	across	identities	and	the	inclusion	of	students	from	diverse	social	
identity	groups),	interventions	that	increase	critical	engagement	with	a	multiplicity	of	
perspectives	(e.g.	courses	related	to	subordinate	identity	groups	and	experiences	and	
intentional	inclusion	of	multiple	perspectives	and	interpretations	across	courses)	and	
affective	engagement	(e.g.	teaching	students	about	whiteness,	about	white	hermeneutical	
ignorance	and	avoidant	discursive	moves,	teaching	students	the	habits	of	perspective	
taking	and	critical	self-reflection)	that	would	hopefully	create	the	ethical,	intellectual,	and	
socio-political	transformation	called	for	by	Medina	(2013)	and,	as	he	suggested,	it	would	
take	generations.	Still,	it	is	not	optional.	As	Fricker	stated	in	her	introduction	to	epistemic	
injustice:	
There	is	a	limit,	of	course,	to	what	virtues	on	the	part	of	individuals	can	achieve	when	
the	root	cause	of	epistemic	injustice	is	structures	of	unequal	power	and	the	systemic	
prejudice	they	generate.	Eradicating	these	injustices	would	ultimately	take	not	just	
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more	virtuous	hearers,	but	collective	social	political	change—in	matters	of	epistemic	
injustice,	the	ethical	is	political	(Fricker,	2007,	p.	7).	
Education	systems	have	perpetuated	inequality	and	epistemic	injustice	since	the	founding	
of	the	United	States;	this	participation	in	the	establishment	and	maintenance	of	inequality	
comes	with	an	ethical	debt.		It	is	not	simply	a	good	idea	for	education	stakeholders	
(teachers,	researchers,	policy	makers,	administrators,	etc.)	to	consider	the	value	of	
“diversity”	epistemically	or	otherwise.	We	must	include	as	essential	in	our	work	the	goal	of	
developing	a	more	epistemically	just	system	of	schooling	and—as	it	is	so	integrated	into	
social	structures—society	at	large.		Working	towards	epistemic	justice	must	be	
fundamental	to	the	work	of	education	and	educators.	We	have	a	responsibility	to	work	to	
correct	the	harms	of	epistemic	injustice.	And,	if	we	take	up	this	work	to	ensure	that	no	
agent	loses	knowledge	as	a	result	of	epistemic	injustice,	then	we	will	also	be	working	to	
ensure	that	every	person	in	our	society	is	able	“to	exist,	humanely,	[to]	name	the	world,	to	
change	it”	(emphasis	original,	Freire,	2009,	p.	88).		
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FOOTNOTES	
	
1	In	this	dissertation,	White	will	only	be	capitalized,	as	in	this	case,	when	it	is	the	first	word	of	a	sentence.	
Black,	in	reference	to	the	social	group	that	includes	those	who	identify	as	racially,	culturally,	or	socially	Black.	
As	Tharps	(2014)	argues,	Black	refers	to	a	specific	social	group,	members	of	the	African	diaspora	(para.	3).	
White	does	not	refer	to	a	specific	racial,	culture	or	social	group	so	the	w	in	white	is	not	capitalized	in	
reference	to	those	with	dominant	social	identities.				
2	Intergroup	dialogue	is	explored	throughout	this	dissertation	and	is	described	in	greater	detail	in	chapters	
one,	three	and	four.	
3	Importantly,	this	pedagogical	exercise	asks	students	to	describe	an	incident	in	the	college	classroom	that	
they	feel	illustrates	a	racial	microaggression.	This	example	centers	the	student	experience.	While	there	can	be	
many	reasons	why	a	professor	would	assign	any	given	topic,	the	professor’s	perspective	or	intention	is	not	
the	focus	of	this	example.	Rather,	the	impact	of	the	professor’s	assignment	on	students,	particularly	students	
with	non-dominant	racial	identities,	is	the	central	case	explored	here.		
4	Student	names,	course	titles,	and	faculty	names	are	pseudonyms	here	and	throughout	this	dissertation	
document.	
6	Students	raised	the	example	of	this	particular	course	with	this	particular	professor	across	semesters.			
7	The	terms	“implicit”	and	“explicit”	as	used	here	draw	from	their	usage	in	the	field	of	social	psychology.	
Implicit	prejudice	refers	to	the	unconscious	positive	or	negative	mental	attitudes	one	holds	towards	a	person	
or	group	while	explicit	prejudice	contrastingly	refers	to	conscious	attitudes	one	is	aware	of	possessing	
(Aberson,	Shoemaker,	Tomolillo,	2004).		
7	While	one	can	argue	that	Fricker	explicitly	states	her	goal	is	to	speak	to	the	practices	of	dominant	groups,	
hence,	her	emphasis	on	a	hermeneutic	injustice	centered	around	changing	individual	perceptions	and	actions,	
this	goal	does	not	excuse	Fricker’s	lack	of	engagement	with	alternative	(e.g.	not	just	feminist	but	also	Black	
and	Black	feminist)	epistemologies	that	do	center	resistance	and	the	practices	of	marginalized	groups.	By	not	
engaging	these	as	a	mode	of	knowing	for	dominant	subjects,	Fricker	re-centers	dominance	in	a	way	that	does	
not	open	it	to	alternative	epistemologies.		
8	The	example	of	hermeneutical	justice	via	the	character	of	Tom	Robinson	in	To	Kill	a	Mockingbird	is	
described	in	greater	detail	in	Chapter	2.		
9	The	identifier	“Hispanic”	will	be	used	when	consistent	with	the	data	and	sources	being	cited.	Otherwise,	this	
paper	will	use	Latin@.	
10	Asian	American	students	are	included	throughout	the	demographics	section	but	not	Native	American,	
Hawaiian	or	Asian	Pacific	Islander	students	to	ensure	consistency	across	measure	as	not	all	studies	include	or	
break	down	statistics	to	include	Native	American,	Hawaiian	or	Asian	Pacific	Islanders;	this	is	not	done	to	
further	marginalize	marginalized	students.	
11	Parents	highest	level	of	education	is	defined	as,	“the	highest	level	of	education	attained	by	the	most	
educated	parent	in	the	child’s	household.”	(Kena	et	al.,	2015,	p.65).	
12	I	am	looking	at	public	schools	because	of	the	implications	for	democratic	participation	and	the	
historic/ethical	role	of	public	education	with	relation	to	participatory	democracy.		
13	Consistent	with	practice	in	university-community	intergroup	dialogue	partnerships	nationally	and	
specifically	the	reports	and	articles	associated	with	the	Metropolitan	Detroit	Youth	Dialogue	initiative,	run	in	
collaboration	with	the	University	of	Michigan	Intergroup	Relations	Program	(e.g.	Richards-Schuster	&	Aldana,	
2013),	the	location	of	this	work	is	identifiable.	Furthermore,	in	keeping	with	the	literature	on	publicly	
engaged	scholarship	(Glass,	Doberneck	&	Schweitzer,	2011),	at	times	we	have	named	our	school	partner	as	a	
close	collaborator	and	co-presenter/author.	This	also	follows	some	of	the	examples	of	YPAR	provided	in	this	
chapter/dissertation.	Finally,	this	practice	is	also	consistent	with	a	basis	in	program	evaluation	reporting.	
14	In	the	interest	of	transparency,	I	was	the	intergroup	dialogue	facilitator	during	the	2011-2012	school	year.	
As	cited,	the	content	here	is	not	from	my	reflection	or	personal	perspective,	it	is	from	the	Evaluation	Report	
(2012)	produced	by	the	collaborators	of	this	project.		
15	All	student	names	contained	in	this	paper	are	pseudonyms.		
16	Intra-group	dialogue	courses	are	similar	in	structure	and	content	to	corresponding	intergroup	dialogue	
courses,	and	they	allow	students	to	explore	a	single	subordinate	or	dominant	group	identity	(Ford	&	Malaney,	
2012).	
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17	Many	of	the	students	had	graduated	before	this	study	started,	and	I	did	not	have	up	to	date	email	contact	
for	them.	
18	Of	the	15	students	who	responded,	five	identified	as	women	of	color,	two	identified	as	men	of	color,	six	
identified	as	white	women	and	two	identified	as	white	men.	
19	Once	papers	were	stripped	of	author’s	name	and	identifying	information,	they	were	assigned	a	number	
instead	of	an	author.	By	race/ethnicity,	numbers	were	placed	in	a	hat	and	numbers	were	picked	at	random.	
20	For	more	detailed	information	on	caucus	groups	and	fish	bowls,	see	Zúñiga	et	al.,	2007.	
21	All	student	identities	described	in	this	paper	are	self-identified.		
22	Lee	speaks	English	as	a	second	language;	while	there	may	seem	to	be	errors	in	his	syntax,	I	believe	the	
intent	and	over-all	sense	of	his	writing	is	clear	and	made	the	intentional	choice	to	honor	his	voice	and	not	to	
insert	brackets	for	syntactical	correctness.		
23	During	the	web	of	oppression	activity,	all	students	in	the	class	collectively	hold	up	a	large	(takes	up	half	the	
room)	roped	spider	web;	all	over	the	spider	web	are	index	cards	covered	in	statistics	about	poverty,	health	
outcomes,	education	outcomes,	religious	bias,	racial	bias,	law	limiting	the	rights	of	those	who	identify	as	
LGBTQA,	to	both	visually	and	factual	represent	the	interlocking	ways	groups	of	people	experience	oppression	
based	on	their	social	identities.	The	web	is	physically	heavy	and	the	statistics	are	emotionally	exhausting;	
students	across	race	point	out	that	it	takes	a	lot	to	“hold	up”	the	web	while	participating	in	the	activity;	after	
the	activity,	they	connect	this	physical	holding	to	their	everyday	acts	participation	in	oppression	(or	
privilege)	as	members	of	our	shared	society.	
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University-Urban High School Collaborations. Paper presented at The 6th Annual Conference 
on Equity & Social Justice, Testing Our Limits: Teaching and Learning with Courage and 
Conviction, New Paltz, NY. 
 
Soto, J. & Nastasi, A.W.  (2012,  November). Intergroup Dialogue: Understanding Diverse 
Social Identities, Moving Towards Social Justice. Workshop presented at the annual National 
Association for Multicultural Educators, Philadelphia, PA. 
 
Nastasi, A. W. (Chair) (2012, May). Dialogic Practices for Social Change. Symposium at the 
Conference on Rhetoric, Activism & Research, Syracuse, New York.  
 
Nastasi, A.W., Terry, A., Brown, B., Stallings, H. & Fetner, S. (2012). Yes, you are “that kind of 
white person,” but we can still work together!: Building Coalitions for Shared Social Action in 
Race Dialogues. Paper presented at the Conference on Rhetoric, Activism & Research, Syracuse, 
New York.  
 
Nastasi, A.W. (March, 2012). Researching to Transgress: The Epistemic Virtue of Research 
With. Paper presented at the meeting of the Philosophy or Education Society, Pittsburg, 
Pennsylvania.  
 
Nastasi, A.W., & Lopez, G.E. (April, 2011).  Writing the divide: High school students crossing 
urban-suburban contexts.  Paper presented at the meeting of the America Educational Research 
Association, New Orleans, Louisiana.    
 
Nastasi, A.W., Nguyen, N., & Harmon, S. (April, 2011). Passionate Practice: Sustaining 
Engaged Graduate  
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Scholarship. Presented at Imagining America’s Publicly Active Graduate Education Conference, 
Syracuse, NY. 
 
Eatman, T.K., Weber, S.A., Nastasi, A.W., & Bush, A.S.  (April, 2011).  Profiles and pathways: 
A mixed methods study of the aspirations and career decisions of early career publicly engaged 
scholars.  Paper presented at the meeting of the America Educational Research Association, New 
Orleans, Louisiana.    
 
Nastasi, A.W. (October, 2010). Engaging the student: Implementing culturally relevant 
curriculum. 
Paper presented at the meeting of the American Education Studies Association, Denver, 
Colorado.   
 
INVITED PRESENTATIONS 
Landscape of Urban Education lecture series presents: ‘Hip Hop Genius: Remixing Pedagogy, 
School Design and Leadership’ with author Sam Seidel. Invited presentation—Syracuse 
University. (April 2012). 
 
White House Young America Series; Guest Speaker: Focus on the Arts & Humanities as 
Catalysts for Change—Syracuse University. (April 2012). 
 
HED 605: The American College and University; Guest presentation at the invitation of 
professor Timothy K. Eatman—Syracuse University. (March 2012). 
 
CFE/EDU 300: Dialogue in Action: Class Matters; Guest presentation at the invitation of 
instructor Meredith Madden—Syracuse University. (February 2012). 
 
EDU 781: Institutions & Processes in Education; Guest presentation at the invitation of professor 
Gretchen Lopez—Syracuse University. (October 2012). 
 
RESEARCH INITIATIVES AND FIELD EXPERIENCE 
Intergroup Dialogue Program, Research Assistant     August 2012-
present 
§ Assist in the preparation of grant proposals 
§ Develop and distribute surveys for multiple research initiatives; manage data using 
Qualtrics and XCEL software; code and analyze data qualitatively; document findings 
by preparing reports 
§ Recruit students and manage course placements for undergraduate intergroup 
dialogue courses 
§ Manage Program’s social media and publications 
 
Intergroup Dialogue Program, Cultural Voices Intergroup Dialogue on Race & Ethnicity High 
School Research Collaboration, Syracuse University.      August 
2012-June 2013 
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§ Collaborated with a Syracuse City School District high school English teacher to 
develop a curriculum for an intergoup dialogue on race and ethnicity with a particular 
focus on community action (Cultural Voices) 
§ Facilitated two sections of Cultural Voices (approximately 45 students) 
§ Acted as a liaison between Syracuse University Intergroup Dialogue Program and 
Nottingham High School, organizing the research team and curricular initiatives  
§ Prepared  and distributed Institutional Review Board materials, mixed methodology 
pre and post test surveys, evaluations and curricular assessments 
§ Inductively coded, analyzed and documented course outcomes  
§ Distributed evaluation report to Syracuse University and Syracuse City School 
District stake holders 
 
Intergroup Dialogue Program, Spotlighting Justice Youth Participatory Action Research 
Collective, Syracuse University.          
 August 2011-June 2013 
§ Collaborated with a Syracuse City School District high school English teacher to 
develop an after school club (Spotlighting Justice) to highlight social justice issues 
and to provide dialogic action in an urban high school. 
§ Facilitated and mentored Spotlighting Justice club (approximately 25 students) 
§ Prepared, distributed and analyzed evaluation surveys 
§ Inductively coded, analyzed and documented club outcomes  
§ Distributed evaluation report to Syracuse University and Syracuse City School 
District stake holders 
 
Imagining America: Artist and Scholars in Public Life Publicly Engaged Scholars (PES) 
Study, Graduate Research Assistant, Syracuse University (Dr. Timothy K. Eatman, PI).  
 Summer 2010-Spring 2011.   
§ Conducted 20 qualitative interviews with early career publicly engaged scholars  
§ Provided a grounded analysis of qualitative interviews and 200 open ended surveys  
§ Generated codes, themes, and memos that explicated the profiles and pathways of 
publicly engaged scholars.  
 
Enrollment Management Affirmative Action Policies Review, Graduate Researcher, 
Syracuse University (D. Saleh, PI).          
  May-August 2010.   
§ Conducted evaluative review of Syracuse University’s implementation of affirmative 
action policies  
§ Designed and conducted qualitative interviews with Student Affairs, Admissions and 
Enrollment Management staff  
§ Documented analysis of departments’ publications/websites within the Enrollment 
Management and Student Affairs divisions  
§ Submitted an evaluation report documenting Syracuse University’s Affirmative 
Action policies and practices 
 
COLLEGE TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
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Intergroup Dialogue: Race and Ethnicity (SOC/WGS 230 & CFE 200). Instructor.  Fall 
2011-Present 
Future Professoriate Program (FPP), Syracuse University     Fall 
2011-Present 
Philosophy of Education (CFE 601). Co-Instructor      Fall 
2012 
Dialogue In Action: Class Matters (CFE 600). Instructor.    
 Summer 2012 
College Learning Strategies (CLS 105), Syracuse University. Teaching Assistant. Fall & Spring 
2009-2012 
First Year Experience (HDEV 105), Binghamton University. Instructor.    Fall & Spring 
2005-2008 
 
 
 
K-12 TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Community School 6 (C.S. 6), New York City Department of Education:   June 
2003-June 2005     Grades 3, 5, & 6 Teacher.  Created and 
implemented a six subject 3rd grade       curriculum and a 5th/6th 
science curriculum. 
 
AWARDS 
Democratizing Knowledge Research Grant, $200 award      2011-
2012 
Future Professoriate Program, $450 award        2011-
2012 
 
SERVICE 
American Educational Research Association (AERA) Division G, Graduate Campus Liaison.  
Spring 2011-Present). 
§ Plan and facilitate meetings and workshops of Division G graduate students at 
Syracuse University.  
Imagining America: Central New York Publicly Active Graduate Education (PAGE), 
Director. August 2010-December 2012 
§ Planned and facilitated programs, speaker series, and networking opportunities to 
inform and develop publicly engaged graduate students in Central, NY.   
§ Planned and implement an annual regional conference.  
 
International Association for Research on Service-Learning and Community Engagement 
(IARSLCE) 12th Annual Research Conference; Invited conference proposal reviewer. May 2012 
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White House Young America Series on Civic Engagement, Steering committee member. 
Syracuse University, April 20, 2012 
Collective Impact Session on Inclusive Urban Education, Invited participant, collaborative 
research project on Scholarship in Action at Syracuse University and School of Education, 
led by Syracuse University Chancellor and Dean with Center for Institutional and Social 
Change at Columbia University Law School. March 2012. 
 
Cultural Foundations of Education Department, Student Representative. Selected to represent 
students at faculty meetings and to provide student leadership in departmental initiatives. Fall 
2011-May 2012 
 
New York College Access Challenge Grant, Fall 2009-Spring 2010   
§ Planned and facilitate workshops for first-generation rural and urban students in 
Onondaga and Jefferson-Lewis Counties, New York to increase college preparedness 
with an interdisciplinary team;  
§ Increased college applications among first-generation students through workshops, 
digital communications, and conferences;  
§ Provided financial aid counseling for 12 students attending Corcorane High School 
through the Say Yes to Education Financial Aid Counselor Network Initiative. 
 
Committees 
Committee on Degrees and Curriculum Member. School of Education, Syracuse University. Fall 
2012-Spring 2013 
Director Search Committee, Imagining America: Artist and Scholars in Public Life, Syracuse 
University. Spring 2012 
Intergroup Dialogue Program, High School Institute Planning Committee, Syracuse University. 
Spring 2011 
School of Education Tenure and Promotion Committee, Syracuse University. Fall 2009-Spring 
2010 
 
Affiliations 
Philosophy of Education Society  (PES) 
American Educational Research Association (AERA) 
American Education Studies Association (AESA) 
Imagining America: Artist and Scholars in Public LIfe (IA) 
 
 
HIGHER EDUCATION PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
January 2008-July 2010 Residential Life, Binghamton University, Community Director  
August 2005-January 2008 Residential Life, Binghamton University, Resident Director  
 
